Hi Yaron,

thanks for your comments, please see inline:


On 04/11/18 16:38 , Yaron Sheffer wrote:
Reviewer: Yaron Sheffer
Review result: Has Nits

Summary: document has non-security related nits.

Details

* The definition of "segment" is different here from the one used in the
architecture RFC. The RFC is more abstract, quoting: A node steers a packet
through an ordered list of instructions, called "segments". Whereas here a
segment is simply a sub-path. This is confusing to a non-expert, and perhaps
indicates a change in the group's thinking.

the definition in this draft relates to segment as used by IGPs, in which case a segment represents the sub-path. There are other segments outside of IGPs which can represent other things, but they are not covered by this draft.



* SID/Label Sub-TLV: is it Mandatory? If so, please point it out.

SID/Label Sub-TLV is not advertised on its own. It is advertised as a sub-TLV of the:

3.2.  SID/Label Range TLV
3.3.  SR Local Block TLV

Both of these section specify that SID/Label Sub-TLV MUST be included.


* "The SR-Algorithm TLV is optional" - I find this sentence confusing. Maybe
replace by "The SR-Algorithm TLV is mandatory for routers that implement
segment routing"?


the text says:

   "If the SR-Algorithm TLV
   is not advertised by the node, such node is considered as not being
   segment routing capable."

Isn't that sufficient?



* The reference under "IGP Algorithm Type" registry should be to the IANA
registry itself, not to the I-D that defines it. (In particular since the IANA
registry has already been established,
https://www.iana.org/assignments/igp-parameters/igp-parameters.xhtml#igp-algorithm-types).

I got another comment from Opsdir last call review to include the I-D that defined it. I Added them both, hopefully that satisfy everybody.


* OSPFv3 Extended Prefix Range TLV Flags octet: add the usual incantation about
reserved bits.

Done.




* In general I agree with the reasoning in the Security Considerations. I would
like to raise the question if, in addition to mis-routing, this adds a threat
of massive denial-of-service on MPLS endpoints, e.g. by allowing an attacker
who has OSPF access to introduce routing loops. (This may be completely bogus,
I am far from expert with either of these protocols).

above is addressed by usage of the usage of the OSPF authentication as described in the security section.

thanks,
Peter


.


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