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https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/MAPREDUCE-2858?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=13134312#comment-13134312
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Robert Joseph Evans commented on MAPREDUCE-2858:
------------------------------------------------

I agree that it is a security hole to be able to send a URL that will bypass 
the check.  I decided to put it in the URL because a cookie would have to store 
in it the app_ids or users or URIs or some other level of granularity of 
approval, which with only 4KB guaranteed for a cookie could quickly be used up. 
 Either that or have some back end data store for the proxy to hold that 
information.  I didn't really want it to be a one shot question.  Are you OK 
with visiting all potentially unsafe Application Master UIs?  I suppose I could 
have the cookie do an LRU thing, and kick out the oldest app_id if there is not 
enough room for a new one.

It is a bit more complex, but I think I can make it work. 
                
> MRv2 WebApp Security
> --------------------
>
>                 Key: MAPREDUCE-2858
>                 URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/MAPREDUCE-2858
>             Project: Hadoop Map/Reduce
>          Issue Type: Sub-task
>          Components: applicationmaster, mrv2, security
>    Affects Versions: 0.23.0, 0.24.0
>            Reporter: Luke Lu
>            Assignee: Robert Joseph Evans
>            Priority: Blocker
>             Fix For: 0.23.0
>
>         Attachments: MR-2858-branch-0.23.txt, MR-2858-branch-0.23.txt, 
> MR-2858-branch-0.23.txt, MR-2858.txt, MR-2858.txt, MR-2858.txt
>
>
> In MRv2, while the system servers (ResourceManager (RM), NodeManager (NM) and 
> NameNode (NN)) run as "trusted"
> system users, the application masters (AM) run as users who submit the 
> application. While this offers great flexibility
> to run multiple version of mapreduce frameworks (including their UI) on the 
> same Hadoop cluster, it has significant
> implication for the security of webapps (Please do not discuss company 
> specific vulnerabilities here).
> Requirements:
> # Secure authentication for AM (for app/job level ACLs).
> # Webapp security should be optional via site configuration.
> # Support existing pluggable single sign on mechanisms.
> # Should not require per app/user configuration for deployment.
> # Should not require special site-wide DNS configuration for deployment.
> This the top jira for webapp security. A design doc/notes of threat-modeling 
> and counter measures will be posted on the wiki.

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