Hi Ketan,

On 03/05/2023 06:09, Ketan Talaulikar wrote:
Hello Authors/All,

I think there are a couple of issues with this document related to OSPFv2 aspects. My apologies for this last minute notice and not catching them earlier during the WGLC. > 1) The OSPFv2 IP Algorithm Prefix Reachability Sub-TLV is not carrying the indication of Type1/Type2 for External and NSSA-External route advertisements. A way to fix/address this would be to introduce a 1 byte flags in the Reserved space and then introduce the "E -bit" similar to how it is there in the base OSPFv2 External LSAs - https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2328#appendix-A.4.5 <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2328#appendix-A.4.5>

can't we live without the Ext. Type-2 metric for the IP algo prefixes and treat then as Type 1 ext metric always?
The real advantage of the Type-2 metric is not really significant.


2) Also for OSPFv2, since we don't have the base OSPFv2 LSA for Algo reachability, we are missing some key sub-TLVs in the OSPFv2 Extended Prefix Sub-TLVs that would be required for IP FlexAlgo reachability - mainly Forwarding Address and Route Tag.

Similarly using the forwarding address is something which has limited benefits and we do not need it for the IP Algo prefixes.

The only problem is during the NSSA translation, where the spec mandates the non-zero forwarding address. Is that something that we really need?


3) Along with the above changes, perhaps some text is required to indicate the use of these new sub-TLVs and how OSPFv2 base route calculations apply for various route types (specifically external and NSSA)?

how is that different to regular prefix (RFC2328)?

thanks,
Peter


4) A nit: in a few places in sec 6.3, the OSPFv2 IP Algorithm Prefix Reachability is being referred to as TLV instead of sub-TLV. Similar issue in sec 6.4 for OSPFv3.

Thanks,
Ketan


On Wed, May 3, 2023 at 12:01 AM John Scudder <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:

    Hi Peter,

    All good, I figured it was something like that. Two residual nits —

    1. One “datapalne” got left in. I guess you need something to seed
    version 11 after all…

    2. It looks like this one got omitted:

    @@ -579,8 +592,18 @@
         receiver.

         The metric value in the parent TLV is RECOMMENDED to be set to
    -   LSInfinity [RFC2328].  This recommendation only servers for
    debugging
    +   LSInfinity [RFC2328].  This recommendation only serves for debugging
         purposes and does not impact the functionality.
    +---
    +jgs: Thanks for adding the additional explanation. I made a minor
    editing
    +correction in-line, but I also have a slightly more extensive
    revision to
    +suggest:
    +
    +NEW:
    +     This recommendation is provided as a network troubleshooting
    +     convenience; if it is not followed the protocol will still
    +     function correctly.
    +—

    Obviously, I don’t insist on the proposed rewrite. But even if you
    don’t use it you presumably should take the s/servers/serves/
    proofreading correction.

    I’m going to go ahead and request IETF Last Call, but feel free to
    push a revision with corrections if you want.

