A Non-Orthodox View 
 
by Walden Bello 
 
ZNet (February 22 2009) 
 
This is the longer version of an essay by the author released by the  British 
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) on February 06 2009. 
 

Week after week, we see the global economy contracting at a pace worse  than 
predicted by the gloomiest analysts.  We are now, it is clear, in no  ordinary 
recession but are headed for a global depression that could last for  many 
years. 
 

The Fundamental Crisis: Overaccumulation 
 
Orthodox economics has long ceased to be of any help in understanding the  
crisis.  Non-orthodox economics, on the other hand, provides  extraordinarily 
powerful insights into the causes and dynamics of the current  crisis.  From 
the 
progressive perspective, what we are seeing is the  intensification of one of 
the central crises or "contradictions" of global  capitalism: the crisis of 
overproduction, also known as overaccumulation or  overcapacity.  This is the 
tendency for capitalism to build up, in the  context of heightened 
inter-capitalist competition, tremendous productive  capacity that outruns the 
population's capacity to consume owing to income  inequalities that limit 
popular 
purchasing power.  The result is an erosion  of profitability, leading to an 
economic 
downspin. 
 
To understand the current collapse, we must go back in time to the  so-called 
Golden Age of Contemporary Capitalism, the period from 1945 to  
1975.  This was a period of rapid growth both in the center economies  and in 
the underdeveloped economies - one that was partly triggered by the  massive 
reconstruction of Europe and East Asia after the devastation of the  Second 
World War, and partly by the new socioeconomic arrangements and  instruments 
based on a historic class compromise between Capital and Labor that  were 
institutionalized under the new Keynesian state. 
 
But this period of high growth came to an end in the mid-1970s, when the  
center economies were seized by stagflation, meaning the coexistence of low  
growth with high inflation, which was not supposed to happen under neoclassical 
 
economics. 
 
Stagflation, however, was but a symptom of a deeper cause: the  
reconstruction of Germany and Japan and the rapid growth of industrializing  
economies like 
Brazil, Taiwan, and South Korea added tremendous new productive  capacity and 
increased global competition, while income inequality within  countries and 
between countries limited the growth of purchasing power and  demand, thus 
eroding profitability. This was aggravated by the massive oil price  rises of 
the 
seventies. 
 
The most painful expression of the crisis of overproduction was global  
recession of the early 1980s, which was the most serious to overtake the  
international economy since the Great Depression, that is, before the current  
crisis. 
 
Capitalism tried three escape routes from the conundrum of overproduction:  
neoliberal restructuring, globalization, and financialization 
 

Escape Route #1: Neoliberal Restructuring 
 
Neoliberal restructuring took the form of Reaganism and Thatcherism in the  
North and Structural Adjustment in the South.  The aim was to invigorate  
capital accumulation, and this was to be done by (1) removing state constraints 
 on 
the growth, use, and flow of capital and wealth; and (2) redistributing  
income from the poor and middle classes to the rich on the theory that the rich 
 
would then be motivated to invest and reignite economic growth. 
 
The problem with this formula was that in redistributing income to the  rich, 
you were gutting the incomes of the poor and middle classes, thus  
restricting demand, while not necessarily inducing the rich to invest more in  
production.  In fact, it could be more profitable to invest in speculation. 
 
In fact, neoliberal restructuring, which was generalized in the North and  
south during the eighties and nineties, had a poor record in terms of growth:  
Global growth averaged 1.1 percent in the 1990s and 1.4 percent in the 1980s,  
compared with 3.5 percent in the 1960s and 2.4 percent in the 1970s, when 
state  interventionist policies were dominant. Neoliberal restructuring could 
not 
shake  off stagnation. 
 

Escape Route #2: Globalization 
 
The second escape route global capital took to counter stagnation was  
"extensive accumulation" or globalization, or the rapid integration of  
semi-capitalist, non-capitalist, or pre-capitalist areas into the global market 
 economy. 
Rosa Luxemburg, the famous German radical economist, saw this long ago  in her 
classic The Accumulation of Capital (1913) as necessary to shore up the  rate 
of profit in the metropolitan economies. 
 
