I find this very interesting and many thanks to Ralph. Dogan _http://www.autodidactproject.org/other/ideo8.html_ (http://www.autodidactproject.org/other/ideo8.html)
IDEOLOGY by Raymond Williams Ideology first appeared in English in 1796, as a direct translation of the new French word ideologie which had been proposed in that year by the rationalist philosopher Destutt de Tracy. Taylor (1796): ‘Tracy read a paper and proposed to call the philosophy of mind, ideology’. Taylor (1797): ‘… ideology, or the science of ideas, in order to distinguish it from the ancient metaphysics’. In this scientific sense, ideology was used in epistemology and linguistic theory until lC19. A different sense, initiating the main modern meaning, was popularized by Napoleon Bonaparte. In an attack on the proponents of democracy — ‘who misled the people by elevating them to a sovereignty which they were incapable of exercising’ — he attacked the principles of the Enlightenment as ‘ideology’. It is to the doctrine of the ideologues — to this diffuse metaphysics, which in a contrived manner seeks to find the primary causes and on this foundation would erect the legislation of peoples, instead of adapting the laws to a knowledge of the human heart and of the lessons of history — to which one must attribute all the misfortunes which have befallen our beautiful France. This use reverberated throughout C19. It is still very common in conservative criticism of any social policy which is in part or in whole derived from social theory in a conscious way. It is especially used of democratic or socialist policies, and indeed, following Napoleon’s use, ideologist was often in C19 generally equivalent to revolutionary. But ideology and ideologist and ideological also acquired, by a process of broadening from Napoleon’s attack, a sense of abstract, impractical or fanatical theory. It is interesting in view of the later history of the word to read Scott (Napoleon, vi, 251): ‘ ideology, by which nickname the French ruler used to distinguish every species of theory, which, resting in no respect upon the basis of self-interest, could, he thought, prevail with none save hot-brained boys and crazed enthusiasts’ (1827). Carlyle, aware of this use, tried to counter it: ‘does the British reader ... call this unpleasant doctrine of ours ideology?’ (Chartism, vi, 148; 1839). There is then some direct continuity between the pejorative sense of ideology, as it had been used in eCl9 by conservative thinkers, and the pejorative sense popularized by Marx and Engels in The German Ideology (1845-7) and subsequently. Scott had distinguished ideology as theory ‘resting in no respect upon the basis of self-interest’, though Napoleon’s alternative had actually been the (suitably vague) ‘knowledge of the human heart and of the lessons of history’. Marx and Engels, in their critique of the thought of their radical German contemporaries, concentrated on its abstraction from the real processes of history. Ideas, as they said specifically of the ruling ideas of an epoch, ‘are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas’. Failure to realize this produced ideology: an upside-down version of reality. If in all ideology men and their circumstances appear upside down as in a camera obscura, this phenomenon arises just as much from their historical life process as the inversion of objects on the retina does from their physical life process. (German Ideology, 47) Or as Engels put it later: Every ideology ... once it has arisen develops in connection with the given concept-material, and develops this material further; otherwise it would cease to be ideology, that is, occupation with thoughts as with independent entities, developing independently and subject only to their own laws. That the material life-conditions of the persons inside whose heads this thought process goes on in the last resort determine the course of this process remains of necessity unknown to these persons, for otherwise there would be an end to all ideology. (Feuerbach, 65-6) Or again: Ideology is a process accomplished by the so-called thinker consciously indeed but with a false consciousness. The real motives impelling him remain unknown to him, otherwise it would not be an ideological process at all. Hence he imagines false or apparent motives. Because it is a process of thought he derives both its form and its content from pure thought, either his own or his predecessors’. (Letter to Mehring, 1893) Ideology is then abstract and false thought, in a sense directly related to the original conservative use but with the alternative — knowledge of real material conditions and relationships — differently stated. Marx and Engels then used this idea critically. The ‘thinkers’ of a ruling class were ‘its active conceptive ideologists, who make the perfecting of the illusion of the class about itself their chief source of livelihood’ (German Ideology, 65). Or again: ‘the official representatives of French democracy were steeped in