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Some years ago, I summarized the 1920's debate between the Deborinists and the 
Mechanists along the following lines:

Probably the most important debate that drew the attention of Soviet 
philosophers during the early years of the USSR was the debate between the 
"mechanists" and the "dialecticians" or Deborinists. This debate at first began 
as a discussion within the philosophy of science but over time came to 
encompass most aspects of philosophy. Furthermore, despite the fact it was 
formally settled in 1929, the issues underlying the debate never went away, and 
recurred in different forms over time. Indeed, since the issues at hand were 
among the most important ones concerning Marxist philosophy, they in fact have 
never really went away.

By the early 1920's, Soviet philosophers were debating what conception of 
materialism provided the best philosophical basis for Marxism. One school held 
that a mechanistic conception of materialism was acceptable. Most of the 
advocates of this view either came straight out of the natural sciences, or 
they were philosophers who had been closely associated with natural science in 
some way. Among the leading advocates of this school were A.K. Timartizev, 
Timianski, Lyubov Akselrod, and I. I. Stepanov.

These people were staunch empiricists. They did not deny the validity of 
dialectics but maintained that dialectics must limit itself to what was 
observable and verifiable by the methods of natural science. Dialectics must 
follow science, and not pretend to be able to lead it. Materialism for these 
people meant a strict and thorough reliance upon the methods and findings of 
the natural sciences. These philosophers embraced the label of "mechanists" as 
a designation for their school of thought, and they insisted that a mechanistic 
outlook was valid not only for the natural sciences but also for the philosophy 
of history and of society as well. For these people, a Marxist philosophy 
therefore had to root itself in the natural sciences and to follow the findings 
of natural science. In their view, it was illegitimate to posit a Marxist 
philosophy that would attempt to dictate to the sciences.

Closely allied to the mechanists, though not entirely agreeing with them was 
the prominent Bolshevik, N.I. Bukharin. Thus Bukharin in his *Historical 
Materialism* embraced a positivist interpretation of Marx's materialist 
conception of history, emphasizing that the goal was to develop causal 
explanations of history, which would take the place of teleological 
explanations. Furthermore, Bukharin argued that "It is quite possible to 
transcribe the 'mystical' (as Marx put it) language of Hegelian dialectics into 
the language of modern mechanics." Bukharin thus maintained that Marx's 
materialist conception of history should over time lead to the development of a 
positive science of society that would be mechanistic in character and in which 
the concept of equilibrium would play a central role.

The mechanists maintained that the dialectical conception of nature, properly 
understood, was the mechanist conception. Indeed, Stepanov once wrote an 
article bearing the title "The Dialectical Understanding of Nature is the 
Mechanistic Understanding" in case anyone should be confused about his position.

As the mechanists saw it, Soviet philosophy was torn by a debate between those 
who maintained that dialectical method was one to be used insomuch as it was 
fruitful for revealing new facts about nature and society, versus those who 
looked to the dialectical philosophy of Hegel to provide themselves with 
ready-made solutions to problems. The mechanists charged their opponents (i.e. 
the dialecticians) with offering a priori solutions to problems in the 
philosophy of nature and the philosophy of history.

Opposing the mechanists were the so-called dialecticians or Deborinists. These 
people had a much higher regard for Hegel than did the mechanists. Furthermore, 
they maintained that the mechanists misunderstood how Marx & Engels had 
reconstructed Hegelian dialectics on a materialist basis. The dialecticians 
were vigorous defenders of what Marxists call the "dialectics of nature." They 
maintained that the laws of dialectics as described by Engels in such works as 
*Anti-Duhring* and "The Dialectics of Nature* are actually found in nature. 
Dialectics reflects the natural world. The dialecticians argued that the 
mechanists were positing a narrow, rigid, and lifeless conception of nature. 
Whereas, the mechanists tended to be either natural scientists or philosophers 
close to the natural sciences, the
dialecticians tended to be professional philosophers with a strong background 
in Hegelian philosophy. The leading dialectician was the philosopher Abram 
Deborin, who had been a protégé of Plekhanov (the "father of Russian Marxism"). 
Like, his mentor, Deborin had been prior to the October Revolution a Menshevik.

