O Departamento de Filosofia da UFRN, através da Base de Pesquisa "Lógica,
Conhecimento e Ética", dá continuidade a sua programação anual dos
Seminários de Lógica e Filosofia Formal, juntamente com o  Grupo de
Lógica, Linguagem, Informação, Teoria e Aplicações – LoLITA, com a
palestra:

 “Genetic Proofs, Reductions and Rational Reconstruction Proofs”.
Profa.  Dra.  Michelle Friend
Department of Philosophy/Columbian College of Arts & Sciences
Washington University

Data:22 /06 / 2012,  às 16h.
Local: UFRN, Setor II, sala I5

Abstract:
Some theorems in mathematics have several proofs. Why? It is clear that
proofs are not meant to only convince us of the truth of the theorem being
proved. Rather, they give us explanations. I explore the philosophical
implications of three conceptions of proof: the genetic conception,
reductions and the rational reconstruction conception.  The genetic
conception traces a theorem back to the setting in which the mathematician
thought of the proof and the theorem. We learn the historical origin of
the theorem. The reduction traces the theorem back to some more primitive
conceptions. The primitive conceptions are associated with a foundational
project, such as constructivism, realism or logicism. With such a proof,
we learn the conceptual justification for the theorem. The ‘rational
reconstruction’ conception of proof is one where we demonstrate that it is
possible to understand a theorem in a novel setting, for example, we might
give a proof in Topos theory of a theorem in geometry. We learn the spread
of the theorem: in what other theories it is provable. The lessons become
more interesting when the novel setting is inconsistent with the original
setting.  As an example, I shall focus on Lobachevsky’s solution to the
problem of indefinite integrals. I shall compare Lobachevsky, Beltrami and
Rodin’s constructions and re-constructions, and offer one of my own,
pointing out the lessons in each case. Lobachevsky give the genetic proof,
Beltrami reduces the proof to Euclidean geometry, which was thought to be
more obvious, or primitive. Rodin reconstructs the proof in topos theory
to give a neutral proof, which is closer to Lobachevsky’s purpose. I give
a reconstruction using techniques developed in the paraconsistency
literature, in order to justify using what might look like contradictory
methods. Each type of proof teaches us different lessons.






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