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On 2017-06-10 09:51, RKOB via Marxism wrote:
https://www.thecommunists.net/worldwide/africa-and-middle-east/qatar-gulf-crisis/
I find the analysis provided here right on the mark. When this was
announced a few days ago, it seemed just like a quarrel between
geographical neighbors that would blow over without any long-term
consequences.
But with Trump weighing in on the side of the Saudis and repeating the
accusations against Qatar of "supporting terrorism", it's clear that it
goes beyond a diplomatic spat and that Trump's involvement had
everything to do with it happening in the first place, as the RKOB/RCIT
analysis states. That greatly raises the stakes and the dangers that
will be faced by currents such as the Muslim brotherhood and Hamas which
are the indirect targets of the attack on Qatar.
FWIW below is the analysis released by Stratfor (private intelligence
agency/thinktank).
- Jeff
Jun 5, 2017 | 22:12 GMT
Qatar's Feud With the Gulf States Reaches New Levels
Long-standing tensions among members of the Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC) that intensified over the past two weeks have culminated in
several Arab governments suspending relations with Qatar. The current
crisis has roots in multiple areas in which GCC states do not see eye to
eye, including in their attitudes toward Iran, their manifold
perspectives on supporting political Islamists and the degree of
economic and strategic rivalries among them.
On June 5, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain
announced they would suspend diplomatic relations with Qatar, which has
long bucked the Saudi line on condemnation of Iran and support for
Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood. Their declarations were
followed by those made by the Tobruk-based House of Representatives
government in Libya, which has close ties to the United Arab Emirates
and Egypt; the Saudi-backed government of Yemen led by President Abd
Rabboh Mansour Hadi; and the Indian Ocean island nations of Mauritius
and the Maldives, which have close ties to the Saudi and Emirati
governments.
The Gulf Cooperation Council States
The countries said they would halt sea trade with Qatar as well. Saudi
Arabia — the only country with a border with Qatar — has also blocked
land transport across that border, according to reports. Several
regional airlines such as Emirates, Bahrain's Gulf Air, Flydubai and Abu
Dhabi's Etihad Airways have canceled flights into Qatar, while Qatar
Airways has canceled its flights to Saudi Arabia. Likewise, GCC airspace
is off-limits to Qatari flights. The countries that scrapped diplomatic
relations with Doha have given Qatari citizens in their territories two
weeks to depart, while diplomatic staff were given until June 7 to
leave. Because of the diplomatic disruptions, Qatar has also been
removed from the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, though Qatar filled only
a token role in that operation.
In announcing the diplomatic and travel freezes, the countries cited
Qatar's alleged support for groups that they consider terrorists, such
as the Muslim Brotherhood, the Taliban and Hamas, as well as others,
including al Qaeda. Qatar hosts a significant number of delegates from
groups such as Hamas or the Taliban and has fashioned Doha into a
neutral zone that allows for negotiations to take place. Qatar's
willingness to host these organizations, of course, has been met with
disapproval in the past. Saudi Arabia has also blamed Qatar for
allegedly supporting Shiite militants in eastern Saudi Arabia and
Bahrain.
Meanwhile, reports have emerged that after Qatar urged them to leave the
country, several Hamas leaders are relocating to Turkey, Malaysia and
Lebanon. This echoes moves Qatar made to try to defuse a similar crisis
in 2014. However, Qatar has not indicated any willingness to soften its
support for the Muslim Brotherhood, the Taliban or Hamas. Backing such
groups has broadened Qatar's regional legitimacy and granted Doha some
leverage with the United States and other countries that seek to control
the behavior of the Islamist groups.
The Spark of a Crisis
The current deterioration in relations between the Arab states and Qatar
was sparked by the remarks of Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad
al-Thani, who was quoted expressing support for Iran, Hamas and the
Muslim Brotherhood at a military graduation speech on May 23. The
statements triggered a response from other Gulf states that started
banning Qatari media outlets, including Al Jazeera. A flurry of
accusations then flew through media outlets on both sides. The decision
by a hacking group calling itself GlobalLeaks to release emails
purportedly from Yousef al Otaiba, the United Arab Emirates' ambassador
to the United States, also suggested strong ties between himself and a
neoconservative pro-Israel think tank, further roiling the media
environment. The toxic back-and-forth that built momentum for Qatar's
estrangement could suggest a concerted move by Riyadh and Abu Dhabi to
pressure Doha by portraying it poorly.
