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Begin forwarded message: > From: H-Net Staff via H-REVIEW <[email protected]> > Date: July 29, 2020 at 2:29:45 PM EDT > To: [email protected] > Cc: H-Net Staff <[email protected]> > Subject: H-Net Review [H-Asia]: Taylor on Nguyen, 'The Unimagined Community: > Imperialism and Culture in South Vietnam' > Reply-To: [email protected] > > Duy Lap Nguyen. The Unimagined Community: Imperialism and Culture in > South Vietnam. Manchester Manchester University Press, 2020. 280 > pp. $120.00 (cloth), ISBN 978-1-5261-4396-9. > > Reviewed by Keith Taylor (Cornell University ) > Published on H-Asia (July, 2020) > Commissioned by Bradley C. Davis > > The military officers who murdered South Vietnamese president Ngô > Đình Diệm in 1963 and the Americans who urged them on > subsequently propagated a view of this man that has become a cliché > in virtually every book written about the Vietnam War: he was a > tyrant with obscure and self-absorbed ideas whose autocratic and > repressive policies provoked an insurgency against his own > government--he was the architect of his own demise. This idea served > the purposes of nearly everyone: the rulers of North Vietnam, the > Americans, and the South Vietnamese who justified their rule by > having overthrown him. > > During the past twenty years, scholars have published studies that > portray Ngô Đình Diệm in a somewhat less dismal light. But the > thoughts and aims of both the man and his domestic critics have > remained elusive--until now. In _The Unimagined Community: > Imperialism and Culture in South Vietnam_, Duy Lap Nguyen has > dissolved the entrenched stereotype of Ngô Đình Diệm and > developed an analysis of his thought, aims, policies, and opponents > that is fresh and convincing, meanwhile subverting prevailing > interpretations of modern Vietnamese history. He also develops a > fresh analysis of American and South Vietnamese relations in the > post-Diệm era. > > This book will be disdained by those committed to the caricature of > Ngô Đình Diệm that was retailed by the military officers who > overthrew him and that remains in fashion among people who write > about the Vietnam War. This book's arguments, while grounded in > historical evidence, are informed by philosophy and cultural > criticism, which may deter some historians. Nevertheless, the > importance of the book is bound to be increasingly understood as the > encrusted stereotypes of the war gradually fade. > > Americans who met with Ngô Đình Diệm typically reported that he > talked endlessly, but they never reported what he said. They were not > listening. By taking seriously what Ngô Đình Diệm and his > brother Ngô Đình Nhu actually said, Duy Lap Nguyen opens a new way > to understand the Vietnam War. > > Philip E. Catton's 2003 _Diem's Final Failure_ reevaluated the > much-reviled "strategic hamlet" program of Ngô Đình Diệm, and > Edward Miller's 2013 _Misalliance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, > and the Fate of South Vietnam_ reevaluated the relationship between > Ngô Đình Diệm and the United States. And while both of these > authors gave the ideological orientation of the Ngô brothers more > serious attention than others have done, Duy Lap Nguyen's mastery of > modern philosophy has broken through the communist-capitalist binary > of Cold War doctrines to reveal the significance and the implications > of their commitment to what is commonly called Personalism, a > twentieth-century ideology that opposed both communism and > capitalism. In doing so, he reveals the nature of the unbridgeable > gulf that opened between Ngô Đình Diệm and both his urban > Vietnamese critics and the Americans. > > Ngô Đình Diệm and his brother Ngô Đình Nhu were inspired by > the early twentieth-century French thinker Emmanuel Mounier's > Personalist critique of bourgeois democracy as serving "the mistaken > concept of freedom" espoused in capitalism, which Mounier understood > as "a non-Christian form of modernity" that replaces God with > ownership and possession of wealth (p. 58). Personalism aimed for a > "freedom" that was neither a Person detached from community, as with > the alienating individualism of capitalism, nor a community detached > from a Person, as with the collectivism of communist dictatorship (p. > 80). For the Ngô brothers, according to Duy Lap Nguyen, "Personalism > was not an anti-communist doctrine, but a communism that was more > anti-capitalist than the vulgar Marxism adopted by the Communist > Party" (p. 82). Nhu ridiculed the northern communists for not really > understanding what communism was: they just waved slogans to seize > power. For the Ngô brothers, the conflict was not between communism > and democracy or between international proletarianism and > nationalism; rather, it was a contest between two different visions > of anticolonial communism: Stalinist and Marxist humanist (p. 83). It > is often forgotten that, prior to his brother becoming prime > minister, Nhu was a leader in the South Vietnamese labor union > movement, not simply as an organizer but as a theorist. > > This interpretation of the thought of the Ngô brothers runs counter > to nearly everything that has been written about them, but it must be > admitted that there has always been something missing in efforts to > explain their aims. Even if some writers have acknowledged that the > Vietnamese Personalism of the Ngô brothers represented some kind of > middle way between communism and capitalism, no one has pursued the > implications of this line of thought with the consistency and clarity > of Duy Lap Nguyen's analysis, which, well documented, is developed in > the contexts of the Strategic Hamlet Program, developed in 1960-62 to > resist the Hanoi-directed rural insurgency in South Vietnam, and of > the deterioration of the