a British perspective --- warning -- it's long --- reward --- it's useful
(IMHO)

-
[image: Noted British labor economist Guy Standing says the mainstream
left, left populists and social democrats, should not be distracted by
populism. Instead it should focus on new answers in an era defined by
chronic insecurity and growing inequality.] <https://portside.org/>

On Neo-Liberalism, Populism, and the New “Dangerous Class"
<https://portside.org/2021-03-06/neo-liberalism-populism-and-new-dangerous-class>


Guy Standing
February 1, 2021
OpenDemocracy
<https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/rethinking-populism/global-transformation-precariat-overcoming-populism/>

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* Noted British labor economist Guy Standing says the mainstream left, left
populists and social democrats, should not be distracted by populism.
Instead it should focus on new answers in an era defined by chronic
insecurity and growing inequality. *

UberEats drivers protest outside Uber's Toronto office. Gig workers suffer
an unstable task-driven existence, manipulated by apps and labor brokers.
But they also have interests and aspirational demands that evolve in
action. , Canadian Broadcasting Corporation



*What follows is Guy Standing’s contribution to a debate on Rethinking
Populism <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/rethinking-populism/>, a project
of openDemocracy, a UK-based independent global media organization that
seeks through reporting and analysis of social and political issues, to
educate citizens to challenge power and encourage democratic debate across
the world.*

*Transformations* tend to go through several preliminary phases. In
Britain, the ‘dis-embedded’ phase in the development of industrial
capitalism involved the Speenhamland system launched in 1795, the mass
enclosures that created a proto-proletariat, and disruption by a
technological revolution. All this prompted a period of primitive rebels –
those who know what they are against, but not agreed on what they are for –
in which protests were mainly against the breakdown of the previous social
compact.

Those included the days-of-rage phase that culminated in the mass protest
in Peterloo in 1819, brutally suppressed by the state, and the Luddites,
misrepresented ever since as being workers intent on smashing machines to
halt ‘progress’, when in fact what they were doing was protesting at the
destruction of a way of living and working being done without a quid pro
quo.

In my *A Precariat Charter*
<https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/a-precariat-charter-9781472510396/> written
in 2014, sketching a precariat manifesto for today’s Global Transformation,
I concluded by citing the stanza from Shelley’s *The Masque of Anarchy*
<http://www.bl.uk/learning/langlit/poetryperformance/shelley/poem3/shelley3.html>,
written in reaction to the Peterloo massacre. Jeremy Corbyn was later to
cite it in his campaign speech of 2017, which James Schneider recalls in his
contribution to this debate
<https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/rethinking-populism/world-win-and-planet-save/>.
Shelley expressed it in class, not populist terms, as I did, in my case
signifying that the precariat was evolving as a class-in-the-making. Corbyn
seems to have expressed it in support of a left populism.

Until his drowning at an early age, Shelley along with Byron and other
artists of that era, including Mozart, were railing against the
bourgeoisie, which is why Mozart and Byron were both drawn to the Don
Juan/Don Giovanni theme. The Romantics failed to arrest the march of
industrial capitalism but their art put out a marker for the future counter
movement.

*The UK and ‘decent labor’*

The trouble was that at the time the emerging mass ‘working class’, the
proletariat, had not yet taken shape as a class-for-itself, and was not
ready to do so until late in the century. Three other primitive rebel
events should be read into the narrative – the pink revolutions of 1848,
often called the Springtime of the Peoples, wrongly seen by some at the
time as presaging the proletarian revolution, the brave prolonged
activities of the Chartists in the 1830s and 1840s, which advanced the
cause of political democracy despite defeat, and the upheavals in the 1890s
that the left have tended to underplay.

The latter marked an enormous historical error by ‘the left’. It is why the
term ‘dangerous class’ was in the sub-title of my *The Precariat: The New
Dangerous Class*
<https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/the-precariat-9781849664561/>, published in
early 2011. Although some Marxists have used it to describe the ‘lumpen
proletariat’, the term ‘dangerous class’ was used in the nineteenth century
to describe those who were in neither the bourgeoisie nor the emerging
proletariat. They were the craftsmen, artisans, street traders and artists,
from whose ranks came the leading figures articulating a version of
socialism as rejection of laborism – freedom from labor, freedom to work
and to leisure (reviving ideas of ancient Greece, embracing *schole*).

