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Best regards, Andrew Stewart - - - Subscribe to the Washington Babylon newsletter via https://washingtonbabylon.com/newsletter/ Begin forwarded message: > From: H-Net Staff via H-REVIEW <h-rev...@lists.h-net.org> > Date: June 22, 2019 at 12:03:41 PM EDT > To: h-rev...@lists.h-net.org > Cc: H-Net Staff <revh...@mail.h-net.org> > Subject: H-Net Review [H-Asia]: Borah on Yazdani, 'India, Modernity and the > Great Divergence: Mysore and Gujarat (17th to 19th C.)' > Reply-To: h-rev...@lists.h-net.org > > Kaveh Yazdani. India, Modernity and the Great Divergence: Mysore and > Gujarat (17th to 19th C.). Leiden Brill Academic Publishers, 2017. > xxxii + 669 pp. $246.00 (cloth), ISBN 978-90-04-33079-5. > > Reviewed by Monish Borah (University of California- Irvine) > Published on H-Asia (June, 2019) > Commissioned by Sumit Guha > > Modernity as a Heuristic to Study the Great Divergence > > Kaveh Yazdani, in _India, Modernity and the Great Divergence_, > provides the readers with a case study of Mysore and Gujarat to > explain why precolonial India could not experience an economic > take-off similar to the one that happened in western Europe. Yazdani > is primarily concerned with "the great divergence" (p. 5) debate, but > instead of asking the usual questions like "why did the West > industrialize before the rest" or "why did the rest lag behind the > West," he decides to frame the concept of modernity as a heuristic > category and use it in three ways.[1] First, Yazdani divides > modernity into three phases: early modernity, which lasted from 1000 > AD to 1500 AD; middle modernity, from 1500 AD to 1800 AD; and late > modernity. Yazdani in _India, Modernity and the Great Divergence_ is > primarily concerned with the transition from middle modernity to late > modernity, which coincides with India transitioning between the > Mughal and the British Empires. Secondly, by using modernity as a > heuristic Yazdani is able to have a lateral look at divergence and > deconstruct it into its constituent elements. In the process of this > deconstruction Yazdani realizes that several concepts like > capitalism, industrial capital, industrialization, commercialization, > and industrial revolution might be related, but their role and > footprint in different societies over time may vary greatly. For > example, he shows how frequently industrial capitalism and industrial > revolution are conflated by historians of South Asia without > realizing that the former is not necessarily a precondition for the > latter. Finally, by adopting "modernity" as a heuristic category > Yazdani managed to free himself from being obsessed with per capita > income in answering crucial questions linked with divergence. Yazdani > here is influenced by the works of Peer Vries, who shows that during > the period under consideration in this book the wealth and > development gap between the richest and the poorest societies in the > world was in the magnitude of five is to one, which is not very high. > So, Yazdani restricts discussion of works that primarily focus on the > income levels of people during the seventeenth to the nineteenth > century to parts of the book that deal with living standards. > > In _India, Modernity and the Great Divergence_, Yazdani is greatly > influenced by the Marxist school of thought, the French _Annales_ > school, world systems theory, and postcolonial studies. As a result > of such influences, Yazdani tries to determine India's modes of > production and spread of liberal ideas during the precolonial period > while at the same time adopting the _longue durée_ narrative style. > But Yazdani also realizes the complexity of the subject matter he is > dealing with when his research reveals multiple modes of production > and several cores and peripheries within India from the seventeenth > to the nineteenth century. So he creates a synthesis in his narrative > by introducing the concept of _Gleichzeitigkeit des > Ungleichzeitigkeit_ (p. 31), or the simultaneity of the > nonsimultaneous, which can be explained as follows. Yazdani's two > case studies of Mysore and Gujarat were amongst the most advanced > regions in India during the precolonial period. He also recognizes > that the period from 1770 to 1830 was a _sattelzeit_ (p. 35) or > saddle period that brought the entire world and more importantly the > core areas of Afro-Eurasia to "late modernity." But the complete > transition of the world to late modernity could only be completed > after the Second World War. Therefore the transition from middle > modernity to late modernity was neither uniform nor smooth, and > several societies, like those in India, continued to deal with > problems inherited from middle modernity. In other words, different > middle modern societies were transitioning to late modernity with > varying acceleration rates. > > One of the primary goals of the author in _India, Modernity and the > Great Divergence_ is to show the endogenous strength and potential of > the "rest" (p. 59) to modernize and to grow, which is also supposed > to inversely work as an argument for the influence of the "rest" (p. > 55) in the industrialization of the West. Yazdani mentions how > eleventh-century Song China was more industrialized and capitalized > than seventeenth-century England. Even from the sixteenth to the > eighteenth century core regions of Asia were more advanced than > Europe in four key areas. First, China had the most advanced career > progression system in the world, which was organized around a battery > of examinations. Second, the cosmopolitan nature of the Mughal > Empire, based on tolerance of diversity in religion and culture, also > had no parallel in the world. Third, the city-dwellers of Northeast, > West, and South Asia had higher sense and concern about hygiene than > the urban inhabitants of Europe. Last, China and India were > mass-producing items like porcelain and textiles even before the > industrial revolution. Now, Yazdani characterizes middle modernity, > which started in the early sixteenth century, as a period when > history truly started becoming global due to increased interactions > fueled by better transportation and communication networks. So he > concludes that several key advancements made by Europe during this > period like the Renaissance, the discovery of America, printing, the > Scientific Revolution, Enlightenment, Industrial Revolution, > industrial capitalism, and the formation of the nation-state and > national identities were direct results of the European exploitation > of the "other" (p. 55). > > Another unique contribution by Yazdani to the divergence debate is > his formulation of the Indian catch-up story. Yazdani considers > middle modernity to be characterized by European dynamism, something > that was missing during early modernity. Yazdani also recognizes that > during middle modernity western Europe was closer to entering late > modernity than any part of