Well put.
I assume your message concerns the problem of expressing dialectics through
formal logical formula.
If so, we can investigate more concretely the utility of formal logical
expressions for representations of dialectical relations, than the true but
rather abstract problem of the correspondence (not identity) between the
symbolic systems used to represent the message and the thing represented.
The kernel of dialectics is purposive activity, activity with an end.
That is, dialectics emerges when life forms do things in order to make some
change in the state of the world of their activity (including, of course,
themselves). Most dialectical activity is not even willed much less
conscious. Some human dialectical activity is, indeed, conscious, and some
is expressed in language form (that which is communicated between men).
Finally, a relatively small amount of human dialectical activity is
expressed in the form of concepts, some of which take the form of formal
logic. Formal logical representation is a special category within the
general category of dialectics. Having described the place of formal logic
in the category of dialectics we can say that the correspondence of formal
logical systems to dialectics in general will, by virtue of the former being
only a very particular representation of dialectical, i.e. reasoned or
logical activity, be restricted relative to the category of dialectics as a
whole.
In the case of formal logic these restrictions are in part represented
by its definitions, axioms, and propositions, but there are also other, (as
Marx would put it) hidden restrictions that are necessary to the practice of
formal logic. As we wrote above, some human dialectical activity (that
which is expressly social) is expressed through language. Most language use
according to researchers and theorists of language learning and use, such as
Vygotsky, is immediate representation of experience, particularistic and
directly related to the activity and things represented. Conceptualisation
is a special development of meaningful speech in which particulars are
categorised by abstract representations in which particulars are grouped
according to some shared relation. The particular utility of the concept is
in the use of the abstraction to design models (surrogates) of world
conditions entirely from symbolic components without reference to immediate
experience. While the concept as the primary instrument of designed
activity imparts great advantages to the development of human practice:"We
pre-suppose labour in a form that stamps it as exclusively human. A spider
conducts operations that resemble those of a weaver, and a bee puts to shame
many an architect in the construction of her cells. But what distinguishes
the worst architect from the best of bees is this, that the architect raises
his structure in imagination before he erects it in reality." (Marx Capital
vol 1.)
it also restricts all creative human activity to the possible constructs of
the linguistic system by which it is formulated.
For Hegel, conceptual activity includes all forms of consciously designed
purposive activity, i.e. the sciences. This is a far larger category than
that of 'formal logic.' Formal logic is reason divested of all content but
that of relation. In terms of language forms, formal logic is meaningful
speech reduced to the conjunctives, determiners, and prepositions. The
subjects of the employment of these operators, the nouns, pronouns, adverbs,
verbs and adjectives is fortuitous and the outcome of pure logic is
indifferent to the relation of the reasoning to actual practice in the
world. This is the 'Pure Reason' of Kant, free of all relation to the world
of movement and of sense. Need I say that the concept of pure reason as
anything but intellectual exercise is pure nonsense from the viewpoint of
objective idealist and of materialist dialectical concepts of knowledge.
MORE LATER.
Victor
----- Original Message -----
From: "Charles Brown" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "'Forum for the discussion of theoretical issues raised by Karl Marx
andthe thinkers he inspired'" <marxism-thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu>
Sent: Sunday, September 18, 2005 19:02
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Contradiction inherent in symbolling
There is an inherent contradiction in all efforts to represent, as the
process is fundamentally establishing an identity between two different
things - the thing represented and the thing being used to represent. I
think this is the contradiction that always pops up in math , logic ,
dialectics because they all involve symboling or representing.
This convention is what allows messages across generations of dead and
living, yet it carries with it inherent paradox.
Will elaborate.
CB
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