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Begin forwarded message: > From: H-Net Staff via H-REVIEW <[email protected]> > Date: September 24, 2020 at 10:14:00 AM EDT > To: [email protected] > Cc: H-Net Staff <[email protected]> > Subject: H-Net Review [H-War]: Conversino on Hill, 'The Red Army and the > Second World War' > Reply-To: [email protected] > > Alexander Hill. The Red Army and the Second World War. Cambridge > Cambridge University Press, 2017. xviii + 738 pp. $19.95 (paper), > ISBN 978-1-107-68815-5. > > Reviewed by Mark J. Conversino (Air University) > Published on H-War (September, 2020) > Commissioned by Margaret Sankey > > Did Nazi Germany lose the war against the Soviet Union or did the Red > Army win it? Was the outcome--Germany's total defeat in the East at > the hands of Soviet forces--brought about, in Alexander Hill's words, > by Stalin's "faceless hordes and overwhelming might overcoming > superior German tactical and operational capabilities" (p. 1)? Or, on > the other hand, did victory come through Moscow's superior marshaling > and use of its human and physical resources to blunt and then break > Hitler's war machine? There is an important difference in how one > answers these and myriad related questions. The Cold War-era view of > the Nazi-Soviet war generally assumed the former position, that > Germany's defeat could be explained in quantitative terms and > ultimately blamed on Hitler's erratic leadership. David Stahel, in > his superb book _Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the_ > East, considered Hitler's invasion doomed to inevitable failure from > almost the start, asserting that while Allied victory was by "no > means clear in late August 1941, Germany's inability to win the war > was at least assured."[1] Likewise, as Stahel and many other scholars > of this war make abundantly clear, the Wehrmacht's operational > prowess--indeed, operational brilliance, especially in the opening > months of the invasion--could not compensate for strategic > miscalculations nor a grand strategy so unhinged from reality as that > pursued by the Nazi elite. The alternative view is that the Soviet > Union could have been defeated but that the Red Army, while > benefitting from German mistakes and miscalculations and the efforts > of the Western Allies, won the war on the merits of its own > performance and the enormous sacrifices of the Soviet people. > > Alexander Hill, professor of military history at the University of > Calgary, sets out to answer this question through an analysis of the > Red Army's effectiveness, or lack thereof, from the experiences > gained in Spain and along the Mongolian border with the Japanese > Empire through the conquest of Berlin and the destruction of the last > vestiges of German resistance in Czechoslovakia. To accomplish this, > Hill employs English- and Russian-language sources, archival and > otherwise, to "present a picture of change and continuity within the > Red Army" from the start of Soviet industrialization to the end of > the Great Patriotic War in May 1945 (p. 9). Hill's work is not a > detailed narrative overview of the war's major campaigns and battles, > and the author assumes that readers have read at least one of the > many "sound overviews" of the war--whether John Erickson's two-volume > set or David Glantz and Jonathan House's _When Titans Clashed_ (1995) > (p. 9). Still, this work provides more than enough of that historical > narrative that readers less familiar with the course of the > Nazi-Soviet war will find it useful and illuminating. While the > author based this work heavily on Soviet archival sources, he also > used Soviet published sources, made more effective in light of > post-Soviet release of other materials. > > The book begins with a chapter-length examination of the Red Army in > the late 1920s, on the eve of the adoption of the first Five Year > Plan and Stalin's "Great Turn" in Soviet development. Familiar parts > of the narrative include a concise analysis of Mikhail > Tukhachevskii's impact on the Red Army along with the general > militarization of Soviet society, the adoption of tanks, > mechanization, and aircraft, and the formulation of the doctrine of > Deep Battle. He notes, however, that by the late 1930s, the Red Army > had an abundance of relatively modern tanks and aircraft but lacked > the overall mechanization necessary to make Deep Battle an > operational reality (something that would dog the Red Army well into > the war itself). On the eve of war, Hill deems the Red Army far more > capable of defending Stalin's "socialist Motherland" than it had been > even a decade before. On the other hand, while it was large and well > equipped (even if much of its equipment was rapidly approaching > obsolescence), the Red Army suffered from indifferent training, and a > bureaucratized, stifled, and overly politicized leadership hobbled > the Great Purge, a calamity that would cost the Red Army dearly in > the early stages of the war. Hill rightly notes as well that > significant flaws in command and control and combined arms > coordination, together with deficiencies in reconnaissance, rear area > support, and overall communications manifested themselves in the Red > Army's bumbling invasion of eastern Poland. Unfortunately, Stalin and > his advisers took little notice of these faults because the Red Army > was ultimately successful in its brief Polish campaign. The > disastrous Winter War against Finland just months later, however, > would bring all of these shortcomings into high resolution. Expecting > a relatively easy victory, the Red Army found itself mired in a > costly stalemate, despite its superior numbers in men and equipment. > To prevail over stubborn Finnish resistance, the Red Army eventually > focused on winning at the tactical level through the application of > overwhelming firepower, suffering 126,000 irrecoverable losses in > what was essentially a palate cleanser for the fighting to come. > Alarmed, perhaps, by the debacle of the Winter