Hi Mahesh, 

> On Jan 7, 2026, at 6:09 PM, Mahesh Jethanandani <[email protected]> 
> wrote:
> 
> Hi Acee,
> 
>> On Jan 6, 2026, at 5:03 PM, Acee Lindem <[email protected]> wrote:
>> 
>> Hi Mahesh, 
>> 
>>> On Jan 6, 2026, at 7:31 PM, Mahesh Jethanandani via Datatracker 
>>> <[email protected]> wrote:
>>> 
>>> Mahesh Jethanandani has entered the following ballot position for
>>> draft-ietf-lsr-anycast-flag-11: No Objection
>>> 
>>> When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all
>>> email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this
>>> introductory paragraph, however.)
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Please refer to 
>>> https://www.ietf.org/about/groups/iesg/statements/handling-ballot-positions/
>>>  
>>> for more information about how to handle DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-lsr-anycast-flag/
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>> COMMENT:
>>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>> 
>>> Thanks to all the folks who have provided review comments on this document. 
>>> In
>>> particular want to call out OPSDIR review comments from Juergen, and YANG
>>> Doctor comments provided by Joe Clarke. Some of these comments builds on the
>>> review they have provided.
>>> 
>>> Section 1, paragraph 0
>>>>  An IP prefix may be configured as anycast and as such the same value
>>>>  can be advertised by multiple routers.  It is useful for other
>>>>  routers to know that the advertisement is for an anycast prefix.
>>> 
>>> I agree with Juergen that this section could do more to explain the 
>>> motivation
>>> for the draft, and move all the implementation details to later sections. 
>>> For
>>> example, and as Juergen asks, what are the implications of other routers not
>>> knowing about the advertisement? I know that Ran provided the explanation in
>>> his response, but it would be even better if that was added here.
>> 
>> No - we already went down a rat hole with this in the WG and Ketan suggested 
>> to remove it.
>> Please discuss with him. 
> 
> Ok. I will wait for him to respond.
> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> Section 2, paragraph 0
>>>>  An IP prefix may be configured as anycast and it is useful for other
>>>>  routers to know that the advertisement is for an anycast prefix.
>>> 
>>> I would encourage the authors to add some of the responses Ran gave to the
>>> OPSDIR review to be added in this document. In this case, the question asked
>>> was, what is prefix and where is it being applied? This might be obvious to
>>> "router folks" but it cannot be assumed that everyone knows what it means.
>>> 
>>> Section 4.2, paragraph 0
>>>>  The following is the YANG module:
>>> 
>>> Please reference all the RFC from which the module imports data from or 
>>> refers
>>> to. For example, it could say - "This YANG module imports definitions from
>>> [RFC8349] and [RFC9129]".
>>> 
>>> Section 6.2, paragraph 3
>>>>  There are a number of data nodes defined in this YANG module that are
>>>>  writable/creatable/deletable (i.e., config true, which is the
>>>>  default).  These data nodes can be considered sensitive or vulnerable
>>>>  in some network environments.  Write operations (e.g., edit-config)
>>>>  to these data nodes without proper protection can have a negative
>>>>  effect on network operations.  Specifically, the following subtrees
>>>>  and data nodes have particular sensitivities/vulnerabilities:
>>> 
>>> Is it true that this YANG module defines multiple data nodes? I can see only
>>> one. The last statement should also be corrected for its pluarity.
>> 
>> As you well know, this is the boiler plate from 
>> draft-ietf-netmod-rfc8407bis. Perhaps
>> this should be corrected  there with "(s)"s rather than "s"s. 
> 
> Yes, it is boilerplate, but nothings says it cannot be modified.
> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> Section 6.2, paragraph 3
>>>>  As specified in Section 2, the AC-flag and the N-flag MUST NOT both
>>>>  be set to 1.  An attacker or a misconfiguration that violates this
>>>>  rule creates a configuration anomaly.  The handling of such anomalies
>>>>  is defined in Section 2.  Modifications to these data nodes without
>>>>  proper protection could prevent interpreting the IPv4 prefix as
>>>>  anycast or node-specific.
>>> 
>>> If the idea is to detect a configuration anomaly, why is that not detected
>>> using a "must" statement? Please add one. Otherwise, this hardly belongs in 
>>> a
>>> Security Considerations section.
>> 
>> We don't normally validate read-only data, i.e., operational state.
>> Rather, it is rendered as is so that anomalies can be detected. 
> 
> I do not understand. The YANG module is defining a RW leaf for 
> ‘anycast-flag’. A must statement there could check if the N-flag is set or 
> not before allowing the flag to be set to true. No?
> 
> Something like 
> 
> must 
> ‘not(/rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols/rt:control-plane-protocol/ospf:ospf/ospf:areas/ospf:area/ospf:interfaces/ospf:interface/node-flag)'

Yes - the co-authors could add this constraint to the read-write node. I'll 
leave it to them.


> 
> And I just noticed that the 'identity ac-flag’ is not used in the module. Is 
> it being used somewhere else? If not, do we need it?

This identity could be returned in the flag container in the 
extended-prefix-opaque container.


Thanks,
Acee




> 
> An example would really help here.
> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> Section 6.2, paragraph 3
>>>>  Some of the readable data nodes in this YANG module may be considered
>>>>  sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments.  It is thus
>>>>  important to control read access (e.g., via get, get-config, or
>>>>  notification) to these data nodes.  Specifically, the following
>>>>  subtrees and data nodes have particular sensitivities/
>>>>  vulnerabilities:
>>> 
>>> Same issue with pluraity in this section.
>>> 
>>> Section 6.2, paragraph 3
>>>>  Exposure of the OSPF link state database may be useful in mounting
>>>>  Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks.
>>> 
>>> How is lsdb being exposed by this model? If not, please remove.
>> 
>> The new flag is part of an LSA encoding which is in the Link State Database 
>> (LSDB). 
> 
> Sure. But the module that is defining the LSDB or access to it should be the 
> place where this statement would make sense.
> 
> Thanks.
> 
>> 
>> Acee 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>> NIT
>>> -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>> 
>>> All comments below are about very minor potential issues that you may 
>>> choose to
>>> address in some way - or ignore - as you see fit. Some were flagged by
>>> automated tools (via https://github.com/larseggert/ietf-reviewtool), so 
>>> there
>>> will likely be some false positives. There is no need to let me know what 
>>> you
>>> did with these suggestions.
>>> 
>>> "I", paragraph 2
>>>> OULD be logged as an operational error (subject to rate-limiting). The 
>>>> AC-fla
>>>>                                     ^
>>> It appears that a white space is missing.
>>> 
>>> "I", paragraph 9
>>>> eted according to OSPFv2 [RFC7684]. Thus the Flags field of the BGP-LS 
>>>> Prefix
>>>>                                   ^^^^
>>> A comma may be missing after the conjunctive/linking adverb "Thus".
> 
> 
> 
> Mahesh Jethanandani
> [email protected]
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 

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