*Synthese Topical Collection: Against the Grain: Developing the Prospects of Non-Naturalistic Metaphysics of Science*
Guest Editors: Raoni Arroyo (Federal University of Santa Catarina / CNPq, Brazil) Bruno Borge (University of Buenos Aires / CONICET, Argentina), Cristián Soto (University of Chile, Chile). Topical Collection website: https://link.springer.com/collections/dgjhfehdbd A key feature of recent developments in the metaphysics of science is that it has mostly, if not exclusively, been developed within a naturalistic framework. For our purposes, naturalism can broadly be conceived in any of the following ways: it can be understood as continuous with, constrained by, derived from, or useful to science. What all these have in common is a deferential attitude towards science, which may roughly be spelled out as follows: when it comes to ontology, methodology, or epistemology, metaphysicians of science should best defer such issues to science (particularly physics). Most, if not all, more or less recent developments that “take science seriously” fall under the naturalistic umbrella. One possible consequence of this default naturalistic orientation is that it may unduly restrict the scope of legitimate metaphysical inquiry. We understand non-naturalistic metaphysics of science as a style of metaphysical practice whose problems need not exclusively arise within or emanate from the sciences. More specifically, it is a kind of metaphysics that remains oriented toward science without treating science as the sole source of its problems, methods, or epistemic credentials. In this context, by “non-naturalistic” we do not mean metaphysics that ignores, or floats free from, science, but rather metaphysical inquiry that engages with science without being fully grounded in, derived from, or subordinated to it. The aim of the Topical Collection is not merely to criticize naturalism, but to articulate positive alternatives: ways of doing metaphysics of science that engage with scientific practices, examine the metaphysical assumptions and frontiers of science, and remain epistemically relevant to our overall scientific outlook without adopting a deferential stance toward science. By contrast, naturalistic metaphysics of science has science as the proper ontological, epistemic, and methodological ground of metaphysical inquiry. Non-naturalistic metaphysics of science asks and addresses metaphysical issues properly, which can rightfully be considered as yielding genuine epistemic contributions to our knowledge or understanding of how the world is or could be. Appropriate Topics for Submission include, among others: 1. Critiques of naturalism in metaphysics of science 2. Scientific antirealism and its bearing on metaphysics 3. Non-realist approaches to metaphysics 4. Pragmatist approaches 5. Perspectival approaches 6. Pluralism in scientific ontology 7. Meinongian and non-standard ontologies 8. Fictionalism 9. Empiricism and its relation to the metaphysics of science 10. Descriptive (Strawsonian) metaphysics 11. Mutualist or co-constitutive accounts of the science–metaphysics relation 12. The role of a priori reasoning in the metaphysics of science 13. Framework-oriented approaches to the metaphysics of science 14. Feminist, social, or situated approaches to scientific knowledge and metaphysics This list is not meant to be exhaustive. For further information, please contact the guest editors: Raoni Arroyo: [email protected] Bruno Borge: [email protected] Cristián Soto: [email protected] The deadline for submissions is *January 15, 2027*. Submissions via: https://www.editorialmanager.com/synt/default.aspx Please select “Submit New Manuscript” and choose the Topical Collection “Against the Grain: Developing the Prospects of Non-Naturalistic Metaphysics of Science” from the drop-down menu. Raoni Arroyo Federal University of Santa Catarina / CNPq Email: [email protected] Bruno Borge University of Buenos Aires / CONICET Email: [email protected] Cristián Soto University of Chile Email: [email protected] -- LOGICA-L Lista acadêmica brasileira dos profissionais e estudantes da área de Lógica <[email protected]> --- Você está recebendo esta mensagem porque se inscreveu no grupo "LOGICA-L" dos Grupos do Google. Para cancelar inscrição nesse grupo e parar de receber e-mails dele, envie um e-mail para [email protected]. Para ver esta conversa, acesse https://groups.google.com/a/dimap.ufrn.br/d/msgid/logica-l/CADbtFBackAGdqcCLUzXZOLBDej_SwhFt-%2BpjEx7ZeHsD15p6-w%40mail.gmail.com.