War, the Soviets > subsequently left nothing to chance in staging the largely bloodless > occupation/seizure of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania under the secret > provisions of the Nazi-Soviet Pact: from the outset, they employed an > overwhelming force of 500,000 troops backed by several thousand tanks > and armored vehicles. Bereft of outside assistance, the governments > of the Baltic republics chose not to resist, resulting in just a few > dozen Soviet casualties. > > Despite cataloguing these obvious problems within the Soviet armed > forces, Hill is within the mainstream of military historians in > asserting that Germany's defeat at the hands of the Soviets was > inevitable, writing that it is "difficult to imagine it [Operation > Barbarossa] achieving more than it would" (p. 119). The important > thing for Stalin and the Soviet Union was that, whatever its > shortcomings, the Red Army fought--first, by wearing down the > Germans, then by breaking them utterly and completely. In this > regard, Hill echoes the assessments of other historians of the German > invasion--while the Wehrmacht piled up dazzling operational > victories, each operational success the Germans achieved was > essentially setting the stage for their ultimate failure. Hill wrote > that "every success limited German potential to concentrate resources > for the next as losses mounted and supply lines were increasingly > strained" (p. 232). In some areas, Soviet resistance collapsed with > alarming speed; in others, Soviet troops fought with grim > determination. With their country's literal survival at stake, Soviet > armies executed, without "particular initiative and creativity," > frequently pointless frontal assaults (p. 240). These relentless > Soviet counterattacks not only cost the Red Army dearly, they > steadily wore down the Wehrmacht as well, inflicting losses on the > German army not seen in any of its previous campaigns in this war. As > an aside to this, Hill even includes a brief, but enlightening, > discussion of the Red Army's use of vodka to fortify its assault > troops, as well as its use as a tonic for frayed nerves and sagging > morale, concluding that "it is actually possible that vodka rations > improved Red Army effectiveness" (pp. 243-44). > > Interestingly, Hill notes that contemporary Russian historians fall > largely into two camps: revisionists who seek to unwind the > triumphalist Soviet narrative of the war and Russian neo-Soviet > types, seeking to replace the Communist Party with Russian patriotism > as the driving force of victory. They, and the majority of their > contemporary Western counterparts, agree that, in Hill's words, the > "Red Army became a more effective fighting force as the war > progressed" (p. 2) and that Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin, likewise, > became a "more effective military leader than he had been when it > [the Soviet-German war] started" (p. 3). Yet Hill centers his > attention throughout the book on the concept of "effectiveness" in > this context. Despite suffering appalling losses in the first months > of the war, the Red Army saved the Soviet Union from certain > annihilation at the hands of a barbarous enemy. "If the aim was to > repel the Nazi-German invader and its allies, and then defeat them" > Hill writes, "then the Red Army achieved the objective and was > effective" (p. 3). "However," Hill writes, "rarely do we consider > effectiveness in terms of achieving a goal at any cost" (p. 4). He > further grants that while the Red Army played a leading > role--"possible [_sic_] the principal role"--in defeating the German > Wehrmacht, it did so while suffering mind-boggling losses that were > not all the result of the operational skill, ferocity, or barbarism > of the German assault and their occupation policies. A substantial > proportion of Soviet losses stemmed from the regime's bungling and > mistakes Stalin and his marshals made prior to and during the first > eighteen months or so of the war. Certainly, in the early weeks and > months of the invasion when the very existence of the Soviet state > and its people was at stake, the Red Army hurled men into battle > often with slight regard for the state of their training or > equipment. Hill, however, notes that even when there was no > compelling operational or strategic reason to do so, Stalin and the > Red Army's generals displayed all too often "a criminal disregard for > the lives of [their] troops in hammering away at German forces in > ill-conceived operations" (p. 6). > > Still, by mid-1944, Hill notes, the Red Army was "in many ways at the > peak of its effectiveness in terms of balancing cost and clear > benefit" (p. 498). When the Red Army launched its own summer > offensive that year, code-named Bagration, on the third anniversary > of the German invasion, the Soviets combined superior operational > prowess with a massive superiority in personnel and equipment to > achieve one of the war's greatest victories--the destruction of > German Army Group Center. The Soviets, admittedly aided by Hitler's > stand-fast orders, clearly not only outgunned the Germans by a huge > margin but outfought them as well. Hill notes further the > contribution of the Western Allies to Soviet success that critical > summer, citing a heretofore unseen degree of Soviet mobility and > sustainment provided by thousands of Lend-Lease trucks and vehicles. > While Soviet losses remained high, Hill concludes that the Red Army, > by the second half of that year, was reducing German strength far > more economically than earlier thanks to "a combination of its > increased effectiveness and other factors such as Hitler now being > the one to throw away troops with attempts to hold territory at any > cost" (p. 511). By the end of 1944, the Red Army had "shown what a > combination of qualitative improvement and quantitative might could > achieve" (p. 512). > > However, Hill's account of Soviet operations through to the end of > the war demonstrated that despite growing