On Sat, Aug 17, 2002 at 11:04:38PM -0400, Hal Vaughan wrote: > I'm not sure whether this is a bug or a feature, or an unavoidable side > effect. > > I was experimenting with moduser (I don't know if it's just a Mandrake command > or not). I had tested everything out, the only thing I needed to verify was > that moduser, when used from a script, would let me change the root account > like any other. (I wished there was another way to verify it...). So I > tested it and must have mistyped something. I lost access to my root > account. > > So here's where LTSP came in.
You could just as well have used an ordinary rescue (installation) disk (be it a CD or a floppy). > I went to rom-o-matic and downloaded the code > to boot my workstation to LTSP with a floppy. I netbooted, copied > /etc/shadow to the server, where I edited it (I put my "normal user" password > in for the root password), then copied it back to /etc/shadow on the > workstation. I rebooted to the hard drive, logged in as root with my > "normal" password, changed it back to normal and everything was as before. > > So is access like this to EVERYTHING on a LTSP client's hard drive > intentional, or an unavoidable situation? (I can't believe I'm the first one > to notice something like this.) From my point of view, this was a BIG help. > It's also a reminder in the future that if I have an insecure location, to > use a password for my BIOS setup. Your finding is not revolutionary. That physical access puts almost all security measures aside is well known. The BIOS trick helps, but if the location is unattended, nothing will keep attackers from simply removing the HD, put in another computer as slave, mount it, edit /etc/passwd, put it back into the original computer and logging is as root? Putting sensitive data in encrypted files helps alot more. -- Hans Ekbrand
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