As a participant, I don't have any particular skin in this argument, so I'll go with consensus, which I'm supposed to do as co-chair anyway. :-)
The one thing not mentioned so far is the fact that there's tell of sites that have implemented the H (hash-key) scheme as we currently have it, versus HMAC. More specifically, there's one large European ISP that has said they have implemented what the -04 version of this draft said. I don't know if there are others, nor do I know if they are tracking this work well enough to know they should change if the WG decides to move to HMAC. We can't argue, though, that this creates an interop concern with the existing deployed base, because there's no actual interoperation in the traditional client/server sense here; if one party is doing it with H and one is doing it with HMAC, they're going to get the same results in the end anyway, minus a few possible paths to stealing the redaction key (even though, as we've said, there are easier ways to mount that attack) in the HMAC case. -MSK _______________________________________________ marf mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/marf