    —John

     > On May 2, 2023, at 6:06 AM, Peter Psenak
    <[email protected]
    <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
     >
     >
     > Hi John,
     >
     > I apologize for the misses, likely the result of multiple editors
     > updating the draft in parallel.
     >
     > I also fixed the nits and updated the security sections as you
    proposed.
     >
     > Version 10 has been published.
     >
     > thanks,
     > Peter
     >
     >
     >
     >
     >
     > On 01/05/2023 20:54, John Scudder wrote:
     >> Hi Peter (and Shraddha),
     >>
     >>> On Apr 28, 2023, at 9:13 AM, Peter Psenak
    <[email protected]
    <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
     >>>
     >>> Shradha and I have worked to address your comments.
     >>> The new version of the draft has been published.
     >>
     >> Thanks for that. I’ve reviewed the diffs in 09. I’ve attached a
    short review of it; there are some minor proofreading changes, but
    also one place a substantive edit was overlooked that I’ve flagged
    in Section 6.2. I also made a further suggestion on your Security
    Considerations.
     >>
     >> I think one more revision and we will be ready for IETF Last Call.
     >>
     >> Thanks,
     >>
     >> —John
     >>
     >> --- draft-ietf-lsr-ip-flexalgo-09.txt 2023-05-01
    13:21:34.000000000 -0400
     >> +++ draft-ietf-lsr-ip-flexalgo-09-jgs-comments.txt    2023-05-01
    14:47:16.000000000 -0400
     >> @@ -138,9 +138,9 @@
     >>     result, traffic for different sessions is destined to a
    different
     >>     destination IP address.
     >>
     >> -   IP address allocated to the UPF can be associated with an
    algoritm.
     >> +   The IP address allocated to the UPF can be associated with
    an algorithm.
     >>     The mobile user traffic is then forwarded along the path
    based on the
     >> -   algorithm specific metric and constraints.  As a result,
    traffic can
     >> +   algorithm-specific metric and constraints.  As a result,
    traffic can
     >>     be sent over a path that is optimized for minimal latency or
    highest
     >>     bandwidth.  This mechanism is used to achieve SLA (Service Level
     >>     Agreement) appropriate for a user session.
     >> @@ -186,9 +186,9 @@
     >>
     >>     Advertisement of participation in IP Flex-Algorithm does not
    impact
     >>     the router participation signaled for other data-planes.  For
     >> -   Example, it is possible that a router participates in a
    particular
     >> -   flex-algo for IP datapalne but does not participate in the
    same flex-
     >> -   algo for SR dataplane.
     >> +   example, it is possible that a router participates in a
    particular
     >> +   flex-algo for the IP dataplane but does not participate in
    the same flex-
     >> +   algo for the SR dataplane.
     >>
     >>     The following sections describe how the IP Flex-Algorithm
     >>     participation is advertised in IGP protocols.
     >> @@ -196,6 +196,11 @@
     >>  5.1.  The IS-IS IP Algorithm Sub-TLV
     >>
     >>     The ISIS [ISO10589] IP Algorithm Sub-TLV is a sub-TLV of the
    IS-IS
     >> +---
     >> +jgs: Was it deliberate that you didn't accept the suggestion to
     >> +hyphenate "ISIS" above, or an oversight? If deliberate, how come?
     >> +If accidental, please change in next rev.
     >> +---
     >>     Router Capability TLV [RFC7981] and has the following format:
     >>
>>          0                   1                   2      3
     >> @@ -302,9 +307,9 @@
     >>  6.  Advertising IP Flex-Algorithm Reachability
     >>
     >>     To be able to associate the prefix with the Flex-Algorithm, the
     >> -   existing prefix reachability advertisements can not be used,
    because
     >> +   existing prefix reachability advertisements cannot be used,
    because
     >>     they advertise the prefix reachability in default algorithm 0.
     >> -   Instead, a new IP Flex-Algorithm reachability advertisements are
     >> +   Instead, new IP Flex-Algorithm reachability advertisements are
     >>     defined in IS-IS and OSPF.
     >>
     >>     The M-flag in the FAD is not applicable to IP Algorithm
    Prefixes.
     >> @@ -410,6 +415,11 @@
     >>     all of them do not advertise the same algorithm, it MUST
    ignore all
     >>     of them and MUST NOT install any forwarding entries based on
    these
     >>     advertisements.  This situation SHOULD be logged as an error.
     >> +---
     >> +jgs: Thanks for these rewrites. Unfortunately there is a
    similar case
     >> +later (Section 6.2) which was missed. It needs a similar rewrite,
     >> +I will flag it below, please refer back to this section.
     >> +---
     >>
     >>     In cases where a prefix advertisement is received in both a IPv4