In the 1890s, against William Morris and colleagues, including some
anarchists, who championed that emancipatory vision, were the laborists,
state socialists, Fabians and others who wanted to generalize decent labor.
By the turn of the twentieth century, the latter had triumphed and marched
forward in labor unions, social democratic parties and Leninism, even
though most of the first batch of Labor MPs in 1906, when asked by an
enterprising journalist what book had most influenced them, mentioned John
Ruskin’s *Unto This Last*, not anything by Karl Marx.

So, we should interpret what Karl Polanyi was to call the Great
Transformation as beginning with a period of dis-embeddedness, when the old
social formation with its specific systems of regulation, social protection
and redistribution was being dismantled mainly by the interests of
financial capital, guided by an ideology of laissez-faire liberalism. This
produced growing structural insecurities, inequalities, stress, precarity,
technological disruption, debt and ecological destruction, culminating in
an era of war, pandemics – most relevantly, the Spanish flu of 1918-1920,
which may have killed 50 million people – and the Great Depression.

The re-embedded phase came after 1945, with European welfare states, shaped
by Bismarckian and Beveridge systems of social security and the Swedish
model crafted by Gosta Rehn and Rudolf Meidner. This transformation marked
the triumph of laborism, of the industrial proletariat.[i] It was not
marked by populism. Its political leaders and intellectual architects were
as uncharismatic as you could imagine.

The Great Transformation ran into the sand in the 1970s, by when
de-industrialization had frayed the proletariat as a mass social force. The
trouble was that the mainstream left were trapped by their own history.
They had built what is often called, misleadingly, *les trente glorieuses*,
but, like Polanyi himself, they implicitly had a teleological perspective
rather than a dialectical one. For too many of the mainstream left, the
Transformation was essentially complete. The rest was a matter of defending
what had been gained and fine-tuning the welfare state and state ownership
of the means of production. But laborism was increasingly reactionary, in
both senses of that word.

This was brought to a crisis in the cauldron of radical ‘primitive rebel’
protests in 1968. Once again, those participating in the upheavals knew
what they were against but had less unity or clarity in articulating what
they were for. Again, this was not a populist moment, it reflected the
breakdown in the post-1945 social compact and the protest of elements of
the dangerous class that despised dour laborism as much as capitalism. The
bourgeoisie looked on with horror and disgust.

The loss of public energy and unity after 1968, and growing ‘stagflation’,
created fertile ground for the emergence of the dis-embedded phase of the
Global Transformation, the painful construction of a globalized market
society. With due respect, interpreting what has happened in terms of
populism is a distraction.

With due respect, interpreting what has happened in terms of populism is a
distraction.

*From neo-liberalism to rentier capitalism*

The Mont Pelerin Society that groomed the economic and political leaders of
the 1980s between 1947 and 1979 could be called ‘neo-liberal’, in that they
believed in free market capitalism, financial and capital market
liberalization and extreme individualism. Undoubtedly, they and their
politicians, notably Thatcher, Reagan and others listed in *The Corruption
of Capitalism*
<https://www.bitebackpublishing.com/books/the-corruption-of-capitalism> (second
edition, 2021), were advocates of global capital and vehemently against the
proletariat.

Many commentators forget that Thatcher was an accidental leader, who never
gained the support of a majority of the electorate.[ii] Intense class
conflict ensued. Key events were the miners’ strikes in Britain and the
defeat of the air traffic controllers in the United States. The miners’
strike was doomed from the outset, but represented the protest of the dying
class, standing up, or going down, with dignity. Those who defied the state
deserve our respect.