Deborin and his followers hit hard against the mechanists, arguing that their 
conception of science could not adequately make sense out of the new 
developments in physics like relativity and quantum mechanics, nor was 
mechanism, in their opinion adequate for making sense out of the then latest 
developments in biology. The dialecticians attacked the positivism of the 
mechanist school which they saw as naive and mistaken. They, as I already 
pointed out, venerated Hegel, in contrast to the disdain that most of the 
mechanists had for him. They held that Marxism could not be adequately 
understood except in reference to Hegel and Hegelianism. While the mechanists 
on the other hand held that Marx had superseded Hegel and Hegelianism. For 
them, the Deborinists constituted a regression back to an idealist metaphysics 
that Marx had transcended.

Besides disagreeing about Hegel, the two schools had quite different opinions 
concerning the meaning and importance of Spinoza's philosophy. The mechanists 
tended to dismiss Spinoza as an idealist metaphysician. While Deborin followed 
his mentor Plekhanov in holding Spinoza to have been a materialist and a 
dialectician. For Deborin as for Plekhanov, dialectical materialism is a kind 
of Spinozism. It should be noted that one of the leading mechanists, L.I. 
Akselrod, had a more positive appraisal of Spinoza, than did most of the other 
mechanists. She, like her adversary, Deborin, had been a protege of Plekhanov, 
who had been a great admirer of Spinoza.  and she followed her mentor in 
treating Spinoza as a precursor of dialectical materialism but she gave special 
emphasis to Spinoza's
determinism, his critique of teleology and his mechanism. Thus, she viewed 
Spinoza as the precursor of the mechanistic materialisms of La Mettrie and 
d'Holboch, who, in turn, were the precursors of the materialism of Feuerbach, 
and hence, of Marx.

The debate between the mechanists and the dialecticians heated up in the late 
1920s, finally coming to a head in 1929 at a meeting of the Second All-Union 
Conference of Marxist-Leninist Scientific Institutions where all the leading 
figures from both sides of the debate appeared. Deborin gave the leading 
report, and a resolution was passed which condemned mechanism. The mechanists 
were condemned as undermining dialectical materialism, and charged with trying 
to substitute a vulgar evolutionism for materialist dialectics, and positivism 
for materialism.

However, the victory of the Deborinists was short-lived, since the following 
year controversy broke out over the issue of "idealism" and of "menshevising 
idealism." Essentially what happened was that Stalin had concluded that while 
the Deborinists had made valid criticisms of mechanism, they had gone too far 
in pushing the stick towards a Hegelian idealism. The application of the term 
"menshevizing idealism" was a reference to Deborin's past support for the 
Mensheviks over the Bolsheviks. Thus, he was being accused of not just being an 
idealist but of being a "menshevizing idealist" which was presumably a lot 
worse. Stalin moved to settle the debate between the mechanists and the 
Dialecticians by fiat. The critique of Deborin was pressed forward by two young 
philosophers, Mark Borisovich Mitin and Pavel Fyodorovich Yudin who linked the 
alleged failings of Deborin to those of his mentor Plekhanov. Deborin was 
accused of divorcing theory from practice. His philosophy was said to be of 
little use for advancing forward Stalin's Five Year Plan with its break with 
the NEP. Mitin in particular argued that both the Deborinists and the 
mechanists had failed to grasp the dialectics underlying the transition from 
NEP to socialism. Thus both schools were charged with promoting a divorce 
between theory and practice. The new view promoted by Mitin (with Stalin's 
backing) attempted to split the difference between the two schools. Dialectical 
materialism affirmed an ontological materialism as advocated by the mechanists. 
But the validity of the dialectics of nature (which the Deborinists had placed 
great emphasis on) was also affirmed as well. At a Party conference this 
critique of the two schools was officially adopted and Deborin made a show of 
support for Mitin.

Deborin and just a handful of other Soviet philosophers had the fortune of 
surviving the great purges of the 1930s. Akselrod, of the mechanist school, 
also survived while numerous other people from the two schools disappeared into 
the gulags and were never heard from again.

This new view provided the basis for Stalin's codification of dialectical 
materialism as presented in his *History of the CPSU (Bolsheviks): Short 
Course* which became official dogma for all Communists.

It is also interest that the issues underlying the debate between the 
mechanists and the Dialecticians appeared in other disciplines as well such as 
in Soviet psychology. The reflexology of Ivan Pavlov can be seen as 
representing a mechanist approach to psychology in which behavior was broken 
down into reflexes - both unconditioned and conditioned. In contrast, the 
Soviet psychologist Lev Vygotsky attempted to construct a psychology directly 
from the premisses of dialectical materialism. He developed genetic approach to 
the development of concepts in early childhood and youth, tracing the 
transition through a series of stages of human development, based on the 
development of the child's social practice. His work eventually impacted 
Western psychology especially through his influence on the thought of Jean 
Piaget. However, under Stalin Vygotsky's work was considered to be heretical 
while Pavlov's work later on became the basis for official Soviet psychology. 
Indeed, in the later years of Stalin's regime, it was made the official Soviet 
psychology and most other schools were suppressed. Thus, while mechanism was 
rejected as a general philosophical outlook, it was embraced in psychology. 
(People attempted to get around that rather glaring contradiction by arguing 
that Pavlovian reflexology was really dialectical in character. And indeed, 
Pavlov,in some moods, had argued that thesis himself).

