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https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/MAPREDUCE-2858?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=13135927#comment-13135927
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Luke Lu commented on MAPREDUCE-2858:
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For the record, I'm +0 on the changes as is, as there are some minor (code and
security) issues (unnecessary/redundant code for WebApps and embedding proxy in
RM and the way the proxy is written and missing logging for same user case (in
case of race) and lack of unit tests for the proxy and filter) and only one
major issue that's easy to fix (redirecting to original tracking url
(presumably history server) is unsafe, as the url is specified by users) and
that I don't have bandwidth right now to iterate on the issue. I'll file
another Jira to improve the current solution, which leaves much to be desired.
bq. if you could tell me where the security errors were in the previous patch I
would appreciate it.
The original patch embed the link unescaped in warnUserPage. You only uriEncode
the application id but not the rest of the path components from a request.
> MRv2 WebApp Security
> --------------------
>
> Key: MAPREDUCE-2858
> URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/MAPREDUCE-2858
> Project: Hadoop Map/Reduce
> Issue Type: Sub-task
> Components: applicationmaster, mrv2, security
> Affects Versions: 0.23.0
> Reporter: Luke Lu
> Assignee: Robert Joseph Evans
> Priority: Blocker
> Fix For: 0.23.0
>
> Attachments: MAPREDUCE-2858.patch, MAPREDUCE-2858.patch,
> MR-2858-branch-0.23.txt, MR-2858-branch-0.23.txt, MR-2858-branch-0.23.txt,
> MR-2858-branch-0.23.txt, MR-2858.txt, MR-2858.txt, MR-2858.txt, MR-2858.txt
>
>
> In MRv2, while the system servers (ResourceManager (RM), NodeManager (NM) and
> NameNode (NN)) run as "trusted"
> system users, the application masters (AM) run as users who submit the
> application. While this offers great flexibility
> to run multiple version of mapreduce frameworks (including their UI) on the
> same Hadoop cluster, it has significant
> implication for the security of webapps (Please do not discuss company
> specific vulnerabilities here).
> Requirements:
> # Secure authentication for AM (for app/job level ACLs).
> # Webapp security should be optional via site configuration.
> # Support existing pluggable single sign on mechanisms.
> # Should not require per app/user configuration for deployment.
> # Should not require special site-wide DNS configuration for deployment.
> This the top jira for webapp security. A design doc/notes of threat-modeling
> and counter measures will be posted on the wiki.
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