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I. Marx and Engels on the Austro-Prussian war Source: http://www.marxists.org/archive/mehring/1918/marx/ch11b.htm#s5 [Please note very well what does Engels have to say on Liebknecht´s sudden Austrophilia, second paragraph] Königgrätz dispelled all misunderstandings immediately and the day after the battle Engels wrote: “What do you think of the Prussians? They followed up their success with enormous energy. Such a decisive battle all over in eight hours is unparalleled; under other circumstances it would have lasted two days, but the needle gun is a deadly weapon, and then the fellows fought with a bravura seldom seen in peace-time soldiers.” Marx and Engels might make mistakes and they often did so, but they never resisted the recognition of error when the events themselves compelled it. The Prussian victory was an unpleasant pill for them to swallow, but they made no attempt to avoid their medicine and on the 25th of July Engels, who still retained the leadership in this question, summed up the situation as follows: “The situation in Germany now seems fairly simple to me. From the moment Bismarck carried out his plan with the Prussian army and met with such colossal success, the development in Germany took such a decided trend in his direction that, like everyone else, we must now recognize accomplished facts whether we like them or not ... There is at least one good side to the matter and that is that it simplifies the situation and makes the revolution easier by abolishing brawling in petty capitals and will in any case accelerate development. After all, a German parliament is quite a different thing from a Prussian chamber. The whole petty-State particularism will be dragged into the movement, the worst localizing influences will be destroyed, and the parties will become really national instead of merely local.” And two days later Marx answered with dry composure: “I agree with you entirely that we must take the mess as it is. Still, it is pleasant to be at a distance during this first period of young love.” At the same time Engels wrote, “Brother Liebknecht is spurring himself into fanatical pro-Austrianism,” and he did not mean this as praise. Liebknecht was obviously responsible for “an outburst of anger” from Leipzig which had appeared in the Frankfurter Zeitung. This “prince-eating” paper had even trimmed its sails so far as to reproach Prussia for its shameful treatment of “the venerable Elector of Hesse” and its heart was warming to the poor blind Guelph. At the same time Schweitzer in Berlin was taking up the same attitude as Marx and Engels, and almost in the same words, and for this “opportunist policy” the memory of the unfortunate man still suffers from the moral indignation of those ponderous “Statesmen” who swear by Marx and Engels, but do not understand them. II. The German national question, Schweitzer, Liebknecht (the elder) and Marx/Engels Source: http://www.marxists.org/archive/mehring/1918/marx/ch13.htm#s2 [Mehring´s comments here are essential. According to him, supporting the Prussian-led unification of Germany was a "fundamental socialist standpoint", while flirting "with the particularist supporters of the “ex-princes” and with the liberal corruptionist regime in Vienna in a fashion which it was impossible to justify on socialist grounds"... unless one thinks of people suggesting that workers should have fought for their own unification against that of the bourgeoisie, particularly if the bourgeoisie was shy enough to pass the task on to the Prussian landlords! This is a rather longish quote, but it allows us to see how the answers to the national question (that is, of the national front, that is of _not isolating the struggles of the working class from the general struggle of the people_) could and should not be split from issues of strengthening of the working class in Germany in the mid/1860s. Mehring states that "Schweitzer was a member of the North German Reichstag for Elberfeld-Barmen whilst his old opponent Liebknecht was a member for Stollberg-Schneeberg. Thanks to their opposing attitudes on the national question, they very quickly came to grips in the Reichstag. Like Marx and Engels, Schweitzer accepted the situation which had been irrevocably created by the Battle of Königgrätz, whilst Liebknecht obstinately opposed the North German League as a product of lawless and infamous violence, and as a creation to be destroyed ruthlessly even if it were necessary to abandon for the moment the social aims of the working class in the process." As we can see, the idea that workers should have their own national unity not that generated by the ruling classes has strong roots -only they are not shared by Marx, who prefers the ideas of a political "enemy" (Schweizer was Lassallean) to those of the "Marxist" ultraleftist (in petty local patriotism guise) Liebknecht...] After difficult struggles and much confusion the Allgemeiner Deutscher Arbeiterverein had developed into a solid organization and it continued to make very satisfactory progress, particularly after Schweitzer had been elected its leader. Schweitzer was a member of the North German Reichstag for Elberfeld-Barmen whilst his old opponent Liebknecht was a member for Stollberg-Schneeberg. Thanks to their opposing attitudes on the national question, they very quickly came to grips in the Reichstag. Like Marx and Engels, Schweitzer accepted the situation which had been irrevocably created by the Battle of Königgrätz, whilst Liebknecht obstinately opposed the North German League as a product of lawless and infamous violence, and as a creation to be destroyed ruthlessly even if it were necessary to abandon for the moment the social aims of the working class in the process. [...] Marx declared that Schweitzer was undoubtedly the most intelligent and the most energetic of all the workers’ leaders in Germany and that only through Schweitzer was Liebknecht compelled to remember the existence of a working-class movement independent of the petty-bourgeois democrats. Engels was of a very similar opinion and declared that the “fellow” understood and could explain the general political situation and the attitude of the workers to other parties much better than anyone else. “He declared that compared with us all other parties represented a reactionary mass whose differences were hardly of any weight for us! He recognizes, it is true, that 1866 and its consequences ruined the princelets, undermined the principle of legitimacy, shook the reaction to the core and brought the people into movement, but – now – he is attacking the other consequences, tax impositions, etc., and he conducts himself far more correctly,’ as the Berliners say, towards Bismarck than does Liebknecht towards the ex-princes.” Referring to Liebknecht’s tactics on another occasion, Engels declared that he was sick and tired of being told again and again, “we must not make any revolution until the Federal Diet, the blind Guelph and the worthy Elector of Hesse have been restored, and just but merciless vengeance wrought on the Godless Bismarck.” Engels was guilty of a certain amount of impatient exaggeration here, but at the same time there was a great deal of truth in what he said. [...] Schweitzer championed a fundamental socialist standpoint, whilst the Demokratisches Wochenblatt flirted with the particularist supporters of the “ex-princes” and with the liberal corruptionist regime in Vienna in a fashion which it was impossible to justify on socialist grounds. In his memoirs Rebel declares that the victory of Austria over Prussia would have been desirable because the revolution could have more easily disposed of an internally weak State like Austria than of an internally strong State like Prussia, but this is an afterthought and, quite apart from the value of this idea, not a trace of any such standpoint can be found in the literature of the day. Despite his personal friendship with Liebknecht and his personal mistrust of Schweitzer, Marx did not fail to realize the true state of affairs. III. On the Franco-Prussian war [Since this mail is already too long, I will just suggest readers to go to the MIA website at http://www.marxists.org/archive/mehring/1918/marx/ch14.htm and read sections 1 and 2 of Chapter 14] ________________________________________________ Send list submissions to: [email protected] Set your options at: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/options/marxism/archive%40mail-archive.com
