Eduardo, eu me preocupo sim. Pode acreditar nisso, e não vou querer 
simplesmente "passar" pelo CA de filosofia. 
D



------------------------------------------------------
Décio Krause
Departamento de Filosofia
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina
88040-900 Florianópolis - SC - Brasil
http://www.cfh.ufsc.br/~dkrause
------------------------------------------------------

> Em 31/01/2014, às 03:50, Eduardo Ochs <[email protected]> escreveu:
> 
> Pra mim uma questão subjacente à de "mérito = produtividade" e à das
> cotas é a seguinte: o quanto nós devemos deixar os losers se ferrarem
> só por eles serem losers?
> 
> Vou me dar a liberdade de fazer uma citação grande, abaixo, de um
> livro absolutamente genial - "The Lives of Animals", do J.M. Coetzee;
> não tenho a tradução dele para Português ("A vida dos animais" -
> Companhia das Letras) online, mas tem um PDF do original aqui:
> 
>  http://tannerlectures.utah.edu/_documents/a-to-z/c/Coetzee99.pdf
> 
> Deixa eu dar uma explicação. Toda vez que a gente discute
> meritocracia, critérios de mérito acadêmico, cotas, etc, a gente
> indiretamente está discutindo também "esquerda", "direita", "política"
> (tanto micro quanto macro), etc - que são coisas com uma carga
> emocional fortíssima... espero que a gente desta vez tenha a
> maturidade de usar a discussão mais pra cada um explicitar a sua
> posição e entender a dos outros do que pra cair na histeria e nos
> ataques ad-hominem...
> 
> Por outro lado, eu SEI que nós - membros da lista, como um todo - não
> temos maturidade pra isto; eu sei que apesar das minhas boas intenções
> daqui a pouco este thread vai ter 200 mensagens, muitas super
> agressivas, como o thread sobre homeopatia, várias pessoas vão estar
> espumando de ódio de outras, vamos ter mais algumas mensagens pedindo
> que o moderador da lista (!!!) tome providências, e meia dúzia de
> pessoas vão se desinscrever da lista... mas uma coisa que eu aprendi
> este ano é que isto é inevitável, e não é problema meu.
> 
> Mas voltando à citação que eu vou pôr abaixo. Um dos grandes temas do
> "A vida dos animais" é que não dá mais pra gente fingir que fechar os
> olhos pro sofrimento dos losers é algo que só os monstros fazem - todo
> mundo faz isto, em maior ou menor grau - e tá na hora da gente fazer
> algo melhor com relação a genocídios do que ficar histéricos num
> momento, e depois esquecer deles.
> 
> (Lembrem que a minha motivação original pra postar isto era: o quanto
> a gente deve pleitear para coleguinhas losers? E: se a gente estivesse
> na posição do Décio, será que a gente conseguiria ter alguma empatia
> pelos coleguinhas losers? Bom, lá vai...)
> 
> 
> 
>       "Between 1942 and 1945 several million people were put to death
>  in the concentration camps of the Third Reich: at Treblinka alone
>  more than a million and a half, perhaps as many as three million.
>  These are numbers that numb the mind. We have only one death of our
>  own: we can comprehend the deaths of others only one at a time: in
>  the abstract we may be able to count to a million, but we cannot
>  count to a million deaths.
> 
>       "The people who lived in the countryside around Treblinka --
>  Poles, for the most part -- said that they did not know what was
>  going on in the camp; said that, while in a general way they might
>  have guessed what was going on, they did not know for sure; said
>  that, while in a sense they might have known, in another sense they
>  did not know, could not afford to know, for their own sake.
> 
>       "The people around Treblinka were not exceptional. There were
>  camps all over the Reich, nearly six thousand in Poland alone,
>  untold thousands in Germany proper. Few Germans lived more than a
>  few kilometres from a camp of some kind. Not every camp was a death
>  camp, a camp dedicated to the production of death, but horrors went
>  on in all of them, more horrors by far than one could afford to
>  know, for one's own sake.
