The comment is by a comrade from another list. I'll ask him On 6/25/09, steiger2...@centrum.cz <steiger2...@centrum.cz> wrote: > Being not of the old list members I would very much appreciate being told the > source of this extremely interesting document. Thanks in advance. > Stephen Steiger steger2...@centrum.cz > ______________________________________________________________ > > Od: cdb1...@prodigy.net > > Komu: marxism-thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu, a-l...@lists.econ.utah.edu > > Datum: 25.06.2009 17:29 > > Předmět: [Marxism-Thaxis] An anti-imperialist perspective > > > > Date: Tues, Jun 23 2009 12:45 pm by Julio > > The passages below are from an old (mid 1970s) document. Some list > members will recognize the author. If you don't and are interested in > locating the source, please e-mail me off-list. (Between * designates > Italics from the author. Between _ designates my emphasis. > Unbracketed ellipsis ... indicating quote discontinuity are the > author's while bracketed ones [...] are mine.) > > IMHO, this is one of the most thought-provoking works in the classical > Marxist tradition ever written. In the best intellectual tradition of > Marx and Engels, the author grappled deeply and seriously with the > existing conditions and ideologies, acknowledging their rationales, > following their logic to the point where they forced him to a deeper > and broader understanding of the issues. Like Marx's best works, it > shows readers how a an engaged mind, committed to the struggle, sorts > things out. > > I read it fresh in 1979, almost as soon as its Spanish version became > available in Mexico. The first few chapters were divulged first in a > short-lived Marxist journal named Teoría y Política published by a > group of South American exiles. The entire work followed under > Alfaguara. I re-read it a few times as an undergrad student in Cuba > and discussed it at length with friends from -- I believe -- at least > four continents, although I can now see how one-sided my concerns > were. While some friends got really agitated about some of the -- IMO > rather subsidiary -- propositions advanced in the work, some rendered > irrelevant by subsequent developments (the bulk of the work is devoted > to a critique of the Soviet socialist formation), the passages below > taken on their own have maintained a large measure of relevance (not > necessarily validity) all along. > > The tension at the center of the quoted section below has been > splitting Marxists since Marx & Engels's times (e.g. the Irish and > Slavic question). On a formal level, the issue reappeared in the late > 19th century/early 20th century chasm between the early > social-democrats (Lenin, Plekhanov, etc.) and the narodniki. (As > shown below, on this matter, Lenin himself experienced a 180 degree > turn over his political life. Just keep in mind the early concerns > Lenin had about proving the political relevance of the social > democracy in Russia in the light of Russia's backwardness. The young > Lenin wasn't emphasizing the lack of capitalist development in Russia, > but precisely the opposite. Naturally, with his responsibilities as > head of the Soviet state, in the middle of a civil war, after a > devastating world war, things looked quite differently.) At a deeper > level, though, the controversy had intrinsic intellectual roots in > Russian history (and other "backward" places), dating back to the > conflict between the liberal modernizers and the ancestors of the > populists. In their historical essays, E.H. Carr and Isaac Deutscher > discussed the matter in some detail. Rosa Luxemburg clashed with the > Polish, Galician, and Baltic nationalists on this very issue. Etc. > > My decision to post these passages in extenso is, of course, prompted > by the current debate re. the Mousavi-Ahmedinajad conflict. > > IMO, the ideological cloak of the anti-imperialist struggle is > secondary. The key thing is the social character of the movement and > its *objective logic* (if I'm allowed to use that old Hegelian > formula). It is of course twisted, ironic and shameful, historically > speaking, that the global discredit of Marxism and -- more tragically > and decisively -- the mechanical suppression of Marxists and > socialists in central Asia and the Middle East (including here > repression conducted by the very forces that now appear to lead the > anti-imperialist resistance, blemishes and all) have limited its role > in the local anti-imperialist struggles, which have turned instead to > the ideological straight-jacketed form of political Islam. > > However, secondary doesn't mean unimportant. If the strictures of the > religious integument have dulled beyond a point the anti-imperialism > it portends, all bets are off. In that case, the triumph of the > popular movement excited by Mir Hossein Mousavi or the aftermath may > turn out to be the necessary precondition for a better political > framework for the anti-imperialist struggle in Iran. I'd think that > the risk has diminished with time, but history shows (including the > history of Iran!) that even a large nation has