Closing the land border and halting air and sea traffic is intended to
put economic pressure on Qatar. Between 40 and 50 percent of its food
imports, including most fresh dairy, vegetables, fruit and processed
cereals, are shipped overland from Saudi Arabia. But when considering
overall imports, the blockade will not have as much of an effect on
Qatar, which receives only 8.8 percent of its imported goods (including
construction materials) from the United Arab Emirates, and only 4.3
percent from Saudi Arabia. The air travel ban will pile more problems on
a struggling Qatar Airways, which immediately lost its right to serve 19
destinations in the countries that issued the bans. The state-linked
airline was already dealing with a 38 percent loss in its brand value
over the past year (it is now worth $2.2 billion). If the trade and
travel blockades continue, Qatar may experience food price inflation,
though food aid pledged by Iran could mitigate that. In the highly
competitive banking and financial services sectors, prolonged economic
sanctions could undermine Qatar's competitiveness with other GCC states.
Some Qatari media outlets could feel more intense pressure from Saudi
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates as well. The Saudis have already
blocked the Doha-based Al Jazeera, and Qatar will feel pressure to shut
down the outlet along with other smaller channels like Al-Araby
Al-Jadeed. Those media outlets, which routinely contradict the GCC's
heavily Saudi-influenced positions, have afforded Qatar the ability to
have an outsized influence on policy debates.
Echoes of the Past
Parallels can be drawn between the incidents of the past week and the
2014 conflict that pitted the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia
against Qatar. That spat arose from Doha's continued embrace of regional
Islamist groups that Riyadh and Abu Dhabi deemed a threat, particularly
the Muslim Brotherhood. Both disputes stem from the same root: Qatar
lacks the demographic and sectarian diversity with which other GCC
states must contend, freeing Doha to support regional groups that help
it expand its influence without stirring up trouble at home. However,
the diplomatic and trade cutoffs of the current dispute are
unprecedented.
As its ties with its immediate neighbors erode, Doha could turn to Iran,
Turkey and Iraq for help. A June 5 meeting in Baghdad among Turkey, Iran
and Iraq called by the head of Iran's Expediency Council highlights that
possibility. Qatar and Turkey have built close and ever-growing ties,
and Iraq's powerful Sunni parliament speaker met with al-Thani on June
4, a sign of the countries' positive relationship. While none of these
countries could supplant the support that Qatar has enjoyed from the GCC
network for decades, or from the United States, Saudi Arabia's efforts
to punish Qatar could spur deeper cooperation between Qatar and other
non-GCC countries.
The actions of the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and others are
part of a coordinated effort to push Qatar to align with the Saudi-led
consensus on the Muslim Brotherhood and Iran. Strong support by the
United States for the Saudi-led coalition likely bolstered those
countries' confidence in making the move to isolate Doha to this degree.
However, that rift also complicates the United States' mission, since it
counts on a tight Sunni coalition to manage regional threats like the
Islamic State. Even as Riyadh tries to undermine the trust Washington
has placed in Doha, it will not be easy as Qatar hosts the
second-largest U.S. military presence in the region, including the U.S.
command center coordinating the fight against the Islamic State.
Additionally, a substantial percentage of its regional air sorties stage
from the al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar. For its part, the U.S. military
announced that it does not plan to adjust its posture in response to the
diplomatic row, which will provide immediate reassurance to Doha that
its key backing is assured and prolong Qatar's ability to hold out under
GCC pressure. Meanwhile, though the United States routinely maintains
military ties with countries that are at odds with one another, the
severity of the intra-GCC split this time around only underscores the
weaknesses of its effort to stand up a viable "Arab NATO."
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