republican ideology to such an extent that it was only some weeks later that they began to have an inkling of the significance of the June fighting’ (Class Struggles in France, 1850). This sense of ideology as illusion, false consciousness, unreality, upside-down reality, is predominant in their work. Engels believed that the ‘higher ideologies’ — philosophy and religion — were more removed from material interests than the direct ideologies of politics and law, but the connection, though complicated, was still decisive (Feuerbach, 277). They were ‘realms of ideology which soar still higher in the air . . . various false conceptions of nature, of man’s own being, of spirits, magic forces, etc. ... (Letter to Schmidt, 1890). This sense has persisted. Yet there is another, apparently more neutral sense of ideology in some parts of Marx’s writing, notable in the well-known passage in the Contribution to the Critique of Political Philosophy (1859): The distinction should always be made between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production ... and the legal, political, religious, aesthetic or philosophic — in short, ideological — forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out.* This is clearly related to part of the earlier sense: the ideological forms are expressions of (changes in) economic conditions of production. But they are seen here as the forms in which men become conscious of the conflict arising from conditions and changes of condition in economic production. This sense is very difficult to reconcile with the sense of ideology as mere illusion. In fact, in the last century, this sense of ideology as the set of ideas which arise from a given set of material interests or, more broadly, from a definite class or group, has been at least as widely used as the sense of ideology as illusion. Moreover, each sense has been used, at times very confusingly, within the Marxist tradition. There is clearly no sense of illusion or false consciousness in a passage such as this from Lenin: Socialism, insofar as it is the ideology of struggle of the proletarian class, undergoes the general conditions of birth, development and consolidation of an ideology, that is to say it is founded on all the material of human knowledge, it presupposes a high level of science, demands scientific work, etc. … In the class struggle of the proletariat which develops spontaneously, as an elemental force, on the basis of capitalist relations, socialism is introduced by the ideologists. (Letter to the Federation of the North) Thus there is now ‘proletarian ideology’ or ‘bourgeois ideology’, and so on, and ideology in each case is the system of ideas appropriate to that class. One ideology can be claimed as correct and progressive as against another ideology. It is of course possible to add that the other ideology, representing the class enemy, is, while a true expression of their interests, false to any general human interest, and something of the earlier sense of illusion or false consciousness can then be loosely associated with what is primarily a description of the class character of certain ideas. But this relatively neutral sense of ideology, which usually needs to be qualified by an adjective describing the class or social group which it represents or serves, has in fact become common in many kinds of argument. At the same time, within Marxism but also elsewhere, there has been a standard distinction between ideology and SCIENCE (q.v.), in order to retain the sense of illusory or merely abstract thought. This develops the distinction suggested by Engels, in which ideology would end when men realized their real life-conditions and therefore their real motives, after which their consciousness would become genuinely scientific because they would then be in contact with reality (cf. Suvin). This attempted distinction between Marxism as science and other social thought as ideology has of course been controversial, not least among Marxists. In a very much broader area of the ‘social sciences’, comparable distinctions between ideology (speculative systems) and science (demonstrated facts) are commonplace. Meanwhile, in popular argument, ideology is still mainly used in the sense given by Napoleon. Sensible people rely on EXPERIENCE (q.v.), or have a philosophy; silly people rely on ideology. In this sense ideology, now as in Napoleon, is mainly a term of abuse. See DOCTRINAIRE, EXPERIENCE, IDEALISM, PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE *Marx’s German reads: ... kurz, ideologischen Formen, worin sich die Menschen diesen Konflikts bewusst werden … ____________________________________ SOURCE: Williams, Raymond. Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society. Revised edition. New York: Oxford University Press, 1985. Pp. 153-157. In einer eMail vom 14.10.2006 18:57:15 Westeuropäische Sommerzeit schreibt [EMAIL PROTECTED]: See my Ideology Study Guide: http://www.autodidactproject.org/guidideo.html At least one prof. has used this in his curriculum. My favorite treatment of the Marxian conception is: Mills, Charles W. '"'Ideology' in Marx and Engels" Revisited and Revised', The Philosophical Forum, vol. XXIII, no. 4, Summer 1992, pp. 301-328. Mills reviews the literature and disagrees with McCarney's interpretation, for example. I have some more recent books on the subject I need to add to my bibliography, can't remember their titles offhand. At 10:09 AM 10/14/2006 -0400, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > >False Consciousness. The concept of false consciousness is a complex >cognitive-epistemological and socio-economic political concept. It was first >explored in some details by the philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment >prominently by Adam Smith and Adam Ferguson but came to be associated with >the work of >Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. The concept occurs in Marx’s and Engelsâ €™ >work at a junction point of various equally complex concepts like theory of >history, social class, consciousness, social and self consciousness, class >consciousness, commodification and commodity fetishism, ideology >and alienation. >It is often claimed (e.g Joseph McCarney) that Marx does not use the phrase >false consciousness and Engels is, then, referred to as the only one to use >it. This is not true. Both of them use the term. But though it is one of the >most central Marxian terms each uses it only once in their whole (published) >work. But the use of the Hegelian category of appearance is essential >here. One >of the meanings of the category appearance in Hegelian system is distorted >and deceiving reflection of the nature of things. Besides all sorts of >different meanings of the term in Hegelian philosophy, Marx and Engels >use it also >to refer to distorted knowledge and or inadequate expression of reality. >Marx >uses the term in an 1854 in New York published essay Der Ritter vom >edelmütigen Bewußsein (The knight of noble-minded consciousness). >However, he uses it >not in a conceptual way to categorise a certain phenomenon. Rather, he >merely >remarks polemically against A. Willich that he (Willich) is suspecting >behind the right facts false consciousness. The connotation of Engels’ >usage of >the term is something more substantial but curious enough it does not >occur in >one of his major writings. In a letter to Franz Mehring from 14 July 1893 he >discusses the genesis of ideology (superstructure) and how it affects >structure. He admits that he and Marx emphasized how structure determines >superstructure but neglected to work out how superstructure affects >structure. In this >context he asserts: ideology is a process accomplished by the so-called >thinker. Consciously, it is true, but with a false consciousness. The >real motive >forces impelling him remain unknown to him; otherwise it simply would not be >an ideological process. Hence he imagines false or seeming motive forces. >It is thank to the work of the first generation of Marxist philosophers, >prominently to that of Georg Lukács, that the concept false consciousness >assumed the preeminence which it enjoys in contemporary debates - in >particular on >ideology. Lukács works out the meaning of the concept for example in his >classical essay Class Consciousness. He suggests that Marx’s concept of >false >consciousness arises as a reply to bourgeois philosophy and sociology of >history. According to Lukács bourgeois philosophy of history and >sociology tends to >give up the sense of history as progress to justify contemporary form of the >organization of society as natural and eternal or it must cut out everything >in the progress of history that refers to the future. Consequently, it >reduces the progress of history to the role individualities or >supernatural forces >like God. Now, Marx resolves this dilemma of bourgeois theory of history, >Lukács suggests, by developing his concept of historical materialism and by >presenting human relations in capitalist society as the reification. This >is, >then, the stage where, by referring to Engels’s above-mentioned letter >Lukács >introduces the concept of false consciousness. He poses the question whether >historical materialism takes into account the role of consciousness in >history. >In this connection he speaks of a double dialectical determination of false >consciousness. On the one hand, considered in the light of human >relations as >a whole subjective consciousness appears to be justified because it is >something that can be understood, that is, it gives an adequate >expression of >human relations. But as an objective category it is a false consciousness >as it >fails to express the nature of the development of society adequately. On the >other hand, this consciousness in the same context appears to fail to >achieve >subjectively aimed goals because they appear to be unknown, unwanted >objective aims as if they were determined by some mystical supernatural >alien forces. >The