benson wrote, and then andrew responded: >>* The counting method, and its implications on voter strategy, however, gives *>>* RRV a more significant edge. With STV, many situations arise where voting *>>* for your favored candidate may hurt his chances of election (versus voting *>>* against him or not voting at all); the honest strategy can be seriously *>>* counterproductive. The voter _must_ try to predict the outcome to know if *>>* one of these situations is occurring, and alter their vote for maximum *>>* strategic effect. If they misjudge or disregard this, their honest *>>* participation may worsen the outcome. * >I've heard this asserted, and seen pages on scorevoting.net which try >to prove it, but a quick analysis doesn't have me convinced.
>Can you explain how this "hurt your preferred candidate(s)" situation occurs? what do you mean you're "not convinced"? there are numerous examples on that site that _prove_ this. here's a URL that demonstrates _numerous_ related pathologies. http://scorevoting.net/IrvPathologySurvey.html these are just simple undeniable facts. you would have found this page easily by using the menu on the left hand side, or by doing a quick search. -- clay shentrup phone: 206.801.0484
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