Non-Classical Solutions to Classical Problems
Workshop on Paraconsistency and Paraconsistent Logics
http://www.philosophie.uni-bonn.de/aktuelles/paraconsistency

According to classical logic a sentence can either be true or false,
but not both at the same time. However classical paradoxes, e.g. the
liar-paradox, which are known since ancient Greek times, suggest that
there actually are sentences who do not seem to fit in the classical
scheme.

Take for example “This sentence is false”. That sentence is true if
and only if it is false. Using the laws of classical logic this
entails that the sentence is both true and false, but then the
explosion-rule of classical logic can be used to deduce the triviality
of the whole system. (The explosion-rule states that a contradiction
entails every sentence.)

Yet paraconsistent theories do not rule out true contradictions, i.e.
true sentences, whose negation is true as well. Hence a non-classical
logic is needed in order to avoid trivialism.

To provide the logical framework for such theories paraconsistent
logic modifies classical reasoning. Classical rules, such as the
explosion-rule, have to be modified in order to maintain a
truth-preserving notion of validity.



The workshop is open to everybody interested in an introduction to
paraconsistent reasoning, as well as an outlook in the fascinating
problems of this area of research.



The workshop takes place on July 24th 2013 in the “großer Übungsraum”
(room number 1.070) of the Institute of Philosophy, located in the
main building of the Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn
(Am Hof 1).

The talks of the workshop will be held in English.

There is no participation fee, but we would like you to register for
the workshop.



Organized by: Chair for Logic and fundamental research
Prof. Dr. Elke Brendel and Jan Goerke M.A.

In order to register contact: [email protected]



Schedule:

11:00 – 12:30    Introduction

12:30 – 14:00    Lunch break

14:00 – 15:30    Graham Priest: Paraconsistent Set Theory

15:30 – 17:00    Heinrich Wansing: Intuitionistic negation as a
paraconsistent negation

17:00 – 17:30    Coffee break

17:30 – 19:00    Ole Hjortland: Paraconsistent Logics and Their Rivals
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