Here we come to the first crucial point I wish to make in this article. The
ideology used to break the old social formation was what we now call
neo-liberalism – known in its various guises as the Washington Consensus,
the Chicago School, shock therapy and supply-side economics. It
corresponded to the ideology guiding the dis-embedded phase in the Great
Transformation. But neoliberalism does not define the system that it
forged. It was a destructive ideological tool, the hallmark of which was
virulent determination to dismantle all institutions and mechanisms of
social solidarity, the benchmarks of ‘the left’, on the grounds that they
stood against the market.

Neoliberalism essentially died in the 1980s as a political project. By then
it had done its work. It had laid the ground for financial capital to take
control from national production capital. The Big Bang in the City of
London symbolized that moment, although reforms in the USA and elsewhere
preceded it. Multinational financial and corporate capital then forged the
hegemonic system of today – rentier capitalism. This in turn, as in
previous dis-embedded phases in the evolution of capitalism, ushered in a
new class structure with new class tensions.

We will come to those later. First, a few words on rentier capitalism. It
represents the triumph of private property rights over free market
principles. Contrary to what neo-liberals claim, it is the most unfree
market system ever constructed. More and more of the income flows to owners
or controllers of property – financial, physical and intellectual. The
income and wealth gained are forms of rent, not profits from production or
wages.

Indeed, another error of the mainstream left was to think neoliberalism
ushered in a ‘deregulated’ labor market. As argued elsewhere, the labor
market is more tightly regulated than in the social democratic industrial
capitalism era. It is just that it is regulated in favor of capital, and
the mainstream left helped to make that happen.

There is no space here to go into the contours of rentier capitalism.[iii]
But a key point for political action in the coming period is that a
transformation can only be forged if one understands the structures one
wishes to see transformed. A focus on ‘neoliberalism’ gives rentier
capitalism a free pass.

Borrowing from the philosophy of science, we may say that a paradigm will
not be displaced by a new paradigm until the existing one prompts questions
that its practitioners cannot answer and a new paradigm exists to fill its
place with a bevy of advocates and practitioners capable of implementing it.

Rentier capitalism is the latest form of capitalism to ‘negate’ the pursuit
of Enlightenment values, encapsulated in its trinity of freedom, equality
and solidarity. However, the immediate challenge is to achieve ‘the
negation of the negation’.

This should remind ourselves of the nature of political transformations.
Rentier capitalism is the latest form of capitalism to ‘negate’ the pursuit
of Enlightenment values, encapsulated in its trinity of freedom, equality
and solidarity. In that regard, Chantal Mouffe correctly refers to
‘struggles for equality and liberty’ and calls for a ‘deepening of
democracy’
<https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/rethinking-populism/left-populist-strategy-post-covid-19/>.
One should also emphasize a need to ‘deepen solidarity’, through promoting
new collective bodies, as is recognized in Spyros Sofos
<https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/rethinking-populism/left-populism-possible/>.
However, the immediate challenge is to achieve ‘the negation of the
negation’. This is an ontological perspective, not a teleological one. We
may not be able to define precisely what type of society we wish to create
in the longer term, but we should be able to see what the near Future could
be.

This point relates to another historical error of the mainstream left, that
is, twentieth century social democrats. They lost a sense of the Future.
They became reactionary, at best promising to restore Yesterday.

*The precariat in the global class structure*

This leads to the class structure generated by the combination of
neoliberalism and its progeny, rentier capitalism. It is a globalized class
fragmentation superimposed on earlier class structures, which always
linger. Very briefly, we should define classes by three dimensions –
distinctive relations of production, distinctive relations of distribution
and distinctive relations to the state. It is essential to define classes
in this multi-dimensional way in order to escape both from the old
pseudo-Marxist dualism of the bourgeoisie versus the proletariat (or worse,
working class) and the phoney dualism of crude populism of ‘the people’
versus ‘the elite’ (or establishment).