difficulty escaping > subordination to imperialism. It's not clear to me from my distance > and ignorance whether this is already the case in Iran. It does > disturb me to see the excited support that the Mousavi movement has > elicited among the always suspect Western establishment. But that's > not decisive. > > I have no answer to the vexing question. The matter is complex. No > kidding. The left in, say, the West doesn't need to settle it as a > precondition to unite in the local struggles ahead. Nothing human > should be alien to us, but too much rancor in disputes that do not > strictly pertain to our present and immediate circumstance strike me > as a cop out. I'm hoping the quotes below highlight the inherent > difficulty of the questions involved and humble us all a little. My > mind on this has shifted and will continue to shift. Back and forth. > And shifts on this tend to be wide pendulum swings, since many > important conclusions follow from each alternative stance. But, "Only > dead minds don't oscillate," wrote Isaac Deutscher. > > For example, during the 1990s, I took some distance from the reasoning > below. Stuff related to my own personal trajectory, in Mexico in the > early 1990s (after the Soviet Union failed), and then in the U.S. > under Clinton. At the time, I remember discounting heavily Chomsky's > categorical views on the militaristic slant of U.S. capital with > regards to foreign and domestic policy. (In fairness, I'm referring > to things Chomsky wrote prompted by the late 1980s Persian Gulf war, > which I read with the benefit of the mid 1990s hindsight.) > > Assuming the inherently antagonistic form in which capitalism > dissolves old conditions and introduces new ones, I thought (and still > think) that the "neoliberal" globalization offered Mexico and other > nations in Latin America a mixed bag that included opportunities for > reducing international inequality. It wasn't automatic, but it was > possible. In my mind, it was something like a recurrence of the > 1850s-1910s expansion of Western capitalism. In Mexico, in the early > 1990s, the whole thing appeared as a *political* swing so strong that > -- in my thinking -- it had exhaust or weaken itself considerably, as > a result of its own inherent contradictions, before the left could > have a *political* clear shot. That, of course, didn't imply > abandoning all struggles, particular the economic, day-to-day > fork-and-knife fights for marginal improvements in the workers' > working and living conditions, but the *political* scope of the > struggle had to be downgraded or risk a worse backlash. (Clearly, > Chavez took the exact opposite approach. He went for the political > jugular in 1992. At the time and for a good while, his Quixotic > gesture looked foolish to me. But, as history twists and turns, it > turned out to be a learning experience for him and Venezuela, without > which he and his country wouldn't be were they are now.) > > Looking at things from the perspective of the mid 1990s, it seemed to > me that the vitality shown by the U.S. non-military economy and the > whole thrust of the "neoliberal" globalization agenda (as opposed to > the "neoconservatism" of the early 2000s) weren't entirely consistent > with the view of a predominantly militaristic, parasytic U.S. (and, if > I remember well Chomsky's remarks, British) economy. I remember > thinking (and I believe I may have posted something about it on one of > the usual lists) that we faced a sort of historical bifurcation, where > the world train was being switched from the Lenin Track (1914-1989) > back to the Marx Track (1850s-1914s). > > It was either my feverish imagination or the track switch prove not to > be very robust since, with the selection of W and the U.S. reaction to > 9/11, the train tripped back to the old Lenin Track. Anyway, with > time, my views have become more mixed, which doesn't make them very > amenable to a small set of categorical statements. > > Still, I can try to schematize my mental framework in a couple of > sweeping statements: At the present time, the biggest danger ahead for > humans doesn't arise from environmental decay or turbulent financial > markets or even nuclear proliferation per se. These are, no doubt, > serious dangers. But, ultimately, the biggest source of trouble lies > in the abismal, persistent levels of *inequality*, especially (though > not exclusively) international inequality. Imperialism, which > continues to provide the current historical form of global capitalism, > is an epi-phenomenon of international inequality. If the available > data are to be trusted, judged according to this rough criteria, the > main forces of progress in the last four or five decades have been > Southeast Asia, China, India, and more recently Russia and some parts > of Latin America. And the main forces of the historical reaction have > remained virtually the same since colonial times: Western Europe and > its offshots in other continents. > > Environmental decay and nuclear weapons are a problem mainly because > they are embedded in a context of deeply rooted international > inequality, which