I'm using 1.1.6. The document was created in that version. No figures in the document. I haven't tried printing it on paper. I tried printing it to file and got the same stuff, so I figured priting to paper would do the same as printing to file. The line that ends page four is "...extrinsic denomination of existing in a place. But this" and then it stops. I don't see anything in the code that could be a mistake. But then I might just not know enough. Also, I did try just copying the text into another document, in case something had gotten corrupted. That didn't work either. On Fri, 20 Apr 2001, you wrote: > On Thu, 19 Apr 2001 19:04:28 -0500 wrote Christopher Jones <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > > > For some reason I cannot generate complete output for one document > > in particular. If I print to file, view postscript or dvi, export to postscript > > or dvi, the displayed output stops at page four. If I view pdf or pdflatex, gs > > comes up, stopped at page four. If I view html, I get the complete document. > > > > I have tried other files, and they work just fine. I can't think of any changes > > I made to anything, which might account for this, and I don't really know how > > to track down the problem. I suppose it must be something to do with the dvi, > > since latex2html does its job.
#LyX 1.1 created this file. For more info see http://www.lyx.org/ \lyxformat 218 \textclass article \begin_preamble \usepackage{abbrevs} \usepackage{achicago} \usepackage{attrib} \usepackage{philabbrevs} \newabbrev\oni{\emph{On Nature Itself} (1698)} \end_preamble \language english \inputencoding latin1 \fontscheme times \graphics default \paperfontsize 12 \spacing double \papersize letterpaper \paperpackage a4 \use_geometry 1 \use_amsmath 0 \paperorientation portrait \leftmargin 1in \topmargin 1in \rightmargin 1in \bottommargin 1in \secnumdepth 3 \tocdepth 3 \paragraph_separation skip \defskip medskip \quotes_language english \quotes_times 2 \papercolumns 1 \papersides 1 \paperpagestyle plain \layout Author Christopher M. Jones \layout Title From Physics to Metaphsics \layout Subsection Introduction \layout Standard The main thesis in \latex latex \backslash S13 \latex default \latex latex of \backslash oni \latex default is that \begin_inset Quotes eld \end_inset we must necessarily place something in bodies over and above uniform mass and its transposition \begin_inset Quotes erd \end_inset . Though it is true that this section presents a largely, and perhaps even entirely negative argument against the Cartesian notion of extension, it's aim is more positive than just this. \layout Standard Though I profess dissagreement with both the interpretations I review, my dissagreement is on different grounds with respect to each of them. Regarding the Garber/Adams interpretation, I align myself with Lodge in his criticisms. Regarding Lodge's insterpretation, I consider my interpretation to be an extension of and a further reflection on some of the hermaneutical issues he raises at the conclusion of his paper which, though it does not consitute a substantial disagreement, nevertheless places the argument in a slightly different light. \layout Subsection Division of the argument \layout Standard Both of the interpretations I review here understand Leibniz's argument as primarily a negative one, primarily concerned to show up the Cartesian notion of body as merely extended to be inadequate. This is reflected in the divisions of the argument offered by its respective commentators. Against these views, which I shall discuss following my discussion of the argument itself, I offer an interpretation recognizing one major division in the section as a whole, the latter of which contains the thesis of the section as a whole, which the conclusions of the previous one are meant to support. \layout Subsection Sturm's Cartesian view of body \layout Enumerate In \latex latex \backslash oni \latex default Leibniz presents an argument which Daniel Garber characterizes as showing that \begin_inset Quotes eld \end_inset if the world is full, and full of matter uniform in its nature (both of which follow from the doctrine of body as exension Descartes held), then change is impossible \begin_inset Quotes erd \end_inset \latex latex \backslash cite[286]{Garber-CCL} \latex default . \layout Enumerate From section twelve, we know that Leibniz takes Sturm to be committed to two related positions with respect to substance and matter. \begin_deeper \layout Enumerate On the one hand, he is committed to the essential passivity of matter (matter is a passive substance), from which it would follow that bodies, or the things in bodies, being only modifications of matter, would be essentially passive. \layout Enumerate On the other hand, he is committed to a view of motion as consisting of no more than the successive existence of the moving thing in different places. \end_deeper \layout Enumerate It is Leibniz's attack against the second position on which we focus our attention. \begin_deeper \layout Enumerate Leibniz begins with what appears to be an uncontroversial position, as far as Sturm may be concerned, that in a plenum there is no criterion for distingui shing bodies uniform in themselves, unless one is provided by motion. \latex latex \backslash cite[164]{ag} \latex default . \layout Enumerate This follows from the thesis, held by Sturm, that bodies are only modifications of a substance which is essentially passive, and so the motion of bodies must be only the appearance of motion (?). \end_deeper \layout Subsection The negative argument \layout Enumerate The negative argument has roughly three components: \begin_deeper \layout Enumerate In the first place Leibniz argues that motive force is not excluded on the grounds that motion is \begin_inset Quotes eld \end_inset only the successive existence of the moving thing in different places \begin_inset Quotes erd \end_inset \latex latex \backslash cite[163]{ag} \latex default . \layout Enumerate In the second place he argues that, having excluded motive force, the Cartesians cannot account for the differentiation of bodies at a given time. \layout Enumerate Finally, he argues that because of these synchronic considerations, neither can bodies be differentiated from one moment to the next. \layout Enumerate From these considerations, Leibniz comes to his first conclusion, that if the Cartesian view is correct then we could not account for the phenomena of diversity and motion. \end_deeper \layout Enumerate We know from earlier in \latex latex \backslash oni \latex default that Leibniz holds that \begin_inset Quotes eld \end_inset extension, or that which is geometrical in bodies, if taken by itself, has nothing in itself from which action and motion can arise \begin_inset Quotes erd \end_inset \latex latex \backslash cite[161]{ag} \latex default . \begin_deeper \layout Enumerate However, it remains for him to show that motion cannot arise from the notion of extension. \layout Enumerate This is what section thirteen is supposed to show. \end_deeper \layout Enumerate We know by now that Leibniz rejects the idea of a plenum, since he maintains that bodies are real, and distinguishable \emph on per se \emph default . \begin_deeper \layout Enumerate But for the moment, he grants sturm his position, even though, as he says, \begin_inset Quotes eld \end_inset it is not quite satisfactory, and \SpecialChar \ldots{} expresses what results from motion better than it expresses its formal definition \SpecialChar \ldots{} \begin_inset Quotes erd \end_inset . \layout Enumerate Indeed, Sturm's construal of 'place' is not in itself problematic for Leibniz, since all this entails is that a body is \begin_inset Quotes eld \end_inset in the present moment of motion \SpecialChar \ldots{} in a place commensurate with itself \begin_inset Quotes erd \end_inset \latex latex \backslash cite[163]{ag} \latex default . \layout Enumerate Recall that Leibniz has a place for what he calls \begin_inset Quotes eld \end_inset mathematical \begin_inset Quotes erd \end_inset or \begin_inset Quotes eld \end_inset geometrical \begin_inset Quotes erd \end_inset extension. What Leibniz's argument attempts to show is that this kind of extension is not satisfactory in itself for doing the job Sturm assigns to it. \end_deeper \layout Enumerate Since Sturm removes from bodies all qualities and modifications by which they may be said to differ in themselves, he has only the external denomination of 'existing in this place' and 'successively coming to exist in another place'. \begin_deeper \layout Enumerate Or we could put it another way: in order to differ from one another, bodies must \emph on differentiate themselves \emph default from one another. \layout Enumerate But since Surm has removed from body all qualities and modifications by which they might do this, he has only the extrinsic denomination of existing in a place. But this ground for difference get Sturm little far, sinc echange of place reduces to the \begin_inset Quotes eld \end_inset perpetual substitution of indistinguishables \begin_inset Quotes erd \end_inset \latex latex \backslash cite[164]{ag}. \layout Enumerate Furthermore, if no body differs from another at a given time, then neither will a given time, or momentary state, differ from a future momentary state. \end_deeper \layout Subsection Two interpretations \layout Subsubsection Garber and Adams \layout Enumerate Though the interpertations which Garber and Adams offer are different in some important respects, they both take Leibniz to be making an \latex latex \backslash ap \latex default claim about the possibility of difference and change, on the Cartesian view of extended body. \layout Subsubsection Lodge \layout Enumerate Paul Lodge argues for the empirical nature of Leibniz's argument. \layout Enumerate The focal point of Lodge's interpretation is the section preceeding the 'concentric spheres' illustration, in which Leibniz says, \begin_deeper \layout Enumerate And since everything substituted for something prior would be prefectly equivalent, no observer, not even an omniscient one, would detect even the lightest indication of change. And thus, everything would be just as if there were no change or discrimination in bodies, nor could we ever explain the different appearances we sense. \latex latex \backslash attrib{ \backslash cite[164]{ag}. \end_deeper \layout Enumerate Lodge draws attention to Leibniz's concern, which appears quite clear from this passage, that the Cartesian position fails to account for the appearance of change, which we clearly do sense. \layout Enumerate However, Lodge goes a