In descending order of income and state power, at the top is the
plutocracy, below which is an elite, and then proficians and the salariat.
These are defined in detail elsewhere. The crucial points for this
contribution are that all are recipients of rentier income and all are
objectively and emotionally detached from existing welfare states. It is
sometimes overlooked that the salariat – those with salaried employment,
occupational pensions, houses and shares – have done very well during the
rentier capitalism era, gaining from one of its outstanding outcomes, asset
price inflation.[iv]

All this means, in turn, that the top strata – perhaps accounting for 30%
of the population – have little inclination materially to defend wages,
labor standards or state benefits, unless driven by fear of losing their
privileges from the rage of the advancing *sans* *culottes*.

Below those groups is the old proletariat, for whom labor and social
democratic parties and labor unions were built, and whose interests were
advanced globally by the International Labor Organization. The key point
for this discourse is that the proletariat was subject to
*proletarianization*, to the disciplines of stable full-time labor,
and to *fictitious
decommodification*, in that the money wage shrank as a share of social
income, with more coming as non-wage benefits and entitlements, giving them
labor security. It was not real decommodification, since workers were
obliged to sell labor (effort and time) in order to obtain those
entitlements or be married to someone who was prepared to do so.

For the proletariat, the norm was and is to be in a stable job. There is
nothing laborists love more than to have as many people as possible in
jobs. They romanticize being in a job, promising Full Employment, and
quietly resorting to workfare. They conveniently forget that being in a job
is being in a position of subordination and fail to recall Marx’s depiction
of labor in jobs as ‘active alienation’.

The hallmark of the proletariat’s relations of production was employment
security, not job security, in the sense of what work or activity one
does.[v.] As for their relations of distribution, those in the proletariat
are, as a norm, neither rent-recipients nor structurally exploited by rent
mechanisms, unless in the process of falling into the precariat.

This leads to what is the emerging mass class of rentier capitalism, the
precariat, below which is a lumpen category cut off from society, without
an active role. The precariat’s distinctive relations of production include
having unstable, insecure labor, having to do a lot of work that is not
labor, including work for the state, having no occupational or
organizational narrative to give to themselves, and being exploited and
oppressed off workplaces and outside labor time as much as within them.

More of them are being drawn into platform capitalism, as ‘concierge’ or
cloud taskers, controlled and manipulated by apps and other labor brokers.
Above all, they are being gradually habituated to precariatization, told to
put up with a norm of unstable task-driven bits-and-pieces existence.

The distinctive relations of distribution are that they must try to survive
solely on low, volatile and uncertain money wages, with few if any non-wage
benefits or assured state benefits, while being subject to onerous
exploitation by rental mechanisms, living constantly on the edge of
unsustainable debt. The insecurity experienced is unlike the norms of the
proletariat, being characterized by chronic uncertainty and fragility to
unpredictable but common shocks.

Those characteristics are bad enough. But it is the distinctive relations
to the state that most define the precariat. The precariat are denizens
<https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/a-precariat-charter-9781472510396/> rather
than citizens, meaning that they are losing or not gaining the rights and
entitlements of citizens. Above all, they are reduced to being *supplicants*,
dependent on the discretionary benevolence of landlords, employers,
parents, charities and strangers, showing them pity.

We should reject the idea that the era of rentier capitalism is
creating generalized
precarity
<https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/rethinking-populism/precarity-populism-and-prospects-green-democratic-transformation/>.
The etymological root of precariousness, from the Latin, is ‘to obtain by
prayer’. That applies to the precariat, not to the salariat or elite. We
should also avoid talking about ‘precarious work’ when what is meant is
insecure or unstable labor. This leads to false political vocabulary and
policy prioritizing.

It is the distinctive relations to the state that most define the
precariat. The precariat are denizens rather than citizens, meaning that
they are losing or not gaining the rights and entitlements of citizens.

Now, in indecent haste, let me recall that the precariat is still a
class-in-the-making, not yet a class-for-itself, in that it is split into
three factions. The first is what can be called Atavists, that is, those
who have a sense of grievance around feelings of a lost Past. This part is
linked to the declining proletariat: it recalls that themselves, their
parents or their communities had a secure Yesterday, which they want back.
This fraction, unless offered an alternative progressive paradigm, listens
to the sirens of neo-fascism, or pluto-populists, who present themselves as
charismatic leaders, promising to bring back ‘greatness’, sovereignty and
so on.