> 
>       "It is not because they waged an expansionist war, and lost it,
>  that Germans of a particular generation are still regarded as
>  standing a little outside humanity, as having to do or be something
>  special before they can be readmitted to the human fold. They lost
>  their humanity, in our eyes, because of a certain willed ignorance
>  on their part. Under the circumstances of Hitler's kind of war,
>  ignorance may have been a useful survival mechanism, but that is an
>  excuse which, with admirable moral rigor, we refuse to accept. In
>  Germany, we say, a certain line was crossed which took people beyond
>  the ordinary murderousness and cruelty of warfare into a state that
>  we can only call sin. The signing of the articles of capitulation
>  and the payment of reparations did not put an end to that state of
>  sin. On the contrary, we said, a sickness of the soul continued to
>  mark that generation. It marked those citizens of the Reich who had
>  committed evil actions, but also those who, for whatever reason,
>  were in ignorance of those actions. It thus marked, for practical
>  purposes, every citizen of the Reich. Only those in the camps were
>  innocent.
> 
>       "`They went like sheep to the slaughter.' `They died like
>  animals.' `The Nazi butchers killed them.' Denunciation of the camps
>  reverberates so fully with the language of the stockyard and
>  slaughterhouse that it is barely necessary for me to prepare the
>  ground for the comparison I am about to make. The crime of the Third
>  Reich, says the voice of accusation, was to treat people like
>  animals.
> 
>  (...)
> 
>       "The question to ask should not be: Do we have something in
>  common -- reason, self-consciousness, a soul -- with other animals?
>  (With the corollary that, if we do not, then we are entitled to
>  treat them as we like, imprisoning them, killing them, dishonoring
>  their corpses.) I return to the death camps. The particular horror
>  of the camps, the horror that convinces us that what went on there
>  was a crime against humanity, is not that despite a humanity shared
>  with their victims, the killers treated them like lice. That is too
>  abstract. The horror is that the killers refused to think themselves
>  into the place of their victims, as did everyone else. They said,
>  `It is they in those cattle-cars rattling past.' They did not say,
>  `How would it be if it were I in that cattle-car?' They did not say,
>  `It is I who am in that cattle car.' They said, `It must be the dead
>  who are being burnt today, making the air stink and falling in ash
>  on my cabbages.' They did not say, `How would it be if I were
>  burning?' They did not say, `I am burning, I am falling in ash.'
> 
>       "In other words, they closed their hearts. The heart is the
>  seat of a faculty, sympathy. that allows us to share at times the
>  being of another. Sympathy has everything to do with the subject and
>  little to do with the object, the `another,' as we see at once when
>  we think of the object not as a bat (`Can I share the being of a
>  bat?') but as another human being. There are people who have the
>  capacity to imagine themselves as someone else, there are people who
>  have no such capacity (when the lack is extreme, we call them
>  psychopaths), and there are people who have the capacity but choose
>  not to exercise it.
> 
>       "Despite Thomas Nagel, who is probably a good man, despite
>  Thomas Aquinas and René Descartes, with whom I have more
>  difficulty in sympathizing, there is no limit to the extent to which
>  we can think ourselves into the being of another. There are no
>  bounds to the sympathetic imagination. If you want proof, consider
>  the following. Some years ago I wrote a book called The House on
>  Eccles Street. To write that book I had to think my way into the
>  existence of Marion Bloom. Either I succeeded or I did not. If I did
>  not, I cannot imagine why you invited me here today. In any event,
>  the point is, Marion Bloom never existed. Marion Bloom was a figment
>  of James Joyce's imagination. If I can think my way into the
>  existence of a being who has never existed, then I can think my way
>  into the existence of a bat or a chimpanzee or an oyster, any being
>  with whom I share the substrate of life.
> 
>       "I return one last time to the places of death all around us,
>  the places of slaughter to which, in a huge communal effort, we
>  close our hearts. Each day a fresh holocaust, yet as far as I can
>  see our moral being is untouched. We do not feel tainted. We can
>  do anything, it seems, and come away clean.
> 
>       "We point to the Germans and Poles and Ukrainians who did and
>  did not know of the atrocities around them. We like to think they
>  were inwardly marked by the aftereffects of that special form of
>  ignorance. We like to think that in their nightmares the ones whose
>  suffering they had refused to enter came back to haunt them. We like
>  to think they woke up haggard in the mornings, and died of gnawing
>  cancers. But probably it was not so. The evidence points in the
>  opposite direction: that we can do anything and get away with it;
>  that there is no punishment."
> 
> [[]],
>  Eduardo Ochs
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