Iraq: Weapons of Mass Destruction
Canada continues to have concerns about Iraq's intentions to
reconstitute its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs.
Concerns persist regarding Iraq's probable stocks of chemical and
biological weapons, and hard information on Iraqi WMD development
programs remains unattainable. While there is no evidence we are
aware of that Iraq has resumed production of chemical weapons (CW)
agents since the departure of UN weapons inspectors in 1998, there
is concern that it is rebuilding the infrastructure it would need to
do so.
There is also a high probability that Iraq retains small
quantities of biological weapons (BW) agents or weapons. While there
is no evidence we are aware of that Iraq has resumed production of
BW agents since 1998, it could have done so without being detected.
As the Iraqi government has used chemical and possibly biological
weapons in the past against its own citizens and Iran, continued
possession of any CW or BW capability would be a matter of grave
concern.
Iraq has retained at least a modest technical capability that
could be a basis for the resumption of a nuclear weapons development
program. It is believed, however, that Iraq neither possesses a
nuclear weapon nor is close to having one, in large measure due to
the difficulty of producing or otherwise acquiring the necessary
weapons-grade fissile material. At present, Iraq cannot produce
sufficient quantities of fissile material to produce a nuclear
explosive device, and would find it difficult to obtain such
material from external sources without detection.
UN Special Commission
The Government of Iraq formally accepted UN Security Council
Resolution 687 (April 1991), establishing the terms and conditions
of the cease-fire that ended military operations following Iraq's
invasion of Kuwait. Under these terms, Iraq accepted unconditionally
and under international supervision the destruction, removal, or
rendering harmless of all its weapons of mass destruction and
long-range missiles, and to allow UN inspections to verify Iraq's
compliance. The UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) was established in
1991 to carry out immediate on-site inspections, and to verify Iraqi
compliance with its obligations. Although UNSCOM inspections and
other activity over the period 1991-1998 did uncover and result in
the destruction of considerable elements of the Iraqi WMD and
missile development programs, systematic Iraqi efforts to conceal
such programs and to deceive UN inspectors resulted in significant
uncertainty in some areas.
International Atomic Energy Agency Action
Team
Between 1991 and December 1998, the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) carried out inspections in Iraq in
accordance with UN Security Council resolutions. It provided the
nuclear-related technical expertise for UNSCOM and continues to
maintain an Action Team that can be mobilized on short notice to
support the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection
Commission (UNMOVIC).
The Agency also applies limited safeguards in Iraq under a
comprehensive safeguards agreement concluded in conformity with the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Safeguards inspections focus
on Iraq's declared nuclear material and are not a substitute for the
verification activities mandated by the relevant Security Council
resolutions.
UNSCOM/IAEA Findings
The IAEA learned that in 1991, Iraq was within 6 to 24 months of
building a nuclear explosive device. UN inspectors from the IAEA
destroyed, removed or placed under monitoring all of Iraq's known
nuclear-related facilities and materials.
By the time of UNSCOM's withdrawal in December 1998, the IAEA
believed that it had obtained a "technically coherent picture" of
Iraq's past undeclared nuclear activities. Despite recent media
reports, the IAEA has not obtained any significant new information
and its assessment of Iraqi nuclear activities remains unchanged.
The Agency also emphasizes that, until inspections resume, it is
unable to determine with any certainty whether, or to what extent,
any new or resumed undeclared activities may have been undertaken by
Iraq since UNSCOM's withdrawal in 1998.
According to UNSCOM, Iraq began its programs to develop
biological and chemical weapons in the early 1970s. In 1995,
following the defection of Saddam Hussein's son-in-law, inspectors
gained greater knowledge about Iraq's biological weapons program,
which was far more extensive than previously thought. Activities
related to BW are the most difficult to detect because they require
much more limited infrastructure. UNSCOM destroyed Iraq's declared
BW facilities and set up monitoring of dual-use equipment at other
facilities. However, UN inspectors were unable to determine the full
extent of the Iraqi program prior to their departure in 1998.
UNSCOM also uncovered a vast Iraqi chemical weapons program.
Between 1991 and 1998, it supervised the destruction of over 40,000
filled and unfilled chemical munitions and 411 tonnes of bulk CW
agents. However, UNSCOM reported that the destruction of about 2,000
unfilled munitions was uncertain, that the destruction by melting of
15,000 rockets was not verifiable, and that 500 mustard-filled
shells remained unaccounted for. In addition, the unilateral
destruction in 1991 by Iraq of 242 tonnes of precursors for VX
production was only partly accounted for. While Iraq claimed that it
never turned VX into a weapon, in 1998 degradation products of VX
were found by a U.S. laboratory on missile warhead remnants.
Before 1991, Iraq was also actively purchasing, developing and
producing long-range missiles that could have been used to deliver
its chemical and biological weapons, as well as future nuclear
weapons. UNSCOM destroyed Iraq's declared stock of ballistic
missiles, however discrepancies and the absence of inspectors for
stocks declared destroyed by Iraq indicate that Iraq may have
retained a small number of long-range missiles (up to 650 km),
perhaps as many as a dozen.
For information on what questions remained unanswered by UNSCOM,
refer to the final report by UNSCOM head, Richard Butler.
UNMOVIC
The UN
Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission was
established by Security Council Resolution 1284 on December 17,
1999, to replace UNSCOM. Its mandate is to disarm Iraq of its
chemical and biological weapons and missiles and to operate a system
of ongoing monitoring and verification to check Iraq's compliance
with its obligations not to reacquire the same weapons prohibited by
the Security Council. UNMOVIC reports solely to the UN. Iraq has so
far prevented UNMOVIC from entering the country, but preparations,
including training of inspectors, continue so that the organization
can respond quickly when the time comes to begin operations in Iraq.
In May-June 2001, Canada hosted a five-week training course for
members of UNMOVIC.
Canada's Role
Canada participated in the work of UNSCOM from its inception. A
number of UNSCOM weapons inspectors were Canadians. Canada is,
therefore, aware from first-hand experience of the great lengths to
which Iraq went to develop chemical, biological and nuclear weapons,
as well as the extent of its efforts to hide them from inspectors.
Canada has also supported UNMOVIC by offering training and other
support. One former UNSCOM inspector--a Canadian with a long and
distinguished career in the field--is also currently a member of the
College of Commissioners, which provides advice and guidance to the
UNMOVIC chairman. Two Canadians work at the UNMOVIC headquarters in
New York and another three are members of the UNMOVIC inspection
roster. Canadians also work for the IAEA, both as members of the
Action Team and as safeguards inspectors.
There are a variety of credible international reports
(linked below) that address the state of Iraqi weapons
development.
Canada and
Iraq ![]() | 