In effect, there is scope for reactionary alliances between elements of the
plutocracy, the proletariat and the Atavists in the precariat. But it would
be a mistake to ignore the class base of such alliances. Donald Trump
epitomized the rentiers; he used anti-establishment rhetoric but jealously
preserved and advanced the interests of the rent-seeking plutocracy. He
never followed a neo-liberal economic agenda. He stood for mercantilism in
foreign economic strategy and for rentiers eager to plunder the commons
domestically, while pursuing a pluto-populist fiscal policy. It is better
to see his era in Gramscian terms, a malignancy of a class-based system in
deepening if not terminal crisis.

The second faction in the precariat is the Nostalgics. Made up largely of
migrants and minorities, these are the real denizens, their sense of
relative deprivation deriving from the fact that they lack a Present, not
feeling at home anywhere. This group is suffering loss of all forms of
commons – civil, cultural, social, natural and knowledge – but its
frustrations only boil over on days of rage, when the pressures they endure
become unbearable. Crucially, they are disenfranchised, emotionally and
literally, not seeing a political movement or vision offering them a real
Present. But they will not support a neo-fascist populism. They will only
be mobilized by a progressive vision of a Future, in which their
citizenship rights will be advanced.

The third faction is the Progressives. This group tends to be young and
relatively educated. Going to school and university or college they were
promised by parents, teachers and politicians they would have a Future.
They emerge without one, except an insecure one burdened by debt stretching
into the future and suffering from a precariatized mind, loss of control
over time.

This group will not vote for neo-fascism either. But they do not long for
the Yesterday of the tired left either. The most memorable piece of
graffiti on a wall in Madrid in the days-of-rage events in 2011 was, ‘The
worst thing would be to go back to the old normal.’ The trouble was, and
still is, that the mainstream left neither attempted to understand the
precariat nor offered a Future. As Beppe Grillo so memorably mocked, they
were ‘dead men walking’.

So, naïve anarchism and populism took over the primitive rebels’ phase of
the countermovement, in the shape of the Movimento Cinque Stelle in
Italy, *Podemos
(‘we can’)* in Spain, adopting the vacuous slogan of Barack Obama, and the
Occupy ‘movement’ in many countries.[vi] The latter were the ‘primitive
rebels’ phase again. Speaking in several of those Occupied meetings in
several countries, it was sad to see the energy being dissipated as
populism produced a muffled set of messages, of grievances, of
frustrations, but not of direction.

If there were to be a manifesto or charter for the precariat, what would it
look like and how would it differ from one for the proletariat, had there
been one, one hundred years ago?

What would the Future look like? Believing that any Transformation must be
led by the needs and aspirations of the emerging mass class, and that the
‘vanguard’ must be the progressive part of that class, in 2014 I asked
myself the impertinent double question
<https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/a-precariat-charter-9781472510396/>: If
there were to be a manifesto or charter for the precariat, what would it
look like and how would it differ from one for the proletariat, had there
been one, one hundred years ago?

Mainstream political parties and movements were not doing that exercise,
because they had either gone atavistic – promoting warmed-up laborism and
jellified Third Wayism – or had gone populist, in talking vaguely but in a
PR mode of ‘we, the people’ against ‘the 1%’ or ‘for the many, not the
few’. If you do not identify the emerging mass class, you are rather
unlikely to identify the priority policies you should be promoting, or the
vocabulary and imagery you need to be using to mobilize those who see
themselves in that class or likely to be in it or having relatives and
friends likely to be in it.

In framing a Precariat Charter, a fundamental understanding had to be kept
in mind. The precariat are not just Victims. They are not defined just by
defeat and pity. They are defined as well by interests, aspirations and
*passions*.[vii] So many commentators focus exclusively on their
victimhood. But we should always remember that an emerging class wants
particular changes, which evolve in action, as the vision crystallizes.