How?  By gaining access to cheap labor, by gaining new, albeit  limited, 
markets, by gaining new sources of cheap agricultural and raw material  
products, 
and by bringing into being new areas for investment in infrastructure.  
Integration is accomplished via trade liberalization, removing barriers to the  
mobility of global capital, and abolishing barriers to foreign investment. 
 
China is, of course, the most prominent case of a non-capitalist area to be  
integrated into the global capitalist economy over the last 25 years. 
 
By the middle of the first decade of the 21st century, roughly forty to  
fifty percent of the profits of US corporations came from their operations and  
sales abroad, especially in China. 
 
The problem with this escape route from stagnation is that it exacerbates  
the problem of overproduction because it adds to productive capacity.  A  
tremendous amount of manufacturing capacity has been added in China over the  
last 
25 years, and this has had a depressing effect on prices and profits.   Not 
surprisingly, by around 1997, the profits of US corporations stopped  growing.  
According to one calculation, the profit rate of the Fortune 500  went from 
7.15 in 1960-69 to 5.30 in 1980-90 to 
2.29 in 1990-99 to 1.32 in  2000-2002.  By the end of the 1990s, with excess 
capacity in almost every  industry, the gap between productive capacity and 
sales was the largest since  the Great Depression. 
 

Escape Route #3: Financialization 
 
Given the limited gains in countering the depressive impact of  
overproduction via neoliberal restructuring and globalization, the third escape 
 route - 
financialization - became very critical for maintaining and raising  
profitability. 
 
With investment in industry and agriculture yielding low profits owing to  
overcapacity, large amounts of surplus funds have been circulating in or  
invested and reinvested in the financial sector - that is, the financial sector 
 is 
turning on itself. 
 
The result is an increased bifurcation between a hyperactive financial  
economy and a stagnant real economy.  As one financial executive noted in  the 
pages of the Financial Times, "there has been an increasing disconnection  
between 
the real and financial economies in the last few years. The real economy  has 
grown ... but nothing like that of the financial economy - until it  
imploded".  What this observer does not tell us is that the disconnect  between 
the 
real and the financial economy is not accidental - that the  financial economy e
xploded precisely to make up for the stagnation owing to  overproduction of 
the real economy. 
 
One indicator of the super-profitability of the financial sector is that  
while profits in the US manufacturing sector came to one percent of US gross  
domestic product (GDP), profits in the financial sector came to two  percent.  
Another is the fact that forty percent of the total profits of US  financial 
and 
non-financial corporations is accounted for by the financial  sector although 
it is responsible for only five percent of US gross domestic  product (and 
even that is likely to be an overestimate). 
 
The problem with investing in financial sector operations is that it is  
tantamount to squeezing value out of already created value. It may create  
profit, 
yes, but it does not create new value - only industry, agricultural,  trade, 
and services create new value.  Because profit is not based on value  that is 
created, investment operations become very volatile and prices of  stocks, 
bonds, and other forms of investment can depart very radically from  their real 
value - for instance, the stock of Internet startups may keep rising  to 
heights unknown, driven mainly by upwardly spiraling financial valuations. 
 
Profits then depend on taking advantage of upward price departures from the  
value of commodities, then selling before reality enforces a "correction", 
that  is a crash back to real values.  The radical rise of prices of an asset 
far 
 beyond real values is what is called the formation of a bubble. 
 
Profitability being dependent on speculative coups, it is not surprising  
that the finance sector lurches from one bubble to another, or from one  
speculative mania to another.  Because it is driven by speculative mania,  
finance-driven capitalism has experienced about 100 financial crises since  
capital 
markets were deregulated and liberalized in the 
1980s, the most  serious before the current crisis being the Asian Financial 
Crisis of 1997. 
 

Dynamics of the Subprime Implosion 
 
The current Wall Street collapse has its roots in the Technology Bubble of  
the late 1990s, when the price of the stocks of Internet startups skyrocketed,  
then collapsed, resulting in the loss of $7 trillion worth of assets and the  
recession of 2001 to 2002. 
 
The loose money policies of the Fed under Alan Greenspan had encouraged the  
Technology Bubble, and when it collapsed into a recession, Greenspan, trying 
to  counter a long recession, cut the prime rate to a 
45-year low of one percent  in June 2003 and kept it there for over a year. 
This had the effect of  encouraging another bubble - the real estate bubble. 
 