Asia. For Yazdani, Europe's leading role > in driving modernity ahead also meant the creation of a decreasingly > polycentric world. But Yazdani also cautions us that the decline of > the Mughal Empire should not be equated with a decline of South Asia. > Yazdani's research provides the readers with several pieces of > evidence that show that although some initial advancements were made > by the Europeans during middle modernity, Indians soon managed to > catch up to them. For example, Indian militaries were clearly > inferior to the European ones in the beginning of the eighteenth > century, but by the second half of the eighteenth century Indian > military forces like those of Mysore were just as good as any > European fighting force. Also, Mysore became a stable and centralized > military-fiscal state like several European nation-states, and the > peasants of Mysore also enjoyed stable property rights. Gujarat also > engaged in rapid catch-up with Europe. Gujarati shipbuilding industry > became as advanced as European shipbuilding industries soon after the > initial contact with the Europeans. Gujarat saw very rapid > urbanization, which was supported by agricultural productivity that > was at least as high as Europe's. Gujarat's textile industry engaged > in manufacturing on a mass scale not only for the sake of domestic > consumption but also for exports. Moreover, the Gujarati commercial > class, consisting of merchants, traders, and bankers, had sufficient > opportunities for social mobility and enjoyed significant political > powers. But then why could India not industrialize and diverge before > the West? Kaveh Yazdani provides two answers to this question. One is > aimed at the core regions of South Asia like Gujarat and the other > addresses the deficiencies of India in general. > > Yazdani indicates quite strongly that advanced areas of India like > Gujarat did not industrialize before western Europe because they fell > into the high-level equilibrium trap. Gujarat had sufficient access > to fuel in the form of wood, geoclimatic situations were favorable, > it enjoyed global leadership in manufacturing goods like textiles, > and its premodern institutions were spurring continuous growth. As a > result, there was no great incentive to pay the opportunity cost to > industrialize. On the other hand, high labor and production costs, > lack of sufficient fuel in the form of wood, and inability to compete > with India in manufacturing led Europe to the path of mechanization > and industrialization. With regard to India in general, Yazdani > points out several endogenous obstacles to divergence, such as bad > institutions, lack of liberalism, and geographical constraints, but > none of these barriers were insurmountable. According to Yazdani, > India's lack of divergence is a result of a combination of both > endogenous and exogenous factors. By bringing the nineteenth century > also under the ambit of _India, Modernity and the Great Divergence_ > Yazdani is able to ask why India could not diverge even in the > nineteenth century, when mechanization of production was introduced > as early as the 1820s. So, how did India's divergence, which should > have been delayed by just a few decades, get delayed by over a > century? > > Yazdani accepts Tirthankar Roy's argument that although British > colonization was characterized by a lack of political freedom, this > does not mean that there was an absence of economic freedom as well. > But unlike Roy, Yazdani is not ready to characterize the drain of > wealth from India to England as payment for the services rendered by > the British to India for two reasons. First, there was a sufficient > number of skilled Indians to provide the same "services" (p. 573), > but they were systematically made noncompetitive by colonial > policymakers through unfair tariffs and custom duties. Second, major > European countries like France and Germany could industrialize only > by developing the skills of their countrymen through state-led > education programs, but India's literacy rate showed real improvement > only after the end of British colonial rule. Yazdani also heavily > criticizes British rule for perverting India's economic growth and > for obstructing India's march toward late modernity. According to > Yazdani, the judicial and the legislative systems that were set up > during colonial rule were discriminatory. As a result, people > belonging to lower castes and women were systematically discriminated > against, which led to a reversal of modernity and to the > "traditionalization" (p. 574) of some parts of India. Yazdani also > shows that not only were property rights regarding land not protected > against predatory behavior, but income from agriculture was no longer > reliable since around thirty million people died from famines in > India between 1876 and 1902. So, exogenous factors like British > colonization had a major negative impact on India's potential for > economic development and her march toward late modernity. > > Kaveh Yazdani's _India, Modernity and the Great Divergence_ is well > written, impeccably researched, well argued, and structured to almost > geometrical perfection. This book is recommended for anyone > interested in the divergence debate or in early modern India. My only > criticism of this book ironically emerges from one of its strong > points. When Barry Eichengreen reviewed Roman Studer's book _The > Great Divergence Reconsidered_, he remarked that statistical works > can only hint at the answers to a larger question and so we are > currently in need of research that can make historical sense of the > economic data out there.[2] Yazdani sets out to do exactly that, but > since he has to rely on the data sets created by people like Stephen > Broadberry, Bishnupriya Gupta, and Roman Studer, he is also forced to > characterize works of people like Kenneth Pomeranz and Prasannan > Parthasarathi as revisionist. This does not seem consistent with the > conclusions that Yazdani himself arrived at. > > Notes > > [1]. For example, Eric Lionel Jones, _Growth Recurring: Economic > Change in World History_ (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, > 2003). > > [2]. Barry Eichengreen, review of _The Great Divergence Reconsidered: > Europe, India and the Rise to Global Economic Power_ by Roman Studer, > _Journal of Interdisciplinary History_ 48, no. 4 (2018): 554-56. > > Citation: Monish Borah. Review of Yazdani, Kaveh, _India, Modernity > and the Great Divergence: Mysore and Gujarat (17th to 19th C.)_. > H-Asia, H-Net Reviews. June, 2019. > URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=54103 > > This work is licensed under a Creative Commons > Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States > License. > > _________________________________________________________ Full posting guidelines at: http://www.marxmail.org/sub.htm Set your options at: https://lists.csbs.utah.edu/options/marxism/archive%40mail-archive.com
