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In Algeria and Libya, the army is the force that shapes society, that controls all the resources. All changes, whether pro-Western or pro-Arab-Nationalism/Soviet-bloc, have come as the result of army coups. In Egypt, the army is also in charge, and the ruling elite is firmly pro-Washington. Egypt resembles Tunisia more than Algeria in that respect. But is there a divergeance of views within the Egyptian establishment somewhat similar to that which led to Ben Ali's downfall ? Well, both countries are gerontocracies. Mubarak is 82. All the Tunisian leaders of the CDR were over 60. In countries like Egypt and Tunisia, where the average age is 22, that means a whole middle-class generation is being denied a chance to express itself. The only option is to emigrate or to have (very) wealthy parents. In Egypt, Mubarak's death is a matter of months/years. This means, I suppose, that different factions are maneuvering behind the scenes. Some see the protests as a sign that the regime must be "liberalized". Others, again I suppose, mainly contenders for the succession, see a need to increase their prestige with the military. The army command itself must be following what Washington says quite closely. And what Washington said today, to Western media at least, was : "more democracy". Given that any army clique must rely on the US for leverage, there is probably a sense within the army that the US feels that the regime must evolve in a more "liberal" direction. It is a general feeling that the demands of the people cannot be ignored, if one wants to protect the long-term interests of the elite. These demands must be safely side-tracked. However, those is a position to succeed Mubarak, will call for an "orderly succession" which means the violent break-up of any demonstrations. Given the nature of the Egyptian military, a conscript-army that is highly centralized (since the conflict with Israel in th 60s and 70s), it is doubtful pro-democracy demonstrators and food-rioters will get more than bullets and token promises of more jobs and greater "electoral freedom". ElBaradei is not, at present, well-connected with the regime. He might easily be coopted as a figurehead however. I really, really hope I'm wrong. ________________________________________________ Send list submissions to: Marxism@lists.econ.utah.edu Set your options at: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/options/marxism/archive%40mail-archive.com