Soviet philosophy thus became frozen for the next couple of decades, until the 
death of Stalin. Upon the ascension of Khrushchev there was a "thaw" in Soviet 
intellectual and cultural life, and during the "thaw" a revival of Marxist 
philosophy took place. And some old issues got revisited, with new ground being 
broken.

Thus, the Soviet philosopher E. V. Ilyenkov, developed Marx's method and his 
idea of social phenomena as 'objectified' activity. Ilyenkov, treated our forms 
of thought as being objectified in our mode of interaction with nature and in 
the form our activity lends the world. Children acquire consciousness through 
the internalization of this externalized 'spiritual culture'. In this analysis, 
Ilyenkov drew upon Vygotsky's research on cognitive development in children.

Like Deborin in the early Stalin era, Ilyenkov pushed an interpretation of 
Marxism that emphasized its Hegelian roots. And in that sense he can be viewed 
as attempting to bring Soviet Marxism more into line with the Western Marxism 
of such people as Georg Lukacs (*History and Class Consciousness*), Herbert 
Marcuse (*Reason and Revolution*), Karl Korsch, or even Sidney Hook (*From 
Hegel to Marx*). Ilyenkov was a staunch foe of positivism and scientism in 
Soviet philosophy and Soviet intellectual life generally. He was a passionate 
critic of reductionism and naturalism in the philosophy of mind. And in the end 
he eventually ran into resistance from the Soviet establishment which grew more 
conservative after the ouster of Khrushchev. He is probably best known for such 
works as *Dialectics of the Abstract & Concrete*( 1960), *Dialectical Logic* 
(1974), and *Concept ofthe Ideal* (1979).

In another work, *Leninist Dialectics & Metaphysics of Positivism* (1979), he 
revisits the controversy that broke out in the Bolshevik faction between Lenin 
and Alexander Bogdanov over the empirio-criticism of Ernst Mach and Richard 
Avenarius. As a true-blue Soviet philosopher, Ilyenkov opted for Lenin over 
Bogdanov, and came down hard on Bogdanov's attempt at reinterpreting Marxism in 
terms of Machist positivism. However, underlying Ilyenkov's book was the not so 
subtle implication, that a positivism, not unlike the kind that Lenin had 
condemned had taken charge in Soviet intellectual and cultural life. Ilyenkov 
dissected Bogdanov's science fiction novel *Red Star* and poked fun at 
Bogdanov's attempt at depicting a future communist society, and he knocked 
Bogdanov's scientism and technocratism, while implying in not so many words,, 
that the very sort of scientism and technocratism which was attributed to 
Bogdanov, was in fact rife in the Soviet society of Ilyenkov's time. Thus, 
Ilyenkov pushed, what in Stalin's time would have been condemned as a 
"Menshevizing idealism" into a general critique of not just Soviet intellectual 
and cultural life, but also implicitly of Soviet society itself. Not too 
surprisingly, Ilyenkov found himself in increasing hot water, and in 1979 he 
took his own life.

During the same period other Soviet thinkers were advancing views that were 
more than a little reminiscent of the 1920s mechanists. Many Soviet scientists 
were more or less positivistic in their philosophical outlooks. During the 
1960's and 1970's Western philosophies including analytical philosophy and 
logical empiricism began to make a mark in Soviet thought. Very often these 
philosophies were presented using the language of dialectical materialism, but 
the underlying substance might bear more than a passing resemblance to the 
ideas of a Rudolf Carnap or a Bertrand Russell.



Jim Farmelant
http://independent.academia.edu/JimFarmelant
http://www.foxymath.com 
Learn or Review Basic Math


---------- Original Message ----------
From: Louis Proyect via Marxism <[email protected]>
Subject: [Marxism] Stalin and Soviet philosophy
Date: Mon, 25 Apr 2016 17:00:18 -0400

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There's some really good stuff in the Crisis and Critique special issue 
on Stalin (as well as some awful stuff, especially Roland Boer). This is 
among the more interesting articles.

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