In 1981 this NY Times reporter/State Department functionary wrote a very 
insightful piece on the wars that were developing in Central America 
that had the potential to become another Vietnam. I found it so 
convincing that I became an activist with CISPES after consulting with 
Peter Camejo. Hence, I recommend a close read of this:

http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2009-08-06/do-or-die-in-afghanistan/p/

Do or Die in Afghanistan
by Leslie H. Gelb
August 6, 2009 | 6:36pm

Article - Gelb Afghanistan Manpreet Romana, AFP / Getty Images The 
president faces a looming deadline on whether to send more troops, but 
Leslie Gelb says the real question is: What’s his exit strategy?

With most eyes fixated on the Afghan presidential elections, the much 
more fateful event—the decision on whether to send even more U.S. troops 
to that beleaguered country—is heading toward the White House. There 
isn’t much mystery about who will win those elections or their 
consequences. Hamid Karzai will keep the presidency and guarantee the 
persistence of a totally ineffectual and corrupt central government in 
Kabul. But the troop increase that new U.S. commander General Stanley 
McChrystal will recommend to President Barack Obama is still up in the 
air. And Obama’s decision will determine whether the United States will 
move to turn the war over to the Afghans within the next three years or 
whether it will shoulder the burden of that war indefinitely.

Not even the smartest person in the world, not even the diviner of the 
most complicated novels, could possibly figure out how the U.S. military 
handles these situations without knowing how the U.S. military handles 
these situations. It is one of the great Kabuki games, or “now you see 
it now you don’t” games. The White House asked Defense Secretary Robert 
Gates, who asked Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Michael Mullen, who asked 
General McChrystal (all with the involvement of CENTCOM regional 
commander David Petraeus), for an assessment of the military situation 
and a recommendation on whether additional U.S. forces will be required 
to meet the U.S. mission in Afghanistan. It all seems very 
straightforward… but it isn’t. It’s necessary to step back a little 
further, to paste in additional background, in order to see the games 
that are about to be played—and their consequences.

Obama’s decision will determine whether the United States will move to 
turn the war over to the Afghans within the next three years or whether 
it will shoulder the burden of that war indefinitely.

When President George W. Bush departed the scene, 32,000 U.S. troops 
were in and authorized for Afghanistan. In March 2009, Obama increased 
that total by 21,000, and the total U.S. number is expected to reach 
68,000 by the end of this year.

Now, Obama gave these U.S. forces what he described as a more specific 
and limited mission than the fuzzy one that governed their actions under 
Bush. The new goal was to “disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in 
Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either 
country,” where they could once again attack America and its allies. To 
Obama, this may have seemed “clear and focused,” but it was anything but 
“limited.” U.S. troops could be there forever “to ensure” terrorists 
would never regain a foothold in that complicated and cavernous country, 
backed up by a safe haven in Pakistan. And besides, to achieve these 
“limited” goals, Obama reaffirmed the American commitment to all the 
nation-building goals that had supposedly vanished with the vanishing 
Bush. As a practical matter, then, the U.S. mission was to do virtually 
everything—defeat the enemy permanently so it could not return and also 
turn Afghanistan into a democratic, free-market (except for the poppies) 
paradise, or at least the Afghan version of such a paradise.

Our senior military commanders are nothing if not smart about these 
matters. They fully realize they can’t do the nation-building job and so 
they keep asking for, or, better, pleading for, the necessary civilians 
and civilian resources to do the job. Without doubt, they need the 
additional civilians to do nation-building, but military pleas are also 
a way of shifting responsibility to the civilian side. In fact, 
civilians are arriving in Afghanistan at a steady pace, given the 
difficulties of recruitment and security.

Now, McChrystal is supposed to present his assessment of the battlefield 
situation by next week. By all indications, it will say the situation is 
very bad, extremely difficult, but not utterly hopeless. The military 
never says “hopeless.” The word suggests that they would be giving up, 
and that’s simply not in their vocabulary. So McChrystal is stuck with 
the second task of saying how many troops he would need to actually 
accomplish his mission. And here comes the beauty of the military 
decision-making process.