makes them explosive. Of course things are not so > simple, but if I were to put my thought in a simple formula, I'd say > that anything that contributes to reducing international inequality is > very good and anything that helps increase international inequality is > very bad. To which I add the Lincoln Question for reasons that will > become obvious below: Whatever historical development is out there, Is > it *of, by, and for* the working people? If the answer is no, then it > winds up contributing to increasing inequality. And vice versa. (For > limitations to the use of the Lincoln Criterion, see my speech at the > NY Left Labor Project Collective on 6/11/09.) > > This is, in short, the rationale of my anti-imperialism. > > * * * > > The shifting of the main line of battle from the internal to the > external contradictions of imperialism, which is reflected in the > slogan "world countryside against the world town," perhaps dubious, > but still highly significant, is of the greatest importance for a > definition of all other positions in revolutionary programmes today. > We must realize that _this was not expected by the classical Marxist > tradition_. It has theoretical as well as practical implications for > the Marxist conception of history. [...] > > It was only realistic of Marx to conclude in 1853 that the British > rule in India would objectively tackle the task of creating the > material foundations for a Western, i.e. capitalist, social order. > The question was not "whether the English had a right to conquer > India, but whether we are to prefer India conquered by the Turk, by > the Persian, by the Russian, to India conquered by the Briton." For > while "there cannot ... remain any doubt that the misery inflicted by > the British on Hindustan is of an essentially different and > _infinitely more intensive kind_ than all Hindustan had to suffer > before," England had still brought about "the greatest, and, _to speak > the truth_, the only *social* revolution ever heard of in Asia." "The > question is, can mankind fulfil its destiny without a fundamental > revolution in the social state of Asia?" But because the history of > British rule in India scarcely displayed anything beyond the > destruction of the traditional social structure, "The Indians will not > reap the fruits of the new elements of society scattered among them by > the British bourgeoisie till in Great Britain itself the now ruling > classes shall have been supplanted by the industrial proletariat, or > till the Hindus themselves shall have grown strong enough to throw off > the English yoke altogether." > > This last mentioned alternative, however, is evidently > uncharacteristic of Marx's future perspective, and the outcome of the > Indian uprising a few years later proved him right in this. It was > also without any further consequences that Engels made a more > favourable assessment of the chances of the Taiping movement in China, > fighting as this did with more suitable methods. The two friends > ultimately held firmly to the general rule with which Marx ended his > concluding essay on India: "When a great social revolution shall have > mastered the results of the bourgeois epoch, the market of the world > and the modern powers of production, and subjected them to the common > control of the most advanced peoples (*sic*), only then will human > progress cease to resemble that hideous pagan idol, who would not > drink the nectar from the skulls of the slain." For Russia, for > example, Marx held that such a revolution in the West would actually > provide the possibility of a comprehensive social reorganization along > the lines of the Chinese people's communes of today. The traditional > village communities were to join together on a regional basis, and to > take over and apply the industrial achievements of a now socialist > West on this broader scale. > > The same basic position is repeated in Engels' final statement of 1894 > on the prospects of the Russian revolution: "However, it is not only > possible but inescapable that once the proletariat wins out and the > means of production pass into common ownership among the West-European > nations, the countries which have just managed to make a start on > capitalist production, and where tribal institutions or relics of them > are still intact, will be able to use these relics of communal > ownership and the corresponding popular customs as a _powerful_ means > of considerably shortening their advance to socialist society.... But > an inevitable condition of this is the example and active support of > the hitherto capitalist West.... And this applies not only to Russia > but to all countries at the pre-capitalist stage of development. > However, this will be relatively easiest done in Russia, where a part > of the native population has already assimilated the intellectual > fruits of capitalist development..." The overthrow of Tsarist > despotism would "also give a fresh impulse to the labour movement in > the West, creating for it new and better conditions for struggle and > thereby advancing the victory of the modern industrial