Ngô brothers' relationship with their urban > Vietnamese critics and with the John Kennedy administration. > > The supposed infamy of the Strategic Hamlet Program was one of the > main accusations made against Ngô Đình Diệm by his urban > critics, who simplistically equated it with the previously abandoned > Agroville Program, a failed 1959-60 experiment to counter communist > insurgency by concentrating rural populations into new towns. This > accusation was also a major feature of the propaganda issued by > Diệm's enemy based in Hanoi. And it was taken up by the Americans > who were frustrated with Diệm's resistance to their advice. > > On the other hand, the rural people whose lives were most directly > affected by the Strategic Hamlet Program benefited from both an > increase of physical security and by a revolutionary shift of local > power from the "notables" of colonial times to a new generation of > locally elected postcolonial leaders. Even American military officers > reported that by 1962 the program was gaining ground against the > insurgency, and North Vietnamese later admitted that it was choking > their activities in the South. But the propaganda barrage from > Diệm's enemies in Hanoi, from his American critics in the press and > in the Department of State, and from the people who overthrew him and > who abandoned the program eventually succeeded in erasing any memory > of the program's success. > > The connection between Personalism and the Strategic Hamlet Program > was lost with the deaths of the Ngô brothers and the demonization of > their regime. The Strategic Hamlet Program was designed not only as a > response to the communist insurgency but also as a response to the > threat of American interference in Vietnamese domestic affairs. It > was also a rejection of colonial politicians who had collected in > Saigon and who were allied with American interests. The people who > overthrew Diệm understood that the program was against their > interests, whether would-be urban politicians who saw for themselves > a role in a US-dominated government or military officers who realized > that the program's success diminished their benefits from US military > involvement. > > The Ngô brothers, no less than the communist leaders in Hanoi, > understood the importance of the rural population; but instead of > terrorizing the peasantry into obedience as the North Vietnamese > urban-based communist "land reform" of 1953-56 had done, they aimed > to foster a nonviolent revolution in the southern countryside to > create a modernized self-reliant rural society that could resist both > the economic and political domination of both the Hanoi-based > insurgency and the urban-based "free world" elite. > > It's no mystery why the fiercest critics of the Ngô brothers were > based in the cities: French-trained remnants of the colonial regime > both civilian and military, the class of entrepreneurs allied with > American economic interests, political Buddhist monks, and American > reporters--for all of these, Personalism was an obstacle to their > influence. From the perspective of the Ngô brothers, these people > represented an urban minority whose interests were opposed to > empowering the rural population and to decentralizing both the > structure of government and the war against the Hanoi-directed > insurgency. On the other hand, the American demand to "democratize" > by bringing the urban elite into the central bureaucracy would crush > the social revolution in the countryside that the Ngô brothers > endeavored to implement as a way to create a more decentralized > rural-based polity capable of resisting the insurgency directed from > Hanoi. > > According to Duy Lap Nguyen, the alliance between the United States > and a burgeoning class of urban entrepreneurs and retailers was > cemented in the mid-1950s by the Commodity Import Program, the scheme > by which American funds were channeled into the Saigon government > while creating an urban society dependent upon American consumer > goods. The Ngô brothers were caught in the contradiction of needing > American assistance while believing that the long-term implications > of doing so would create a colonial economic and a political > structure that was against the interests of the great majority of > South Vietnamese. Their only hope was to reorient the economic and > political basis of government away from the cities and into the > countryside before being overwhelmed by the rising American > involvement in their country. This proved to be a vain hope. > > Turning to the post-Ngô Đình Diệm era, the second major argument > in Duy Lap Nguyen's book is about the economic, cultural, and > strategic results of the ascendance of American tutelage over the > Saigon government. The key insight here is related to Lyndon > Johnson's "limited war" idea, how it reflected the growing importance > of advertising strategies in American culture, and its effect on the > economy and culture of South Vietnam as well as on American > perceptions of the war. The limited war approach was based on > "image-making as global strategy." The war of attrition that ensued > was "a spectacular form of coercion devoid of real political power > ... enormous superiority in the means of violence" was employed in > the absence of a plan to actually prevail (p. 168). > > The American strategy for intervening in the Vietnam War, to the > extent that it can be called a strategy, was to persuade Hanoi's > leaders to give up their effort to conquer South Vietnam by > demoralizing them with a spectacle of bombs and air-mobile > operations. There was never a strategy to actually win the war, only > to make the enemy think that it could not win. American perceptions > of the war were thoroughly shaped by this emphasis upon appearance > over reality. Consequently, in 1968 the