step farther than this to say that it is not merely the way the world appears to our senses which Sturm's view fails to account for, rather it is the fact that \begin_inset Quotes eld \end_inset our phenomenal representations of the world are themselves qualitatively diverse \begin_inset Quotes erd \end_inset \latex latex \backslash cite[96]{lodge-heterogeneity}. \latex default It is a further consequence of this that we represent the world as containing intrinsic qualitative differences. \layout Enumerate Lodge points to passages such as the one from blahblahblah, in which Leibniz says, 'equivalent things would always be substituted for previous ones, given a plenum, with the result that the diversity of the phenomena would not be produced,' and, from a letter to De Volder, \begin_deeper \layout Enumerate Those who have minds possessed by such a crude picture give insufficient consideration not only to other matters, but especially to the fact that no basis for distinction in corporeal things would arise were that the case (something I once demonstrated to Sturm)\SpecialChar \ldots{} \latex latex \backslash attrib{ \backslash cite[183]{ag} \end_deeper \layout Enumerate The key here, as I understand it, is the use Leibniz makes of the production or the arising of appearances out of the world, such that his thesis is not just that extension alone fails to furnish an adequate description of appearances, but that the world which is merely extended in the way Sturm describes could not give rise to the appearances to which it does in fact give rise. \layout Subsubsection Hermaneutical issues \layout Enumerate Lodge locates the meat of the argument in Leibniz's use of a \begin_inset Quotes eld \end_inset causally mediated relation of resemblance between our sensations and at least some of the object of which they are sensations \begin_inset Quotes erd \end_inset \latex latex \backslash cite[97]{lodge-heterogeneity}. \latex default But the most we can say about Leibniz's notion of resemblance, at least directly, is, as Lodge puts it, that it is a \begin_deeper \layout Enumerate \SpecialChar \ldots{} Leibniz thinks of resemblance as a one-one mapping which is 'orderly', in other words one which allows us to move from domain to range in a relatively striaghtforward way. And whatever the complexities tha tattend the partitioning of all the epxpressi o nrelations into those which are resemblance rleations, and thos ethat are not, it seems that many philosophers of this time, would have accepted that there is such a resemblance between our sensations of bodies and the qualities of the bodies themselves. \latex latex \backslash attrib{ \backslash cite[98]{lodge-heterogeneity}. \end_deeper \layout Subsection An Alternative interpretation \layout Enumerate Concluding his discussion with some breif methodological arguments, Lodge points out that many commentators may be influenced in their readings of Leibniz's various arguments by an assumption that Leibniz must, as he is a 'rationalist' argue on \latex latex \backslash ap \latex default grounds for the internal inconsistency or contradictoriness of the Cartesian account. The commentators seem especially willing to do this, says Lodge, where the complexity and multi-layeredness of Leibniz's analyses offer enough ambiguity so as to make room for this kind of reading. \layout Enumerate I wonder if Lodge's caution might direct us to find still more layers of complexity in Leibniz's argument in \latex latex \backslash S 13 of \backslash oni \latex default , now that he has done the better work of opening up this line of thinking to us. Of principle concern to me is that I do not see Leibniz as offering a straightf orwardly negative argument in this section. In order to show why I think this is, I wish to return, as promised, to the matter of the division of the section. \layout Subsection The positive thesis \layout Enumerate Leibniz argues for two conclusions, or conseqences of the argument: \begin_deeper \begin_deeper \layout Enumerate \begin_inset Quotes eld \end_inset \SpecialChar \ldots{} it ought to be accepted as certain that such consequences are alien to the nature and order of things, and that nowhere are there things perfectly similar (which is among my new and more important axioms). Another conseqence of this is that, in nature, there are neither corpuscles of maximal hardness, nor a fluid of maximal thinness, nor a subtle matter universally diffused, nor ultimate elements which certain people call by the names 'primary' and 'secondary'. \latex latex \backslash attrib{ \backslash cite[164]{ag}} \end_deeper \layout Enumerate Leibiz fleshes out this second conclusion via Aristotle: \begin_deeper \layout Enumerate \begin_inset Quotes eld \end_inset Because, I think, Aristotle (more profound in my view than many think) saw several of these principles, he judged that, over and above change in place, one must have alteration, and that matter is not everywhere similar to itself, or selse it would remain unchageable. \begin_inset Quotes erd \end_inset \latex latex \backslash cite[164]{ag}. \end_deeper \end_deeper \layout Subsection Why my interpretation is wrong \layout Standard j;kj;kj \layout Standard \latex latex \backslash bibliographystyle{achicago} \layout Standard \latex latex \backslash bibliography{Leibniz} \the_end