proletariat, a > victory without which present-day Russia, whether on the basis of the > community or of capitalism, cannot achieve a socialist transformation > of society." > > History has furnished a decisive corrective to this original Marxist > prognosis. While the capitalist order is already in a third phase of > its internal contradictions, _and *moving* in them instead of > succumbing to them_, as Marx predicted for its first phase, and Lenin > conclusively for its second, many peoples in the precapitalist > countries have set out on their own road towards socialism. The > proletarian revolution in the West did not take place; and its > appearance in the form previously anticipated has become ever more > improbable. The nature and character of a revolution are only > determined up to a certain point by the programme and heroism of its > vanguard, who can only achieve the first steps. The Soviets of 1905 > and 1917 continued the Paris Commune, but after them this continuity > was broken. Today, adherence to the hope of a classical socialist > overthrow in the West must lead to _a pessimism that is actually > groundless_. _The revolutions in Russia and China, in the Balkans and > in Cuba, have probably contributed not less but rather more to the > overall progress than the proletarian revolutions hoped for in the > West could have done_. > > Marxism, in other words, set out on a different journey, via Russia to > Asia, Africa and Latin America, a route associated with the names of > Lenin, Mao Tse-Tung, Nkrumah and Castro. _It represents today > something incomparably greater and more diverse than in the era of > Marx_, and also in regard to its significance for Europe. It is not a > question of its "purity," but rather that it can simply no longer be > monopolized as a tool for study and for changing social realities. > (The variety of these must be stressed, so as to understand _the > differentiation_ of Marxist thought as something *positive*.) > Historical materialism itself prohibits us from judging whether > conditions in the Soviet Union, People's China, etc. realize > "authentic Marxism," though it can explain why the official > representatives of the various tendencies struggle for sole possession > of the truth. What is authentic is not the letter of theory, but the > historical process. If Leninism already represents in its theory, and > especially in its practice, a considerable "revision" of the orthodox > doctrine, that is the great merit of the founder of the Soviet Union. > > Lenin's view of the revolutionary possibilities of the Asian peoples > was rendered more acute right from the beginning by his understanding > of the semi-Asiatic character of social relations in Russia. As early > as 1900, when the Russian reactionary and liberal press were > accompanying Tsarist participation in the imperialist police action > against the so-called Boxer rebellion in China with a campaign of > hatred against the barbarian Chinese, those enemies of culture and > civilization, Lenin stressed, as he was repeatedly to do later, the > similarity of the social problems facing the peoples of Russia and > China: "The Chinese people suffer from the same evils as those from > which the Russian people suffer -- they suffer from an Asiatic > government that squeezes taxes from the starving peasantry and that > suppresses every aspiration towards liberty by military force; they > suffer from the oppression of capital, which has penetrated into the > Middle Kingdom." The term "Asiatic" here describes a specific form of > relations of domination. In the same sense, Lenin was later to write: > "In very many and very essential respects, Russia is undoubtedly an > Asian country and, what is more, one of the most benighted, medieval > and shamefully backward of Asian countries." > > Against the background of this historical affinity, he observed how > the Russian revolution of 1905 was followed by very similar events in > Turkey, Persia and above all in 1911 in China, while India and > Indonesia also began to stir. There could be no doubt, Lenin > concluded in 1908, that the European policies of robbery and > oppression would steel the Asian peoples for a victorious struggle > against their oppressors. The Russian revolution had *two* great > international allies, one in Europe (the modern proletariat) and one > in Asia. In 1913 he gave an article the significant title "Backward > Europe and Advanced Asia," and wrote earlier the same year: "The > awakening of Asia and the beginning of the struggle for power by the > advanced proletariat of Europe are a symbol of the new phase in world > history that began early this century." If the mention of Asia was > initially contingent, it indicated none the less the beginning of a > shift of emphasis. In considering the historical destiny of Marxism > in the same year 1913, Lenin emphasized with respect to the new > "source of great world storms opened up in Asia": "It is in this era > of storms and their 'repercussions' in Europe that we are now > living.... Certain people who were inatentive to the conditions > preparing and developing