manpower shortages, postwar > political aims drove operations that often incurred, once again, huge > numbers of casualties. Large-scale offensive operations in peripheral > theaters such as in Hungary, gained notable victories, including the > defeat of the puppet government of that country and opening the route > to Vienna, but neither result was "crucial for defeating Nazi Germany > by this stage" (p. 526). Indeed, the author is highly critical of > other such peripheral Soviet operations in East Prussia, where German > units, cut off from the main front by February 1945, put up a > desperate and futile resistance to the very end of the war. Rather > than simply screen and contain these stranded German units, the Red > Army battered away at them at great cost. He likewise notes that the > Soviet leadership sacrificed many of their soldiers' lives for > postwar territorial gains rather than for any reason related to the > immediate defeat of the enemy. Even with Germany's defeat an absolute > certainty, in the conduct of the Soviets' Berlin operation, > "political factors were now increasingly prominent as military and > justified heavy losses that would have been intolerable for the > democracies fighting to the west" (p. 541). Hill rightly stipulates > that the barbaric nature of the Soviet-German war, including its > duration, could explain the enormous disparity in losses suffered > between the USSR and the Western Allies. Yet "such arguments hide the > extent to which Stalin and the Soviet system under Stalin exacerbated > the price of what under any circumstances would have been a costly > struggle" (p. 560). Despite the clear progress and institutional > learning exhibited at all levels of the Red Army and even the Kremlin > leadership, Hill concludes "the late-war Red Army was still > man-for-man, tank-for-tank, aircraft-for-aircraft all too often not > as effective as either its principal opponent or key allies in terms > of the ability to destroy the enemy ... without first being > destroyed" (p. 566). > > Readers familiar with the nature of Stalinism and the Soviet state > itself should not be surprised by these conclusions. Hill includes a > chapter on Stalin's purges of the Red Army's officer corps, but this > was but one relatively small element of his vicious and often > capricious rule. In the 1930s, as Timothy Snyder and others have > documented, "the Soviet Union was the only state in Europe carrying > out policies of mass killing."[2] Before the Second World War, the > Stalinist regime, as Snyder noted, had "already starved millions and > shot the better part of a million."[3] In his quest to turn the > Soviet Union from a backward, agrarian empire into a modern > industrial giant, Stalin terrorized and enslaved millions of his own > people on flimsy or nonexistent charges of wrongdoing, committed > genocide in Ukraine, and even murdered tens of thousands of otherwise > loyal members of the Communist Party and even his inner circle. We > should not expect, then, that such a regime would wage war any > differently than it did, even after the tide had turned decisively in > Moscow's favor. After all, whether building "socialism" at home or > waging war to save and then expand the Soviet empire, results were > all that mattered to Stalin and the military and civilian leaders who > lived or died at his whim. > > Despite immense losses among its ranks and the civilian society that > supported it, the Red Army had not only saved the Soviet Union, it > ultimately and completely vanquished its foes and drove into the very > heart of Europe, where Soviet power would hold sway for the next > forty-five years. Taking all this in hand, Hill concludes that "both > the Red Army and the Soviet system had passed the test of total > war--a considerable achievement when one considers the state of the > Red Army and Soviet economy in the 1920s. Millions had paid the > ultimate price for that victory--a sacrifice on an unprecedented > scale that stands as a chilling reminder of the potential of modern > industrial states to wage intensive, sustained, and total war" (p. > 582). Military professionals and academic specialists alike will > benefit from Hill's analysis. The Red Army and the Second World War > is meticulously researched, including among its sources an extensive > number of Soviet and Russian sources, including diaries, memoirs, > interviews, and eyewitness accounts. Hill adroitly includes concise > accounts of the war's dozens of operations and battles that, together > with his insightful analysis, will make this a valuable single-volume > resource for all those seeking to expand their understanding of this > still-evolving narrative of this crucial period in military, > European, and Russian history. > > Notes > > [1]. David Stahel, Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the > East (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 451. > > [2]. Timothy Snyder, _Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin > _(New York: Basic Books, 2010), x. > > [3]. Snyder, _Bloodlands_, xi. > > Citation: Mark J. Conversino. Review of Hill, Alexander, _The Red > Army and the Second World War_. H-War, H-Net Reviews. September, 2020. > URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=55197 > > This work is licensed under a Creative Commons > Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States > License. > > -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- Groups.io Links: You receive all messages sent to this group. View/Reply Online (#1896): https://groups.io/g/marxmail/message/1896 Mute This Topic: https://groups.io/mt/77058184/21656 -=-=- POSTING RULES & NOTES #1 YOU MUST clip all extraneous text when replying to a message. #2 This mail-list, like most, is publicly & permanently archived. #3 Subscribe and post under an alias if #2 is a concern. -=-=- Group Owner: [email protected] Unsubscribe: https://groups.io/g/marxmail/leave/8674936/1316126222/xyzzy [[email protected]] -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