Ontologically, the negation of the negation means creating a new Today by
overcoming barriers to the realization of the aspirations of the emerging
class, creating a social structure that can presage a new Tomorrow, which
may not be imaginable or visible when we are in a mess. We can,
realistically, only paint the Future as the next transformational stage on
an unfolding journey. This is surely one of the lessons of the failed
‘left’ experiments of the twentieth century, of getting ahead of oneself,
of then sliding into the optic of ‘the ends justify the means’.

Reinventing the future, in class terms, has always been the primary task of
‘the left’. So when it came to framing a Precariat Charter, it seemed
appropriate to take as a guiding principle the adage of Aristotle that only
the insecure man is free. That means we must not be stuck in the old sense
of security, even though it is a human need to enjoy *basic security*.

The Precariat Charter was based on analyzing the characteristics of the
precariat, listening to self-declared members of it in what were over 400
presentations in 40 countries, reading the thousands of emails from readers
or listeners and, above all, recognizing that a Charter had to combine
elements to ‘right wrongs’ and elements for institutional changes needed
for an aspirational Future.[viii]

What emerged, rightly or wrongly, was a set of 29 policy or institutional
reforms that were markedly different from what a proletariat charter would
have looked like and from what was being advocated by either the populist
left or social democratic left parties, then or now.

*The strange death of left populism*

In 2016, I had the privilege of being invited by John McDonnell, the Shadow
Chancellor of the Exchequer, to be one of his economic advisers, remaining
so until after the General Election of December 2019. He understood the
precariat, as well as my emphasis on the centrality of the commons in a
transformative vision. He repeatedly assured me that he would deploy the
vocabulary and agenda all that implied. But he just could not do so. He did
openly advocate a basic income, as I had urged him to do, and he publicly
backed my report for the leadership on piloting basic income, as did the
previous Labor leader, Ed Miliband, as well as the Shadow Ministers with
the relevant portfolios. However, the Labor bureaucracy showed no interest,
let alone engagement.

Labor’s left populism was trapped in its laborism, its diagnosis of the
nature of ‘the enemy’ and a lack of awareness let alone understanding of
the precariat.

The left populism of which James Schneider writes in his contribution to
this debate
<https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/rethinking-populism/world-win-and-planet-save/>
was
trapped in its laborism, its diagnosis of the nature of ‘the enemy’ and a
lack of awareness let alone understanding of the precariat. One problem was
that leading figures in the insurgent group, Momentum, were atavistic
laborists; another was that labor unions thought that the problem was
reducible to reintegrating those in ‘precarious labor’ (sic) into the
unionized proletariat. The team around Jeremy Corbyn were also atavistic,
focusing on ‘the Preston model’, nice but strangely peripheral to the
concerns and aspirations of the precariat.

John McDonnell organized an event on the commons in the Speaker’s Chamber
of the House of Commons, at which I was an opening speaker. The Chamber was
packed, but nobody from Corbyn’s team was there. Ironically, in mid-2020, I
was invited to give a webinar on rentier capitalism with Jeremy Corbyn as
discussant/moderator. He was characteristically gracious and attentive, and
ended by saying he was supportive of the analysis and prognosis. The
tragedy was that a good man was in the wrong job at the wrong time, and had
surrounded himself with laborists and those steeped in old class analysis.

There is one point on which to end this section. The defeats for left
populism of recent years, in Britain and elsewhere, must be understood as a
loss of vision. I warned in speeches in early 2016 that Brexit could be won
and Trump could win because the Atavists and declining manual proletariat
would support them, while most of the Nostalgics were disenfranchised and
while the Progressives were disengaged and unenthused. Left populists were
failing to be popular enough.

What transpired is that in Brexit, the Progressives in the precariat were
confronted by one side offering Remain coupled with the prospect of more
years of austerity and the other Leave side promising an unedifying retreat
into nationalism and bourgeois rule. Confronted by such a choice, most
stayed at home. A similar pattern allowed Trump to win, albeit with a
minority of the actual vote. Something similar happened in the 2017 General
Election in Britain, despite Corbyn’s mobilization of many motivated by
anger and frustration, and a similar pattern happened even more strongly in
the 2019 General Election.

