http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2003_01.htm
Oddly enough, however, we find a DM-classicist like Lenin arguing along
familiar lines, for all the world sounding like a born-again Realist with
added Hegelian spin:
"Thought proceeding from the concrete to the abstract -- provided it is
correct (NB)
-- does not get away from the truth but comes closer to it.
The abstraction of matter, the law of nature, the abstraction of value,
etc., in short all scientific (correct, serious, not absurd) abstractions
reflect nature more deeply, truly and completely." [Lenin (1961), p.171.
Emphases in the original.]
Unfortunately, Lenin forgot to say how any of this is remotely possible if
abstractions are creations of the human mind. If scientific knowledge more
truly reflects the world the more its abstractions are correct, how could
this be if abstractions do not exist 'objectively', in some form or other,
for science to reflect? If abstractions don't exist in the outside world
then what could there be in nature for scientific knowledge to depict? On
the other hand, if they do exist, what are they composed of and what form
do they take?
Poor fearing comprehension. Nothing here about Platonism. Just the nature
of scientific idealization. Compare Leszek Kolakowski. Or Marx's general
introduction to the Grundrisse.
Traditional theorists often call such abstractions the "essential"
features of reality, which, according to them, underlie appearances and/or
the material world. In contrast to the particulars we meet in everyday
life, abstractions appear to be general in form. Indeed, the use of
abstractions, so we are told, allows human cognition to arise from
immediate experience to more general knowledge of the world.
In that case, abstractions seem to be required in order to express
generality and help in the formation of scientific knowledge. But, if they
are general in form, does that mean that abstractions are somehow 'spread
out', as it were, dispersed over the concrete objects they collect
together, uniting the seeming diversity we see in nature? Or, are they no
more than 'unifying principles', which are essential for the progress of
science?
Perhaps they are, but more work will need to be done before it is clear
just how such 'principles' are more than merely "useful fictions", handy
at least for boosting the morale of scientists.
Lenin does not promote the former idea of abstraction, nor does any
Marxist. What you call generality seems to be closer to what Marx and
Lenin are getting at.
Well, are abstractions like classes, then? Classes are abstract
particulars of a rather peculiar sort: they are singular in form, but
compound in nature. If Universals are like classes -- which exist anterior
to material reality -- that would appear to suggest they are like ghostly
containers of some sort, but with material contents. Does this
intellectualist approach to reality therefore commit us to the existence
of classes over and above their members? Indeed, does such a theory amount
to a sort of bargain basement Platonism?
This has nothing whatever in common with the cite from Lenin. We know that
Marx & Engels criticized this conception in THE HOLY FAMILY.
Nevertheless, using their 'natural' abstractive skills, intrepid
abstractors are supposed to be able to ignore certain features of material
objects, enabling them to form more general ideas or concepts to which
increasingly wider classes of objects belong. At least that is what the
metaphysical brochure would have us believe. But, materialists should be
suspicious of such moves: how could abstractions be material (in any sense
of the word) if adepts have to disregard certain aspects of material
reality to derive some idea of them? Indeed: if, according to Lenin,
materiality is bound up with "objective existence" outside the mind, how
could a single abstraction be material if it requires the exercise of
mental gymnastics to conjure it into existence? Even worse, how could any
of them be "objective"?
This has nothing to do with Lenin's claims. And see Marx in Grundrisse:
from vague notions of a complex whole to decisive general abstract
relations to the conceptual reconstruction of the concrete.
If this is correct, it would seem that the class of concrete objects could
only ever have aspiring, but never successful members. Moreover, given
this way of seeing things, no sentient material being would ever have the
remotest idea what could possibly count as the genuine article, since bona
fide concrete particulars will only emerge from their shells at the end of
an uncompletable infinitary exercise in interconnection. The dots
determining the shape of that particular metaphysical puzzle will it seems
never be joined up. Indeed, an fully accurate depiction of the very first
concrete particular will only leap from the Ideal page on 'Epistemological
Judgement Day', so to speak. Because of this, it looks like no human being
will ever be in a position to form a clear idea of a single concrete
particular; on that score, humanity is doomed never to know what they are.