the mass struggle were driven to despair and > to anarchism by the lengthy delays in the decisive struggle against > capitalism in Europe.... The fact that Asia, with its population of > eight hundred million, has been drawn into the struggle for these same > European ideals should inspire us with optimism and not despair.... > After Asia, Europe has also begun to stir...." > > Characteristic of Lenin's position is his reference to the way that > the philosophical and political slogans of the anti-imperialist > liberation struggle derive from the ideals of the bourgeois and the > proletarian revolution in Europe. The new role of Asia in no way > meant that "light shines only from the mystic, religious East." "No, > quite the opposite. It means that the East has definitely taken the > Western path," which Russia had itself embarked upon. At least at the > theoretical level, Lenin continued to the last to hold the conviction > that "the social revolution in Western Europe is maturing before our > eyes." But after 1917, while the Bolsheviks _waited passionately_ for > the outbreak of the revolution in the West, and in Germany in > particular, which was to come to the relief of the Russian October and > secure its future, a different orientation came more and more to the > fore. > > In November 1919 Lenin developed the following idea in addressing > representatives of the Communist organizations of the East: since the > imperialists would not allow the European revolutions to take their > course easily and swiftly, and since the "old socialist compromisers > are enlisted on the side of the bourgeoisie," "the socialist > revolution will not be solely or chiefly a struggle of the > revolutionary proletarians in each country against their bourgeoisie > -- no -- it will be a struggle of all the imperialist-oppressed > colonies and countries, of all dependent countries, against > international imperialism." The programme of the Russian Communist > Party was based on the union of the civil war in the advanced > countries with wars of national liberation. "It is self-evident that > _final_ victory can be won _only_ by the proletariat of _all the > advanced countries_ of the world, and we, the Russians, are beginning > the work which the British, French or German proletariat will > consolidate. But we see" -- and _this is a completely new > formulation_ -- "that they will not be victorious without the aid of > the working people of all the oppressed colonial nations, first and > foremost, of Eastern nations. We must realize that the transition to > communism cannot be accomplished by the vanguard alone." The task > Lenin proposes, therefore, is to "translate the true communist > doctrine, which was intended for the Communists of the more advanced > countries, into the language of every people," and "our Soviet > Republic must now muster all the awakening peoples of the East and, > together with them, wage a struggle against international > imperialism." > > In March 1923, when he wrote his final testamentary essay, "Better > Fewer, but Better," Lenin took a decisive step further. "Shall we be > able," he asked, "to hold on with our small and very small peasant > production, and in our present state of ruin, until the West-European > capitalist countries consummate their development towards socialism?" > After surveying the contradictions between the rich imperialist > states, he reached the conclusion that "the outcome of the struggle > will be determined by the fact that Russia, India, China, etc., > account for the overwhelming majority of the population of the globe," > a majority schooled and trained for the struggle by capitalism itself. > He then indicated what he saw as the basic contradiction and central > task of the epoch introduced by October: "*To ensure our existence > until the next military conflict between the counter-revolutionary > imperialist West and the revolutionary and nationalist East, between > the most civilized countries of the world and the Oriental backward > countries which, however, comprise the majority, this majority must > become civilized.* We, too, lack enough civilization to enable us to > pass straight on to socialism, although we do have the political > requisites for it." Two months earlier he had written: "If a definite > level of culture is required for the building of socialism... why > cannot we begin by first achieving the prerequisites for that definite > level of culture _in a revolutionary way_, and *then*, with the aid of > the workers' and peasants' government and the Soviet system, proceed > to overtake the other nations?" In this way, therefore, Lenin derived > from the enforced circumstances which the Russian revolution had > arrived at by its isolation the programmatic basis of subsequent > development. > > For the heroes of the Second International, who charged the Bolsheviks > with violating "Marxist orthodoxy," and their imitators of today, > Lenin offered the following consideration: "Our European philistines > never even dream that the subsequent revolutions in Oriental > countries, which possess much vaster populations