American people turned > against the war because the spectacle of the Tet Offensive convinced > them that the United States could not win the war when in reality the > Tet Offensive was a major defeat for Hanoi. Facts no longer mattered; > it was the spectacle that counted. > > Duy Lap Nguyen points out that this way of thinking had already led > to the overthrow of Ngô Đình Diệm in 1963 after the American > press had demonized him. His overthrow was not related to the actual > state of the insurgency but rather was to produce a desired public > impression--an American ally had to be eliminated for his refusal to > acknowledge the sovereignty of American public opinion. The young > activist Buddhists who sought his downfall had mastered the American > susceptibility to spectacular persuasion. In 1968, the leaders in > Hanoi inadvertently discovered this as well. > > The second part of the book endeavors to bring literary criticism > into an analysis of the Second Republic (1967-75) to suggest that the > effect of American commodity capitalism was to subordinate South > Vietnamese writers to a free market based on the mindless consumerism > of acquiring ever more goods and services. Duy Lap Nguyen's reliance > on Võ Phiến's view of South Vietnamese literature leads to a > contradiction. He accepts Võ Phiến's elitist criticism of this > literature as lacking literary value: authors were forced to write > for a popular readership and "instead of educating the people through > the creation of high works of culture ... had to mix with the masses" > and to prostitute their artistic ability by creating popular cultural > commodities for a mass audience that was too lazy to appreciate art > (p. 197). > > Duy Lap Nguyen cites Walter Benjamin and Theodor Adorno on literature > as "distraction" to develop Nguyễn Hiến Lê's observation of this > literature as a "wasteful form of gratification ... entirely separate > from the way that literary works had once been appreciated" (p. 201). > This reinforces his citation of Võ Phiến's nostalgia for > literature produced by premodern mandarins and colonial > intellectuals, which led him to see the spread of works of art "to > the masses" as a lowering of standards and to lament the absence of > writers who could write pedagogically to elevate national > consciousness. > > But then as an example of this new literature with mass appeal, Duy > Lap Nguyen analyzes the Z.28 novels of Bùi Anh Tuấn; he references > the ideas of Walter Benjamin, Guy Debord, Michel Foucault, Jean > Baudrillard, and Carl Schmitt to explain that these novels were a > critique of South Vietnamese urban society under American economic > and cultural ascendancy. Furthermore, according to Duy Lap Nguyen, > these novels portrayed the United States as a poisonous ally that > held South Vietnam hostage to its spectacular "limited" style of > warfare that ultimately made the continued existence of the country > impossible (p. 216). > > The question arises: how then do these novels relate to Võ Phiến's > assertion that literature in South Vietnam had nothing important to > say about the fate of the country? Duy Lap Nguyen argues that South > Vietnamese literature reflected the mindlessness of commodity > capitalism and at the same time argues that one of the most popular > novelists critiqued the social effects of this mindlessness as well > as the entire American project in his country. > > This apparent analytical dead-end in the analysis of South Vietnamese > literature may lack plausibility, but it nevertheless introduces a > topic that deserves more attention: the literary freedom enjoyed by > South Vietnamese writers, how it was exercised in the era of > commodity capitalism, and what this can tell us about the > urbanization of the country under wartime conditions that made rural > life increasingly untenable. > > Duy Lap Nguyen's insight into how "image-making as global policy" led > American leaders to be deceived by their own strategy is particularly > appropriate with regard to Lyndon Johnson, who gave up his political > career in 1968 as a result of a purely spectacular victory of the > enemy as portrayed by the US news media. This was a "turning point" > that came not from a "decisive defeat on the battlefield" but from > "the failure of the planners, as specialists in the practice of > global image-making, to sell the image of omnipotence to its intended > audience" both in Hanoi and in American public opinion (p. 250). > > I believe that Duy Lap Nguyen's analysis is basically correct. As a > consummate politician, Lyndon Johnson lived in the realm of spectacle > and American public opinion, which ended his career. John Kennedy > also lived in that realm, which ended the life of Ngô Đình Diệm. > American public opinion and politics continue to flounder between > reality and the spectacle. > > Citation: Keith Taylor. Review of Nguyen, Duy Lap, _The Unimagined > Community: Imperialism and Culture in South Vietnam_. H-Asia, H-Net > Reviews. July, 2020. > URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=55242 > > This work is licensed under a Creative Commons > Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States > License. > > -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- Groups.io Links: You receive all messages sent to this group. View/Reply Online (#85): https://groups.io/g/marxmail/message/85 Mute This Topic: https://groups.io/mt/75873485/21656 -=-=- POSTING RULES & NOTES<br />#1 YOU MUST clip all extraneous text when replying to a message.<br />#2 This mail-list, like most, is publicly & permanently archived.<br />#3 Subscribe and post under an alias if #2 is a concern. -=-=- Group Owner: [email protected] Unsubscribe: https://groups.io/g/marxmail/leave/8674936/1316126222/xyzzy [[email protected]] -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