McChrystal and the other generals know they are sitting on a political 
powder keg and can’t confront their president with a request he doesn’t 
want and can’t meet. At a minimum, they’ve got to give him options. The 
game is to say that “if you want to do X and Y, and take certain risks, 
then you need this number of additional troops; and if you want A and B, 
and to take additional risks, then you need an even higher troop level.” 
McChrystal’s options are likely to run from a low of about 4,500 
additional troops to as many as 27,000 additional new ones.

At some point in the next days, the White House will let the generals 
know the number they’re looking for, which could possibly be zero combat 
troops, but several thousand new military trainers. Some bargaining will 
follow with some back and forth between McChrystal and his superiors at 
the White House. They will settle among themselves, and then the press 
leaks will begin about what McChrystal or the military commanders 
“really” wanted. And Obama will be accused of not providing all the 
troops our commanders needed to get done the job that Obama himself 
mandated.

It won’t be easy to escape this now-classic model of presidential 
decisions on requests for increased troops in times of war. But the real 
tragedy of what will be happening in the next two-to-four weeks on this 
issue could well be what doesn’t get discussed at all—namely the real 
strategic importance of Afghanistan, the sensible American commitment to 
meet those needs, and a coherent strategy for fighting a near-impossible 
war in that most inhospitable of countries.

If President Obama just looks at this troop decision in isolation, he 
may well miss his last reasonable opportunity to seriously review the 
strategy he set forth in March. And whether he knows it or not, that 
strategy promises neverending U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan, 
and repeated pressure for more U.S. troops and dollars.

Obama and his colleagues should open up the agenda to re-ask themselves 
the most basic questions. What exactly do we gain by keeping al Qaeda 
and the worst of the Taliban out of Afghanistan when those terrorists 
can hit us even now from Pakistan, Yemen, or Somalia? Are U.S. troops to 
stay in Afghanistan indefinitely to prevent al Qaeda from coming back 
even in 2020? Or are we seriously planning to turn the responsibility 
over to the “good” Afghans themselves? And if we’re planning a transfer 
of responsibility, why aren’t those plans spread out in detail both in 
public and in private for Afghans and Americans to see? Unless these 
plans are made absolutely specific and endlessly repeated, Obama will 
never be able to Afghanize the war.

Sure, there will be risks in turning over responsibility to the Afghans, 
risks which we already run by al Qaeda’s presence in other states. But 
it’s not as if America’s departure from a combat role in Afghanistan and 
resumption of a military support role instead would leave us defenseless 
and powerless. As I’ve written on a number of occasions, Washington has 
many instruments of power that can be used in this and similar 
situations. The United States does know how to help friends with 
military and economic aid to take care of themselves when that is our 
real goal. Americans know how to contain threats, just look at 
Washington’s success in the Cold War. And also stare at the fact that 
there are ready-made allies for containment against the Taliban among 
its neighbors in Russia, China, India, and yes, especially Iran. There 
is an alliance to be put together here that can box in the Taliban and 
its friends. And Americans also know how to do deterrence and practiced 
it with great success during the Cold War and its aftermath. Anyone who 
holds territory is fully aware of what U.S. military might can do to 
them if they harm American soil.

And the last power instrument, which Americans often fear for the 
silliest of political reasons, that it might look like weakness, is to 
attempt negotiations with adversaries, to divide and conquer them as the 
British did for centuries. People often try to engage me in defining a 
“moderate” Taliban. I won’t go through such an abstract discussion. My 
answer always is that we should put $275 down on the table, $50 more 
than Taliban fighters are now being offered by the bad guys, see if they 
pick it up and see who they fight for the next day. If they take 
American money and don’t fight against our side, then they are 
“moderate” Taliban.

President Obama and his able colleagues may have other and even better 
ideas. The point is they owe it to themselves, and more they owe it to 
us, to reconsider all the basic questions about where they are going and 
what it will cost the rest of us. If he does not move in coming weeks to 
Afghanize the war, it will soon and irrevocably become America’s war and 
Obama’s war.

Leslie H. Gelb, a former New York Times columnist and senior government 
official, is author of Power Rules: How Common Sense Can Rescue American 
Foreign Policy (HarperCollins 2009), a book that shows how to think 
about and use power in the 21st century. He is president emeritus of the 
Council on Foreign Relations.

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