Similar drifts into losing causes have characterized the populist left in
continental Europe, with Podemos shrinking into a reformist package, with
M5S mired in its unresolved class base, and with social democratic parties
struggling to hold onto dwindling shares of the electorate.

If we want a Green Left Transformation we must forge a cross-class alliance
built around the aspirations of the Progressives in the precariat, a
revival of the commons and a green-blue vision of a sustainable balance
between humanity and nature.

The good news is actually quite encouraging. The right is winning with a
dwindling share of the vote as well. In Britain, the Conservatives gained a
landslide victory in December 2019 with the support of just 29% of the
electorate, and with most of those elderly. Meanwhile, everywhere, the size
of the Atavist faction of the precariat has almost certainly passed its
peak, while the Progressive numbers are mounting every day.

The challenge before us is that if we want a Green Left Transformation we
must forge a cross-class alliance built around the aspirations of the
Progressives in the precariat, a revival of the commons and a green-blue
vision of a sustainable balance between humanity and nature. William
Wordsworth’s words from The Prelude come to mind:


*“Bliss it was in that dawn to be alive But to be young was very heaven.”*

Put in modern parlance – everything is up for grabs.

*Notes and references*

[i] I have called this the era of *industrial citizenship*, due to social
‘rights’ being linked to industrial-style labour. This labourist model
should be contrasted with an emancipatory one around *occupational
citizenship.*

[ii] This author recalls going on a London tube in 1985 and seeing daubed
in black paint along the adverts, *‘If Maggie’s the answer, it must have
been a bloody stupid question.’*

[iii] That is done in Standing
<https://www.bitebackpublishing.com/books/the-corruption-of-capitalism>,
2021.

[iv] This makes it problematic to claim that ‘precarisation is afflicting
all’ as Azmanova suggests
<https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/rethinking-populism/precarity-populism-and-prospects-green-democratic-transformation/>,
whatever meaning one gives to ‘precarisation’.

[v] Although I have explained at length the difference between the seven
forms of labour-based security, many writers still treat employment
security and job security as synonymous, thereby missing a key factor in
the debate on the precariat.

[vi] Of course, one populist party did temporarily gain office, *Syriza* in
Greece, mentioned by Spyros Sofos
<https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/rethinking-populism/left-populism-possible/>
 and Didier Fassin
<https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/rethinking-populism/blind-spots-left-populism/>.
Probably, the less said about Syriza the better. Its self-centred leader,
Alexis Tsipras, said arrogantly, ‘Defeat is the battle that isn’t
waged…..Lost battles are battles that are not fought.’ Then, he surrendered
without putting up any fight worthy of the name.

[vii] In a different context, this was brilliantly understood by the great
political economist Albert Hirschmann, The Passions and the Interests:
Political Arguments for Capitalism Before Its Triumph
<https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691160252/the-passions-and-the-interests>
.

[viii] *The Precariat* has been translated into 23 languages, which has led
to nearly a decade of emails from around the world. It should be stated
that many of the 400 presentations came after the *Charter* was drawn up.
They have generally confirmed the articles, although no doubt there would
be differences, particularly of priorities, if the book were to be written
now. Some of the themes went forward into *Plunder of the Commons: A
Manifesto for Sharing Public Wealth*
<https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/308/308407/plunder-of-the-commons/9780141990620.html>
.

[*Guy Standing is Professorial Research Associate, School of Oriental and
African Studies, University of London, Fellow of the UK Academy of Social
Sciences, and co-founder and honorary co-president of the Basic Income
Earth Network (BIEN).  He is the former director of the International Labor
Organization's Socio-Economic Security Program, responsible for reporting
on  global socio-economic security and the Decent Work Index. Among his
latest publications are Basic Income: How We Can Make it Happen (2017), and
The Corruption of Capitalism: Why Rentiers Thrive and Work Does Not Pay
(2016).*]

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