As early as 2002, progressive economists were warning about the real estate  
bubble.  However, as late as 2005, then Council of Economic Advisers  Chairman 
and now Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben Bernanke attributed the rise  in 
US housing prices to "strong economic fundamentals" instead of speculative  
activity.  Is it any wonder that he was caught completely off guard when  the 
Subprime Crisis broke in the summer of 2007? 
 
The subprime mortgage crisis was not a case of supply outrunning real  
demand.  The "demand" was largely fabricated by speculative mania on the  part 
of 
developers and financiers that wanted to make great profits from their  access 
to foreign money - most of it Asian and Chinese in origin - that flooded  the 
US in the last decade.  Big ticket mortgages were aggressively sold to  
millions who could not normally afford them by offering low "teaser" interest  
rates 
that would later be readjusted to jack up payments from the new  homeowners. 
 
How did problematic mortgages become such a massive problem?  The  reason is 
that these assets were then "securitized" - that is converted into  spectral 
commodities called "collateralized debt obligations" (CDOs) that  enabled 
speculation on the odds that the mortgage would not be paid. These were  then 
traded by the mortgage originators working with different layers of  middlemen 
who 
understated risk so as to offload them as quickly as possible to  other banks 
and institutional investors. These institutions in turn offloaded  these 
securities onto other banks and foreign financial institutions. 
 
The idea was to make a sale quickly, get your money upfront, and make a  tidy 
profit, while foisting the risk on the suckers down the line - the hundreds  
of thousands of institutions and individual investors that bought the  
mortgage-tied securities. This was called "spreading the risk", and it was  
actually 
seen as a good thing because it lightened the balance sheet of  financial 
institutions, enabling them to engage in other lending activities. 
 
When the interest rates were raised on the subprime loans, adjustable  
mortgage, and other housing loans, the game was up. There are about four 
million  
subprime mortgages which will likely go into default in the next two years, and 
 
five million more defaults from adjustable rate mortgages and other "flexible 
 loans" that were geared to snag the most reluctant potential homebuyer will  
occur over the next several years.  But securities whose value run into as  
much as $2 trillion had already been injected, like virus, into the global  
financial system.  Global capitalism's gigantic circulatory system was  fatally 
infected.  And, as with a plague, we don't know who and how many  are fatally 
infected until they keel over because the whole financial system has  become so 
non-transparent owing to lack of regulation. 
 
For Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Bear Stearns,  
Bank of America, and Citigroup, the losses represented by these toxic 
securities  simply overwhelmed their reserves.  Iceland's banks and many 
European  
financial institutions have since joined the list of victims. Some, like Lehman 
 
Brothers, have been allowed to die, but most have been kept alive with massive  
injections of taxpayers' cash by governments that want the banks to lend to 
keep  the real economy going. 
 

Collapse of the Real Economy 
 
But instead of performing their primordial task of lending to facilitate  
productive activity, the banks are holding on to their cash or buying up rivals 
 
to strengthen their financial base. Not surprisingly, with global capitalism's 
 circulatory system seizing up, it was only a matter of time before the real  
economy would contract, as it has with frightening speed in the last few 
weeks.  Woolworth, a retail icon, has folded in Britain, the US auto industry 
is 
on  emergency care, and even mighty Toyota has suffered an unprecedented 
decline in  its profits.  With American consumer demand plummeting, China and 
East 
Asia  have seen their goods rotting on the docks, bringing about a sharp 
contraction  of their economies and massive layoffs. 
 
Globalization has ensured that economies that went up together in the boom  
would also go down together, with unparalleled speed, in the bust, the end of  
which is nowhere to be discerned. 
 
_____
 
Walden Bello is professor at the University of the Philippines, Diliman;  
senior analyst at Focus on the Global South; and president of the Freedom from  
Debt Coalition.  He can be reached at _waldenbe...@yahoo.com_ 
(mailto:waldenbe...@yahoo.com)  ..  This  article was first published by the 
Philippine Daily 
Inquirer on February 11  2009, and it is reproduced here for educational 
purposes. 
 
Source: MR Zine _http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/bello200209.html_ 
(http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/bello200209.html)  
 
_http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/20638_ 
(http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/20638)  
 

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