On Mon, Jul 1, 2013 at 3:44 PM, Patrick Ben Koetter <[email protected]> wrote:
> Before we take out to write code, I would like to ask mailman-developers > how it > should be done to fit best into Mailman's architecture. Here are the DMARC > features that should go into Mailman 3: > > - don't allow email that comes from a domain with a DMRAC record of > p=reject > - take ownership of the email and send it with a From: using the > domain of the mailing list. (There's a patch for this for Mailman 2.1, > which > might might be helpful for Mailman 3.) > - find the authentication-results header and rewrite it as an > Original-Authentication-header: > http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-kucherawy-original-authres-00.html > I'm all for experimentation and being adaptive as new things come along, and I'm obviously supportive of the DMARC effort. That said, I hope that these are going to be configurable options, defaulted "off" for backward compatibility. This is because: (a) the second bullet above is a significant departure from current use (as I understand it), and fails the test of least surprise if we were going to suddenly see that MM3 does things quite differently than previous versions or, indeed, other packages; and (b) I'm uneasy about Original-Authentication-Results. As far as I'm aware there's only a single, proprietary implementation. Its proponents have explained the logic to me several times, but I remain unconvinced. I'm all for experimentation in order to provide data for future efforts, so I don't really object, but this shouldn't be taken as a well-vetted proposal just because there's an (expired) draft about it. -MSK _______________________________________________ Mailman-Developers mailing list [email protected] http://mail.python.org/mailman/listinfo/mailman-developers Mailman FAQ: http://wiki.list.org/x/AgA3 Searchable Archives: http://www.mail-archive.com/mailman-developers%40python.org/ Unsubscribe: http://mail.python.org/mailman/options/mailman-developers/archive%40jab.org Security Policy: http://wiki.list.org/x/QIA9