whole work of Marx is dedicated to the explanation of this >contradiction. As Rosa Luxemburg has shown, Marx’s and Engels’ whole >work is driven by >the question of how human relations can be brought into an agreement with >human >consciousness. The mature work of Marx’s on this question is Capital. The >key chapter for the study of Marx’s concept of false consciousness is >the first >chapter of the Capital on commodities. The key concept for understanding of >this concept is his concept of commodity fetishism, which he develops in >this >chapter. In his analysis of commodity Marx differentiates between value in >use and value in exchange. The use-value of commodities is obtained by >transforming natural objects into useful objects, say, by transforming >wood into >table. This transformation is accomplished by useful or productive labor to >satisfy various human needs. The exchange-value is the relative value of >commodities, which refers to socially necessary labor time that was >necessary to >produce them. The use-value is realized in the consumption of >commodities. The >exchange value is realized in the exchange process, that is, by relating to >commodities to one another and exchanging them for one another. Now, in his >analysis of the relationship of use-value and exchange value Marx sees a >mutual >negative relationship. He thinks that this negative relationship >originates in >the value from of commodities because in the exchange process the aim of >production (satisfaction of needs) has been reversed into obtaining of >exchange-values. The aim of production is, then, no longer satisfaction >of human needs >but production and realization of exchange values. This gives rise to the >fact that human products as commodities dominate humans rather than vice >versa >humans their product. This is, in turn, the reason why everybody strives to >realize exchange-values and becomes commodity fetishist. From now on >commodities (a trivial thing, if considered in the light of use-value) >appear to be >mystified things endowed with life and turned into supernatural divine >forces >that are prayed for. As a result human relations take the form of social >relations between products. >The commodification of products, however, requires the commodification of >human labor too. The commodification of human labor in turn requires the >separation of laborers from their means of production and monopolization >in the >hands of the few (original accumulation) so that the laborers have >nothing to >sell but their labor forces, that is, their physiological and intellectual >functions of their bodies. This is also the source of the rise of social >classes >in capitalist society with their class consciousnesses or ideologies. In >capitalist society, then, there are two contradictory sets of ideologies: >on the >one hand, there is the institutionalized ideology of ruling class >claiming to >represent the whole of society and there is, on the other hand, the >subaltern ideology of subordinated classes. In short, ideology as a form of >consciousness arises from social class relations. >Marx’s concept of ideology has been often equated with false >consciousness. >But as Theodor W. Adorno has shown as early as 1930s and as Hans Heinz Holz >and István Mésáros enforced in the 1970s the equitation of >ideology with false >consciousness is undertaken in the tradition of Weberian sociology – in >particular in the sociology of knowledge of Karl Mannheim. Ideology >in Marxian >thought has many meanings and false consciousness is just one of them. To >introduce a historical perspective into the debate on false consciousness, >in his >above-referred essay Lukács suggests considering Marx’s concept of >ideology >in the light of class position vis-à -vis the means of production. Only in >this >manner, Lukács thinks, one can obtain the category of objective possibility >to overcome consciousness as ideology and false consciousness. He thinks >that >because of its position vis-à -vis the means of production the only class >that >is objectively interested in overcoming consciousness as ideology and false >consciousness is working classes. Marx and Engels formulated this idea as >early as 1848 in the Manifest of Communist Party. >DoÄŸan Göçmen >Further Reading >István Mésáros, Marx’s Theory of Alienation, Merlin Press, >London, 1986. >István Mésáros, The Power of Ideology, ZED Books LTD, London & New York, >2005. > >_______________________________________________ >Marxism-Thaxis mailing list >[email protected] >To change your options or unsubscribe go to: >http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis _______________________________________________ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list [email protected] To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis _______________________________________________ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list [email protected] To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
