Quoting Ivan Ogai ([email protected]): > * Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]> [2016-09-13 15:48]: > > On Tue, Sep 13, 2016 at 03:11:57PM +0200, Ivan Ogai wrote: > > > > Using LXC, I had a simple script run as a normal user that > > > > > > 1) created an unprivileged container > > > > > > 2) added a user in the container with the same uid and gid as the user > > > in the host, let's say 1000 > > > > > > 3) modified the configuration of the container in > > > ~/.local/share/lxc/example/conf to share their ids: > > > > > > lxc.id_map = u 0 100000 1000 > > > lxc.id_map = g 0 100000 1000 > > > lxc.id_map = u 1000 1000 1 > > > lxc.id_map = g 1000 1000 1 > > > lxc.id_map = u 1001 101001 64535 > > > lxc.id_map = g 1001 101001 64535 > > > > > > 4) and added a mount to share a directory, e.g. > > > > > > /home/$USER/development home/$USER/development none bind,create=dir 0 0 > > > > FWIW what I'm hoping to see soon is an option to > > > > 1. overlayfs-mount $HOME/development to $tmpdir > > 2. shiftfs-mount $tmpdir into the container at $HOME/development > > > > Then after running the container you could look at the airlocked diff > > before commiting it back into your homedir, in case some bug or trojan > > in your container tried to do something nefarious. > > That is quite cool indeed, but IIUC it doesn't mount a dir whose changes > are seen in both ends, no matter if the changes takes place in the host > or in the guest.
Correct. And it's worth thinking on more. The current approach has (at least) two problems: 1. The directory you're sharing is vulnerable to the container 2. The container has full permissions over your host uid (i.e. 1000). If (1) is not a concern - and if you want changes seen in both directions in real time then it's not - then we can protect for (2) using just shiftfs, as it allows us to not map host uid 1000 into the container at all. _______________________________________________ lxc-users mailing list [email protected] http://lists.linuxcontainers.org/listinfo/lxc-users
