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Best regards, Andrew Stewart Begin forwarded message: > From: H-Net Staff via H-REVIEW <[email protected]> > Date: January 24, 2019 at 7:00:09 PM EST > To: [email protected] > Cc: H-Net Staff <[email protected]> > Subject: H-Net Review [H-War]: Allison on Cameron, 'The Double Game: The > Demise of America's First Missile Defense System and the Rise of Strategic > Arms Limitation' > Reply-To: [email protected] > > James Cameron. The Double Game: The Demise of America's First > Missile Defense System and the Rise of Strategic Arms Limitation. > New York Oxford University Press, 2017. 248 pp. $74.00 (cloth), > ISBN 978-0-19-045992-5. > > Reviewed by Rusty Allison (Air University, Air War College) > Published on H-War (January, 2019) > Commissioned by Margaret Sankey > > The Cold War ended twenty-seven years ago, but the scars of nuclear > brinksmanship are tattooed across the fabric of the American plains > and etched in the minds of the American psyche. Despite the 1991 > collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States still retains an > enormous arsenal of nuclear weapons--an arsenal that has parity with > Russia--capable of annihilating cities and civilizations. The massive > arsenal of today in many ways stems from the fall of America's first > ballistic missile defense (BMD) system that refocused attention away > from survival of a nuclear attack toward strategic arms limitations > and acceptance of mutually assured destruction (MAD). In essence, it > was BMD that transferred an ill-fated feeling of security for the > American population to a geopolitical bargaining chip to arrest the > rise of Soviet nuclear weapons capability. America's first missile > defense system may serve as a Cold War relic, but it should inform > policymakers of the domestic and foreign tensions and implications as > they seek to develop a coherent, executable nuclear strategy. > > James Cameron's research takes us on an exhilarating geopolitical > roller coaster, and brilliantly makes a cross-cutting examination of > US nuclear policy formulation spanning three presidential > administrations between 1961 and 1972. His diagnosis of the Kennedy, > Johnson, and Nixon White Houses brings to the forefront > contradictions between public and private dialogue, as well as the > competition among national security and domestic priorities (p. 162). > His thorough analysis encapsulates the topsy-turvy nature of US > policy from its early beginnings of the perceived "missile gap" > rhetoric all the way through flexible response, the rise and fall of > a BMD, and ultimately giving in to strategic arms limitations and > MAD. This well-written and easy-to-follow book is a must-read for > policymakers and for professors and students at universities that > have courses on public policy and security studies. The _Double Game > _will also be enjoyed by historians and political scientists alike. > > The key theme of the book resides in Cameron's argument that > "policymakers struggled to balance the demands of presenting a front > of strategic coherence with the incoherent reality behind the scenes, > provided an overarching dynamic through which the first US missile > defense program met its demise and the United States government > officially accepted the logic of mutually assured destruction" (p. > 7). Cameron's theory is strengthened by the acquisition of tapes from > the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon Oval Offices. His ability to contrast > the often contradictory internal dialogue between the three > presidents and their closest advisors with the messages sent to > Congress and the American public is extraordinarily illuminating. It > was this double game, the struggle to balance foreign and domestic > demands with the contradictory private dialogue within each White > House, that earned the book's fitting title. > > The book is organized chronologically and its chapters align each > presidential administration to its position on US nuclear policy. > With this design, Cameron seamlessly makes room to superimpose > domestic congressional opinion and "public mood." The _Double Game > _is consistent in its approach to highlight the intricacies and > complexities of the interplay among domestic politics, geopolitics, > and presidential strategic thought. Channeling Robert Jervis's > terminology of "reality makers" and "reality takers," Cameron shows > how each president became dependent on the mood of the American > public, the "reality takers," to determine nuclear policy (p. 163). > > The book's path succinctly charts Cameron's chronologic methodology. > In 1961 Kennedy, against his own beliefs, advocated for nuclear > superiority in order to gain public support and a reputation of being > tough on the Soviet Union. In 1963, needing to show consistency, > resolve, and control, Johnson stayed on that same rhetorical path > despite his desire to invest in domestic reform. He later became > embattled in Vietnam and faced tremendous domestic pressure to limit > military expenditures. Inheriting congressional and public collapse, > yet being categorically opposed to parity, it was Nixon, ironically, > who conceded to aborting the Safeguard BMD system in favor of > strategic arms limitations in 1972 in Moscow. > > One major area where this book could have been strengthened is its > coverage of foundational nuclear policy from 1945 to 1960. It is > important for any strategist, historian, political scientist, student > of policy, or policymaker to understand the fundamental principles > that created the circumstances of 1961 and beyond. Without any > discussion of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki detonations, Soviet nuclear > weapons capability, and the launch of Sputnik, the reader could > misunderstand the context of a lasting superpower competition and > deterrence capability. Also, this foundation would serve readers well > by helping them to understand the moral dilemma of ultimately, and > reluctantly, committing to MAD. To fully understand the double game > in which policymakers will engage, it is critical to attempt to > understand the mind-set of the earliest nuclear policymakers. > > This book is equally balanced between an analysis of nuclear weapons > buildup, BMD, and strategic calculation in relation to domestic and > bureaucratic politics. Its relevance is clear today as a revisionist > Russia physically reasserts itself in eastern Europe, China's > influence gains momentum, and North Korea and Iran strive for nuclear > weapon latency. This book is timely and important for policymakers, > political scientists, historians, and analysts of policy. The public > debate is now surrounded by peer competition and budgetary > constraints in a war-weary nation in the wake of seventeen years in > Afghanistan and fifteen years in Iraq and Syria. As we shift > attention to China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran, now is the time to > read this book. > > Citation: Rusty Allison. Review of Cameron, James, _The Double Game: > The Demise of America's First Missile Defense System and the Rise of > Strategic Arms Limitation_. H-War, H-Net Reviews. January, 2019. > URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=53591 > > This work is licensed under a Creative Commons > Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States > License. > > _________________________________________________________ Full posting guidelines at: http://www.marxmail.org/sub.htm Set your options at: https://lists.csbs.utah.edu/options/marxism/archive%40mail-archive.com
