The Apache Logging Services PMC has received the security report
summarized below. After analysis, we classified it as INVALID (works as
designed). In the interest of transparency, and so that the community
and other researchers can benefit from the analysis, we are disclosing a
summary of it.

  Report reference: GitHub private vulnerability report, received 31
October 2026 (not publicly accessible)
  Disposition: INVALID -- works as designed, duplicate; no CVE
  TLP:CLEAR (this message may be redistributed without restriction)

The reporter was informed of this classification and of our intent to
publish this summary.


== Summary of the report ==

`Rfc5424Layout` writes the name of a `StructuredDataId`, which is also
the SD-ID of a `StructuredDataMessage`, into the structured-data section
of an RFC 5424 record without validating it. The `StructuredDataId`
constructor checks only the length and splits the name at `@`. An SD-ID
containing `]`, `[`, `=`, `"` or a space can therefore close the current
SD-ELEMENT and open a forged one. An SD-ID containing a newline can
terminate the record and start a forged one. The reporter contrasted
this with parameter names, which are sanitized, and proposed applying
the RFC 5424 SD-NAME constraints to the SD-ID at emission time or in the
`StructuredDataId` constructor.


== PMC assessment ==

This is NOT a vulnerability, and it is a duplicate of a report class we
have already disclosed. The SD-ID is named explicitly in our threat
model as a structural identifier: a developer-controlled input, expected
to be a compile-time constant, that the framework trusts. Populating it
from untrusted data is application misuse and out of scope:

https://logging.apache.org/security.html#threat-common-sources-structural

Our analysis of the `MSGID` and `SD-ID` fields, including why parameter
names are treated differently and a list of the previous reports, was
published on this list on 25 September 2026:

https://lists.apache.org/thread/g66cto6nlwj9fd5jj1ldhdc07nrjlr3f

This is the seventh report on these two fields since December 2025. The
report states that the library "neither prevents nor warns against" this
usage. The threat model above, which predates the report, says otherwise.

As noted in the earlier summary, the threat model allows the framework
to reject a malformed structural identifier. Fail-fast validation in the
constructors of `StructuredDataId` and `StructuredDataMessage`, together
with documentation of the expected syntax, is tracked in:

https://github.com/apache/logging-log4j2/issues/4051

We also remind researchers that GitHub Private Vulnerability Reporting
is not a supported channel for security reports. Please follow the
instructions at https://logging.apache.org/security.html#reporting and
e-mail [email protected].


== References ==

  Threat model:
    https://logging.apache.org/security.html
  Previous summary (MSGID and SD-ID):
    https://lists.apache.org/thread/g66cto6nlwj9fd5jj1ldhdc07nrjlr3f
  Security FAQ, syslog and RFC 5424 layouts:

https://logging.apache.org/security/faq.html#crlf-injection-rfc5424-layout

Questions and follow-up are welcome on this list or GitHub Discussions.

On behalf of the Apache Logging Services PMC,
Piotr P. Karwasz

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