and a much vaster > diversity of social conditions, will undoubtedly display _even greater > distinctions_ than the Russian revolution." What singular Leninists, > then, are those who would today play schoolmaster to the Chinese > revolution, the revolution of a good quarter of humanity! > > Marx only touched in passing on the question as to how the > non-European peoples were to appropriate the achievements of the epoch > of private property, i.e. the wealth of Europe with its industrial > preconditions. It seems that he did not realize the full implications > of either the tremendous material gap or the gap at the level of the > subjective factors, the historical human types, between Europe and the > colonized sector of the globe. The characteristic drama of the > present, which we denote with the abstract term "development," would > have been no less a problem if the hopes of the European socialists > had been fulfilled -- on the contrary! Both Hegel and Marx liked to > refer to the unexpected, unforeseen breakthrough of a historical > necessity as the "cunning of reason." Should we not see such a > cunning of reason at work in the fact that the masses of the "Third > World" have anticipated the revolt of Europe? > > The peoples of the backward countries today are involved in a race > with catastrophe, a catastrophe which could claim far more victims > than the molten iron of the Russian revolution -- and needless victims > at that. Revolutions such as the Russian and the Chinese are the > precondition for victory over hunger. One of the earliest ideas of > Marxism, that the "overthrowing" class, or the formerly oppressed > classes, needs the revolution _as its own action_, in order _to "rid > itself of all the muck of ages and become fitted to found society > anew_," is _nowhere more valid_ than for those doubly oppressed > peoples whom capitalism found at a lower stage of social development. > What they need is not bread from Canada, but rather bread from Asia, > from Africa, and for this they need a new form of life, similarly > non-capitalist to that in the Soviet Union and in China. How else are > the colonized peoples to overcome their inferiority complex, to find > on a massive scale the new consciousness and self-consciousness > required for their ascent, except through a revolutionary liberation > of their own? The external conditions for this may be favoured by the > existence of other socialist powers, but the popular masses of the > Southern hemisphere can _in no case_ be freed from outside. > > What they initially require most of all, for their material > reconstruction is _a strong state_, often one that is in many respects > despotic, in order really to overcome the inherited inertia. And such > a state power can only draw its legitimation and authority from a > revolution, and thus put a stop to the decay and corruption > characteristic of the old "Asiatic mode of production." This state > power *must* be in charge of any "development aid" that comes from > outside with technical knowledge, and is therefore always inclined to > fall into the old colonial manner. There are very few people like > Norman Bethune. That is why state power resulting from liberation > must be established _before_ any European advisers proclaim a > "*Communauté*." It must take the same attitude towards advisers of > this kind as the young Soviet power did to bourgeois specialists. And > if such advisers are now coming from the Soviet Union itself, as well > as from other countries tied to it, the same arrangements must apply > to them too, until they have given proof of their internationalist > solidarity and fraternity. For the history of the liberation movement > since the Second World War has proved irrefutably that the pace and > the effect of emancipation for the masses depend on the achievement of > precisely this state of affairs. > > Let us try and imagine what the peoples still under pre-capitalist > conditions and colonial exploitation would have obtained if the West > European proletariat at the turn of the century had anticipated the > liberating revolutions outside of Europe. Can we assume that a spirit > of human solidarity, the practice of equality towards all who bear the > human countenance, would have immediately and unreservedly been > achieved? The working classes of Europe are objective participants in > colonialism, and this was never without its ideological effects. At > the Stuttgart Congress of the Socialist International in 1907, a > clause in the draft resolution that the Congress did not condemn all > colonial policy on principle, since under socialism this could have a > civilizing effect, was rejected by only a narrow majority. Lenin also > reported how the attempt was made in the Congress's commission on the > colonial question "to ban the immigration of workers from backward > countries (coolies -- from China, etc.)