Bom dia, Talvez seja de interesse da lista, achei curioso o tema da palestra.
Atenciosamente, Marco > *July 1st*, 4:30 pm - 6 pm > Speaker: *Alexandre Billon* (IJN & Lille) > Commentator: Ekaterina Kubyshkina (Université Paris 1, IHPST) > Title: Schematizing the paradoxes---and showing that hypodoxes are > paradoxical > Abstract: > There is a long tradition, going back at least to Richard (1905), Poincaré > (1906) and Russell (1906), of blaming circular definitions for the > so-called ‘paradoxes of self- reference’. In this paper, I draw on this old > idea to put forward a paradox schema that fits many of these paradoxes, > including Russell’s paradox, the Liar, Berry’s paradox and Curry’s paradox. > According to this schema, which I call the Elusiveness Schema, all these > paradoxes hinge on the definition of an object which is at least implicitly > circular. In each case, we have good reason to believe both that this > definition succeeds in picking its definiendum, and that it fails because > of vicious circularity. Hence the paradox. > This paradox schema has a few interesting features which make it fruitful. > It applies, in particular, similarly to the classical paradoxes and to what > is often called ‘the duals’ of these paradoxes (the set whose members are a > member of themselves, the Truth- Teller sentence Tt =‘Tt is true’, etc.). > While these duals are not usually considered paradoxical—it is sometimes > said that they are merely ‘pathological’ or that they are `hypodoxes'—the > Elusiveness Schema shows that they are in fact genuinely paradoxical. This > has consequences both for the classification of the paradoxes and for the > way we should solve them. http://www.institutnicod.org/seminaires-colloques/seminaires/doc-in-nicod-844/article/presentation-1400?lang=fr <http://www.institutnicod.org/seminaires-colloques/seminaires/doc-in-nicod-844/article/presentation-1400?lang=fr> -- Você está recebendo esta mensagem porque se inscreveu no grupo "LOGICA-L" dos Grupos do Google. Para cancelar inscrição nesse grupo e parar de receber e-mails dele, envie um e-mail para [email protected]. Para postar neste grupo, envie um e-mail para [email protected]. Visite este grupo em https://groups.google.com/a/dimap.ufrn.br/group/logica-l/. Para ver esta discussão na web, acesse https://groups.google.com/a/dimap.ufrn.br/d/msgid/logica-l/e5eb3703-2cae-4972-a76a-366394eac4f4%40dimap.ufrn.br.
