About a year ago I got into a discussion with someone on this
article. This is how it began:
Date: Mon, 20 Sep 2004 06:39:07 -0400
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
From: Ralph Dumain <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Logic and Dialectics by Robin Hirsch
In Cultural Logic:
http://eserver.org/clogic/2004/hirsch.html
Some useful references.
This is a succinct criticism of the sloppy approach to dialectics, in view
of developments in logic and mathematics since the 19th century. However,
the author's logic falters when drawing conclusions on the value of
dialectical thinking.
I then got embroiled in a brief argument as to whether Hirsch had anything
positive to contribute to the understanding of dialectical thinking, Hegel,
or Marx. The discussion resulted in about a dozen posts, and quickly got
sidetracked over the first few. I will reproduce a fragment of my first
response:
Date: Fri, 24 Sep 2004 02:56:59 -0400
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
From: Ralph Dumain <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: [marxistphilosophy] Re: Logic and Dialectics by Robin Hirsch
There is a fundamental problem I have in approaching your response to this
article as well as the original article itself. In order to clarify it, I
need to triangulate the three basic philosophical tendencies at work:
(1) mathematical logic & analytical philosophy
(2) dialectical materialism & its relation to formal logic
(3) your Hegelian approach to Marxism.
Hirsch and you deal with the problematic aspects of (2) from entirely
opposite standpoints which in actuality don't intersect. Your approach
disregards (1) almost entirely, except when it enters into the sights of
your real target, which is (2). Hirsch has nothing to say about the
terrain covered by (3) and engages the common turf fought over between (1)
and (2), based on the claims of each to have a scientific perspective on
the world and an approach to logic. There is a basic incommensurability
here, because the tradition that feeds on the past 130 years of
mathematical logic, and the Hegelian tradition that one way or another
feeds into both diamat and your perspective, have remained completely
apart from one another, and it is a rare individual who has the competence
to cover the ground of both traditions. You seem to be unaware what a
serious problem this is.
Hirsch's concern is with the ineptitude of those elements within the
diamat tradition which make a complete hash of logic. He is right to
criticize this. However, Hirsch further complicates the matter by falling
apart logically when he reverts to discussion of political matters: his
concern with logic here is logically inept and intellectually incoherent.
The question of the correspondence view of truth is an important one,
especially given the idealist nature of the coherence theory of
truth. This is of course an issue that belongs to epistemology and by
implication ontology generally, in which Marxists have had a stake as
well. The Soviets may have accomplished little else, but they were very
good in combatting all the worst tendencies of neopositivism and
postpositivism in the West.
The question of logic requires a deeper approach, especially its
historically problematic relationship with ontology. The rigidified
diamat illegitimately based upon the messy reasoning of Engels has had a
rather childish view of logic, which Hirsch attempts to correct. There is
a deeper question about logic, however, which is addressed although not
clarified by the form-content issue. Again, here we have two entirely
separate traditions that never intersect and therefore never get compared
on an intelligent basis. The indifference of formal logic to content is
its strength: that's what logic is, to begin with. The issue of its
relationship to the structure of the concepts plugged into it should not
be so mysterious, but this is where the problem lies as well as the
alienation embedded not in the formalism itself but in the lack of contact
between those who study the formal structures of deductive inference and
the subject matter of the real world. But the attempts to politicize
logic and make it relevant to real life always betray the bad faith of
anti-intellectualism, and Hirsch after all his efforts to raise the dismal
level of orthodox Marxism ultimately collapses into incoherence himself.
His example of contradictions--inconsistencies--in. U.S. policy over Iraq
is more confused even than diamat's more intelligent representatives,
because he descends beneath the level of those he criticizes. The Soviets
once did as the Trotskyists continue to do (based on the nonsense written
by Trotsky and Novack) to get mixed up about logic, but since the '50s
they have been smart enough not to get logical inconsistency mixed up with
dialectical contradiction at least. (Their fudging ultimately was based
on treating Engels as sacred text instead of straightening out his
confusions.)
You are not interested in any of this but start out on a completely
different basis, with the question of the value-form, alienated labor,
totality, and contradictions in practice. It is a completely different
argument from the one Hirsch is engaged in, which is about the formal
conditions of scientific and logical adequacy, and has nothing to do with
everything that dialectic is about when not foolishly competing with
formal logic on foreign turf. (Again, even the smarter Soviet
philosophers recognized this distinction.)
From this point the discussion veered in another direction.
Looking over Hirsch's article again (in my copy on disk--I had a problem
accessing the article on the web last night), I am not so offended but
still find the conclusion underdeveloped, petering out at a critical
point. I wish Hirsch would have expressed himself with greater acumen,
though he does indeed touch on some key issues that need to be
developed. I'll single out a few phrases:
-----------------------
48. Strangely enough, logic is a political subject. . . .
49. But the other political aspect of logic concerns the function of logic
for society. The class that runs our system has no logical explanation
about how their system works. . . .
50. Of course Capitalism recruits scientists and professors who are experts
in formal logic. Yet there is no correspondence between the elaborate
theories of logic that exist in the academies and universities and the
irrationality of the way the system actually works. To leave these two
features separate from each other is to miss the whole point of logic which
must surely be to clarify the process of rational thought in order to help
bring about a rational way of doing things. That is not to say that every
aspect of formal logic must have an immediate application to the problems
in hand. But if the subject as a whole has no link to significant problems
facing society then it risks stagnation and aimlessness.
51. Marxists, on the other hand, do have a coherent and logical explanation
of how the system works . . . .The great strength of Marxism is the clarity
of these arguments. It can only weaken our case if there are parts of our
argument which are hidden in darkness.
52. In the current period the system is undergoing profound and rapid
changes. . . . All over the world, people will be looking for solutions to
the disaster that is Capitalism. Some of these people will have very
confused, illogical ideas about how to change things. . . . The reformist
argument is quite undialectic. . . .
54. In a period of rapid changes we will need to develop our theories and
at the same time maintain a dialectic link between theory and practice. If
we can ensure that our theory is scientific and logical right to its
foundations then our analysis will be more convincing to those we seek to
convince, and we will also be subject to a logical discipline that will
help maintain the correct link between theory and practice and thereby help
us intervene in the struggles ahead in a way that makes a decisive difference.
----------------------
This is not a terrible argument, but it needs to be cleaned up and
developed further. There are two strands of argumentation woven together:
(1) logic and illogic have vital political correlates and applications;
Marxists who can exploit logic against illogic have a great intellectual
weapon in their hands they should not waste. (2) The professionals trained
in logic are incapable of confronting the (il)logic of the world in which
they actually live outside of their professional intellectual life,
including their intellectual understanding of their society. The first
point is reasonably straightforward, though it could have been expressed
better. It's certainly an admonition to Marxists to think clearly and use
logical thinking to their advantage. The second point is the more profound
one, though, and resonates with my perspective: the intellectual
consequences of alienated and fragmented perspective and social being. It
is such a central point that it needs to be developed as a theoretical and
not merely political argument. The framing of the conclusion, i.e. that
logic is a political subject, needs to be formulated much better, and
ironically would be much more effective and even politically valuable if
carefully formulated in a less politicized fashion.
_______________________________________________
Marxism-Thaxis mailing list
Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu
To change your options or unsubscribe go to:
http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