." "This is the same spirit of > aristocratism," Lenin observed, "that one finds among workers in some > of the 'civilized' countries, who derive certain advantages from their > privileged position, and are, therefore, inclined to forget the need > for international class solidarity." > > The immediate, trade-union interests of the Western working classes, > who would have developed a considerable need to catch up, both > materially and culturally, and would not have been as driven to > solidarity from the foreign policy standpoint as was the poor Soviet > republic, could have been kept on reins only by the most extreme > revolutionary consciousness and selflessness. The bureaucracies of > the social-democratic parties and trade unions, however, tended rather > to cultivate colonialist prejudices. For the sharpened awareness of > the present-day reader, even Frederick Engels' position is not > completely free from a certain "expert" European arrogance, as can be > seen for example in many of his articles on the Indian insurrection of > 1857-9. More than a few authorities of the Western labour movement > would have had a good try at teaching the "savage" and > "half-civilized" peoples how to behave, and after the first > unsuccessful attempts to spread a Protestant work ethic in Asia and > Africa, withdrawn angrily like the righteous guardian from his > ungrateful ward. The labour bureaucracies were all inclined, at the > very least, to an _educational colonialism_. And nothing is more > likely than that the peoples affected would have been forced to turn > against such hypothetical socialist governments -- even if under > somewhat more favourable conditions than before, and with a European > left-socialist minority on their side. > > Above all, we must repeat once more that _these peoples have an > unconditional *need to rebel for themselves*, if they are to reshape > their society_. They must begin by taking a cultural distance from > Europe, even while assimilating its technical achievements. For the > export of European civilization is _colonialist to the roots, even if > pursued by a workers' government_. Neither Russia nor China would > have managed to attack their own problems of development at such pace, > with such an unleashing of the human productive forces, if they had > not been forced to solve them in revolutionary self-preservation > against a hostile environment. > > If a socialist or communist order, as we have since had to realize, > cannot be based on material preconditions that are merely provincial > in character, then _the task of overcoming the lack of civilization > which Lenin referred to must be fulfilled by the revolutionary peoples > themselves, by creating the labour discipline they need in the course > of their struggle, this being the major world-historical task in > preparing for socialism_. _*With the revolutions in Russia and China, > with the revolutionary process in Latin America, in Africa and in > India, humanity is taking the shortest route to socialism*_. There, > in the "East," the real wretched of this earth have awakened. The > role of the working class, who gave the decisive impulse to the > Russian revolution and who obviously have a task in Europe, must be > seen afresh in this context. Moreover, even their revolution in > Europe would not have led directly to the socialism for which Marx > hoped, but far more probably to the phenomenal form so familiar to us, > which Bakunin already feared from the look of the Prusso-German > Social-Democrats and the style of leadership in the International. > Time and again, our bureaucratic centralism is explained in terms of > Russian backwardness, though _in fact_ this is only responsible for > certain excesses. In so far as the hierarchichal apparatus of > functionaries of the workers' organizations is the potential state > machine, what this is preparing is not a new Paris Commune, but rather > a state monopoly freed from capitalism. > > We can envisage the state monopoly tendency better, a tendency which > is coming to form the object of the liberation struggle the world > over, if we compare this modern transition period towards classless > society with the ancient economic despotism which was the predominant > form of entry into class society. This is a further reason why the > history and present developmental tendencies in the East are of > particular interest to us. We shall see that the character of this > epoch, as it develops into the "conflict between the > counter-revolutionary imperialist West and the revolutionary and > nationalist East," is the present consequence of all former world > history. On the essential points, it needs only the further > development of the premises already provided by Marx and Engels in > their materialist overview of historical evolution. > > > > _______________________________________________ > Marxism-Thaxis mailing list > Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu > To change your options or unsubscribe go to: > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis > > > _______________________________________________ > Marxism-Thaxis mailing list > Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu > To change your options or unsubscribe go to: > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis >
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