I use the modem-manager to connect my USB internet modems that work with ZTE(not all) and Huawei modems quiet well. I tried installing the mobile partner software that comes with Airtel modems on my box, but it was so buggy, it couldn't work, so i had to fall back to the in-built modem-manager.
However, it's interesting to learn that these modems are vulnerable! Do the telecoms know this? On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 1:00 AM, William Kibira <[email protected]>wrote: > Hence I would like to place my Disclaimer here, i am not a hacker, i have > never even tried it to do it. I am just saying they are possible exploits > to attack even a *nix based OS like many Linux flavors or BSD. Although You > can build up your own security systems based to mask out these kind of > weaknesses and you can also use this to base on research you might carry > out in your own time . > > Great to be here , a place where the greats get to share ideas . > > > On Sun, Aug 18, 2013 at 11:13 PM, William Kibira > <[email protected]>wrote: > >> The mobile partner for Linux comes with most modems that have been >> released this year for ZTE and Huawei , it doesn't actually run like the >> the linux in-built modem-manager process which helps linux use usb-switch >> (Look it up) to not mistake The modem for a storage device as did with >> modems in the past. The next step is that modem-manager gets information >> of the modem and stuff. Now here is the risky part. >> >> This process runs as a super user since it needs to access the modem via >> a device instance /dev/ttyUSB0 or whatever it comes up with, >> The bad news is that well, this is a possible exploit for a hacker with >> good working knowledge on device access, and if i recall correctly, when i >> was studying how to program for the video devices in the video4Linux book, >> i realized that if you have any of these devices in your control, The >> machine is pretty much toast [If your a good C programmer] , Sorry i think >> you don't have to imagine much about CIA and NSA, If you can use >> modem-manager via it's sms utility , i guess you can dump your payload . >> Then again, it is just a theory. like most things. >> >> >> On Sun, Aug 18, 2013 at 10:50 PM, Benjamin Tayehanpour < >> [email protected]> wrote: >> >>> On 18 August 2013 20:56, kizito Mudambo <[email protected]> wrote: >>> > @ william Kibira, for the linux part, i dont think it would be as >>> easy as >>> > that given the fact that linux handles executables or any thing that >>> can be >>> > excuted in a different manner... >>> >>> If I have to take a guess at how the exploit works, it's probably some >>> buffer overflow exploit in the parsing. The problem here is that since >>> the code is injected into an already-running process, the usual Linux >>> failsafes at the file system level (requiring executable bit to run, >>> etc.) are bypassed. As you say, the rogue code *should* not be able to >>> do anything a normal unprivileged user cannot do, but that's still a >>> lot. Think about it. The user's home directory is compromised. >>> Documents, saved passwords, session cookies... AND, notice the word >>> "should". Since the mobile partner needs to access a hardware device, >>> it does need some privileges a normal user doesn't have. The proper >>> way to do it is to add the user to the dial-out group, and have the >>> device nodes owned by the same. The less proper way is to start the >>> program with root privileges, grab access to the dongle, and then drop >>> all privileges. The horribly improper way would be simply to run the >>> whole thing as root altogether. >>> >>> Since I don't use the mobile partner software for Linux, I don't know >>> under which category this software falls. It does sound like a badly >>> designed piece of software, though, so I'm not hopeful... In either >>> case, the home directory is at risk, and there are loads of things an >>> attacker could do there. It would be a simple matter for an attacker >>> to edit .bashrc, prepend a path to the exec environment, and then >>> write a replacement sudo script which intercepts the password and >>> sends it back to the attacker. It would be an even simpler matter to >>> install a malicious browser add-on which intercepts every password >>> entered. The possibilities are endless, given a careless user. >>> _______________________________________________ >>> The Uganda Linux User Group: http://linux.or.ug >>> >>> Send messages to this mailing list by addressing e-mails to: >>> [email protected] >>> Mailing list archives: http://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/ >>> Mailing list settings: http://kym.net/mailman/listinfo/lug >>> To unsubscribe: http://kym.net/mailman/options/lug >>> >>> The Uganda LUG mailing list is generously hosted by INFOCOM: >>> http://www.infocom.co.ug/ >>> >>> The above comments and data are owned by whoever posted them (including >>> attachments if any). The mailing list host is not responsible for them in >>> any way. >>> >> >> > > _______________________________________________ > The Uganda Linux User Group: http://linux.or.ug > > Send messages to this mailing list by addressing e-mails to: > [email protected] > Mailing list archives: http://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/ > Mailing list settings: http://kym.net/mailman/listinfo/lug > To unsubscribe: http://kym.net/mailman/options/lug > > The Uganda LUG mailing list is generously hosted by INFOCOM: > http://www.infocom.co.ug/ > > The above comments and data are owned by whoever posted them (including > attachments if any). The mailing list host is not responsible for them in > any way. > -- David Okwii, Technology innovator/catalyst, analyst and blogger, Editor in Chief for the TechPost <http://www.techpost.ug>, Blogger/reporter for Mozilla Uganda <http://www.mozilla-uganda.org>, Systems & Solutions Administrator for Cured Ltd, Mobile(default): +256-791-040-262, Mobile(other): +256-778-706-301, Website: w <http://oquidave.blogspot.com>ww.techpost.ug LinkedIn:http://www.linkedin.com/in/oquidave Twitter: http://twitter.com/oquidave Christ in me the Hope of Glory(Col.1:27)
_______________________________________________ The Uganda Linux User Group: http://linux.or.ug Send messages to this mailing list by addressing e-mails to: [email protected] Mailing list archives: http://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/ Mailing list settings: http://kym.net/mailman/listinfo/lug To unsubscribe: http://kym.net/mailman/options/lug The Uganda LUG mailing list is generously hosted by INFOCOM: http://www.infocom.co.ug/ The above comments and data are owned by whoever posted them (including attachments if any). The mailing list host is not responsible for them in any way.