The British Neo-Hegelian Idealists, perhaps?
Dialecticians might take exception to these claims because they ignore the
dialectical interplay between the knower and the known, and the abstract
and the concrete. They also seem to confuse subjective with objective
dialectics.
What she said.
Clearly, there is no way that surgically enhanced words like these could
have been social products, nor could they have been grounded in material
reality -- by material practice. They had a strictly limited utility
radius and a highly exclusive clientele; and deliberately so. Only words
such as these could act as intermediaries between select human beings and
the 'Mind of God'; only they could reflect "Essence", "Being" and the
"Rational" order of reality. In this way, therefore, theories exploring
the relationship between "Thought" and "Being" were covert extensions to
Theology.
Of course, these are no mere suppositions; what we know of the history of
Philosophy fully supports this unflattering view.
This quasi-mystical approach to knowledge supplied a rationale for the use
of language as a handy device, one that enabled adepts to gain ready
access to truths about the underlying 'necessary' structure of Reality.
Profound secrets of "Being" could be laid bare by thought alone; no
expensive equipment or messy experiments were required. In fact, no
contact with the material world was needed at all. Wealth, patronage,
leisure, a lively imagination and a flare for jargon are all that were
required. No coincidence then that this approach to abstract ideas has
proven to be highly conducive to a ruling-class view of nature and
society. [More of this later.]
This ancient, aristocratic attitude to 'knowledge' has re-surfaced many
times, in many disguises, in different Modes of Production right
throughout history. It is in fact a common theme that unites every shade
of ruling-class thought, despite its frequent re-packaging as history unfolded.
Much truth in this, but sloppily conceived from the first sentence. A
number of philosophers of different stripes would agree, from Dewey to Adorno.
In traditional Philosophy, one particular idea motivated the above
considerations more than any other: the belief that Logic reflected the
essential nature of Being, that nature's secrets could be unmasked by an
examination of the logical structure of suitably doctored sentences. It is
this no coincidence that the word "speculate" (as in "speculative
philosophy", used by Hegel) comes from the Latin speculum, or mirror.
Not only were Logic and Epistemology two sides of the same coin, the view
prevailed that Logic was just a higher form of Psychology. If Logic was
the study of the "laws of thought", as many supposed, and if Logic
mirrored the structure of reality, the temptation to regard it as a sort
of cosmic super-code, a shortcut to knowledge which mapped out reality way
beyond the scope of the senses, became irresistible. Small wonder then
that many traditional thinkers succumbed, and reality was viewed as the
expression of -- or as identical with -- Logos and Mind.
OK. Marxism at least officially rejects this view. But anticipating your
argument, I suppose that Engels began the trend where objective and
subjective dialectics are fused, thus 'materialistically' replicating
Hegel's notion of objective spirit.
Specially concocted language must therefore be able to link finite minds
with the infinite Ground Of Meaning. Clearly, Philosophers were happy to
cling onto the delusion that human thoughts (but especially their own)
were somehow cosmically significant. This self-deception encouraged the
further idea that the essential properties of Being were a reflection of
(what were in fact) the contingent features of the logico/grammatical
properties of just one group of languages -- the Indo-European family --,
which is the language group in which most of these fairy-tales have been spun.
Too much linguistic philosophy. What a waste.
If religious affectation is the opiate of the oppressed, rationalising
suffering in its wake, metaphysical abstraction is the reverse opiate of
the oppressor -- rationalising the power of the very class that created
the need for such opiates in the first place. That, of course, helps
explain why the words "Logos" and "Logic" are not accidentally related --
and incidentally
Interesting thought!
As will be demonstrated throughout this site, this aprioristic tradition
in Western Philosophy helped DM-classicists flip Hegel's Idealism into its
inverted alter ego: Dialectical Materialism.
A change of name, perhaps; but a ruse by any other name is still a ruse.