     >>     Prefix Reachability TLV and an IPv4 Algorithm Prefix
    Reachability
     >> @@ -434,6 +444,9 @@
     >>     with a different Algorithm, MUST ignore all of them and MUST NOT
     >>     install any forwarding entries based on these
    advertisements.  This
     >>     situation SHOULD be logged as an error.
     >> +---
     >> +jgs: These two paragraphs need a rewrite similar to Section 6.1.
     >> +---
     >>
     >>     In cases where a prefix advertisement is received in both an
    IPv6
     >>     Prefix Reachability TLV and an IPv6 Algorithm Prefix
    Reachability
     >> @@ -579,8 +592,18 @@
     >>     receiver.
     >>
     >>     The metric value in the parent TLV is RECOMMENDED to be set to
     >> -   LSInfinity [RFC2328].  This recommendation only servers for
    debugging
     >> +   LSInfinity [RFC2328].  This recommendation only serves for
    debugging
     >>     purposes and does not impact the functionality.
     >> +---
     >> +jgs: Thanks for adding the additional explanation. I made a
    minor editing
     >> +correction in-line, but I also have a slightly more extensive
    revision to
     >> +suggest:
     >> +
     >> +NEW:
     >> +     This recommendation is provided as a network troubleshooting
     >> +     convenience; if it is not followed the protocol will still
     >> +     function correctly.
     >> +---
     >>
     >>     An OSPFv3 router receiving multiple OSPFv3 IP Algorithm Prefix
     >>     Reachability Sub-TLVs in the same parent TLV, MUST select
    the first
     >> @@ -932,13 +955,47 @@
     >>     This document inherits security considerations from [RFC9350].
     >>
     >>     This document introduces one additional way to disrupt Flexible
     >> -   algorithm based networks.  If the node that is authenticated
    is taken
     >> -   over by an attacker, such rogue node can advertise a prefix
     >> +   Algorithm based networks.  If a node that is authenticated
    is taken
     >> +   over by an attacker, such a rogue node can advertise a prefix
     >>     reachability for a particular IP Flexible-algorithm X while that
     >>     prefix has been advertised in algorithm Y.  This kind of
    attack makes
     >> -   the prefix unreachable.  Such attack is not preventable through
     >> +   the prefix unreachable.  Such an attack is not preventable
    through
     >>     authentication, and it is not different from advertising any
    other
     >>     incorrect information through IS-IS or OSPF.
     >> +---
     >> +jgs: Thanks for this. I think you should provide a reference to
     >> +illustrate what you're talking about, e.g. "This kind of attack
    makes
     >> +the prefix unreachable (to see why this is, consider, for
    example, the
     >> +rule given in the second-last paragraph of Section 6.1)".
     >> +
     >> +I see you cribbed the text from RFC 9350, which is not a bad idea
     >> +considering that was recently approved by the IESG so
    presumably they
     >> +like the look of it. But in that case, I think it would be a
    good idea
     >> +to copy the 9350 section more comprehensively. Something like this:
     >> +
     >> +   This document adds one new way to disrupt IGP networks that
    are using
     >> +   Flex-Algorithm: an attacker can suppress reachability for a
    given
     >> +   prefix whose reachability is advertised by a legitimate node
    for a
     >> +   particular IP Flex-Algorithm X, by advertising the same
    prefix in
     >> +   Flex-Algorithm Y from another, malicious node. (To see why
    this is,
     >> +   consider, for example, the rule given in the second-last
    paragraph of
     >> +   Section 6.1.)
     >> +
     >> +   This attack can be addressed by the existing security
    extensions, as
     >> +   described in [RFC5304] and [RFC5310] for IS-IS, in [RFC2328] and
     >> +   [RFC7474] for OSPFv2, and in [RFC4552] and [RFC5340] for OSPFv3.
     >> +
     >> +   If a node that is authenticated is taken over by an
    attacker, such a
     >> +   rogue node can perform the attack described above.  Such an
    attack is
     >> +   not preventable through authentication, and it is not
    different from
     >> +   advertising any other incorrect information through IS-IS or
    OSPF.
     >> +
     >> +I was tempted to rewrite further (I was bugged that "node that is
     >> +authenticated" isn't a well-defined term) but I think the
    argument that
     >> +this text already passed IESG review recently, is pretty
    compelling, so
     >> +the above is just a minimal substitution into the RFC 9350 security
     >> +considerations.
     >> +---
     >>
     >>  13.  Acknowledgements
     >>
     >>
     >>
     >>
     >>
     >

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