It appears that Hanno Böck via mailop <[email protected]> said: >Hi, > >On Mon, 18 May 2026 18:21:45 +0200 >Tobias Fiebig via mailop <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Removing the ed25519 seems to help; Also, no indicators on the >> dashboard >> for the IPs, all in good standing, and can also deliver flawlessly >> to all other ESPs. > >Unpopular opinion: >The way ed25519 support in DKIM works makes it basically useless, and >everyone is probably better off just not generating such signatures. > >This has nothing to do with the algorithm, and everything with how DKIM >works.
I wrote the RFC that adds the algorithm and I agree. The main reason we did it was to have a backup in the unlikely event that RSA is broken. Short of that, don't bother. >Your only practical deployment option is to add ed25519 signatures on >top of RSA. Then you only have to worry about extra complexity (bad) >and whether there are any bugs on the receiving end that trigger if it >sees an unknown signature key type. In DKIM2 the plan is to allow multiple cryptographic signatures with different selectors in each DKIM-Signature header. Verifiers have to support RSA and ed25519, signers can use either or both. We expect at some point we'll add another algorithm or two once the post-quantum stuff shakes out. R's, John _______________________________________________ mailop mailing list [email protected] https://list.mailop.org/listinfo/mailop