(3) Philosophy was thus regarded by those in the know as the source of a
special sort of knowledge, one that was anterior to the sciences, but
which nonetheless was capable of delivering a superscientific
understanding of reality. Philosophical theses supposedly revealed what
were in effect super-necessities underpinning Being itself, knowledge of
which was attainable by the application of 'reason' alone.
This is certainly not Engels' philosophy, but this mode of thinking became
tacitly rooted in Soviet Marxism as a state doctrine.
The downside of this is of course that if for any reason the special role
that Philosophers have arrogated to themselves is denied --, that is, if
it could be shown that the baroque linguistic structures Philosophers
concoct are just "houses of cards" (to paraphrase Wittgenstein) -- then
the whole enterprise would cease to have a point. With no reason for its
existence, Philosophy would become little more than a source of endless
tortured prose; its books fit only for gathering dust in the basement
stack of the local library -- or, better still, for providing ample fuel
for countless very large bonfires, as Hume suggested.
This is horseshit. British bourgeois philosophy of the most insipid
sort. It's not even intelligent ideology critique.
However, the point worth emphasising here is that what had once been the
product of the social relations among human beings (ordinary language) was
transformed and fetishised into a medium that now appeared as an
expression of the real relations between things; in its more extreme form,
as those things themselves, and as the only guide to the nature of
"things-in-themselves". Language was imbued with magical powers;
linguistic megalomania now had a political licence to practice.
You confuse means with ends. Metaphysics is not merely linguistic
megalomania. Childish.
With respect to truth, Lenin famously argued that:
"[D]ialectical logic holds that 'truth' is always concrete, never
abstract
." [Lenin (1921), p.93.]
On the other hand, he also maintained that:
"Thought proceeding from the concrete to the abstract -- provided it is
correct (NB)
-- does not get away from the truth but comes closer to it.
The abstraction of matter, the law of nature, the abstraction of value,
etc., in short all scientific (correct, serious, not absurd) abstractions
reflect nature more deeply, truly and completely." [Lenin (1961), p.171.]
At first sight, these two passages do not appear to be consistent.
Admittedly, in the second, Lenin does go on to mention "practice" as a
crucial component in the "cognition of objective reality", but that does
not explain how "all scientific
abstractions" could possibly "reflect
nature more
, truly", when "truth is always concrete, never abstract"
(emphases added). How can practice reconcile a "never" with an "always"?
And how can an abstraction like "All truth is concrete" be true itself?
Of course, the epistemology presented in Lenin's work is more
sophisticated than this initial paradox might at first sight indicate.
This suggests that the resolution of this difficulty will require greater
clarity about what DM-theorists mean by their use of words like "abstract
and concrete".
Last two sentences: just so.
The heart of the argument can be found in the section "The Abstract And The
Concrete". It should be read with some care. From what I see, the
"Achilles Heel" of Lenin's position would be the assertion of infinite
interconnections of any finite object. That is a genuine
concern. Otherwise, Rosa's argument about Lenin et al lacks clarity.
In the balance of this section Rosa further expounds on the nature of
scientific abstraction and reconstructs the rational meaning of Lenin's
assertions, which echo Marx's. Sounds good. But apparently this reasoning
cannot get off the ground.
The comes the section: "DM-Epistemology: Set In Concrete?", which begins:
The reason why the dialectical juggernaut cannot begin to roll is
connected with the answer to the following questions:
(1) What would the implications be for DM if it turned out that instead of
beginning with abstract general terms to help refine experience,
dialecticians without exception actually started with particulars -- or
from terms that named abstract particulars --, and advanced from there by
only ever using particulars?
Indeed:
(2) What if, instead of using abstract general terms to account for wider
and more general connections in nature, DM-theorists used nothing but the
names of abstract particulars, ones that were incapable of accounting for
anything?
As should seem obvious, unhelpful answers to these questions could deepen
the suspicion that DM cannot account for knowledge. If all this is true,
not only would DM-epistemology have run off the road and into a ditch,
scientific knowledge would be in a hole, too.
To be continued.
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