Best regards, Andrew Stewart
Begin forwarded message: > From: H-Net Staff via H-REVIEW <[email protected]> > Date: March 28, 2021 at 2:14:57 PM EDT > To: [email protected] > Cc: H-Net Staff <[email protected]> > Subject: H-Net Review [H-Diplo]: Frazier on Stur, 'Saigon at War: South > Vietnam and the Global Sixties' > Reply-To: [email protected] > > Heather Marie Stur. Saigon at War: South Vietnam and the Global > Sixties. Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 2020. 292 pp. > $29.99 (paper), ISBN 978-1-316-61411-2. > > Reviewed by Jessica M. Frazier (University of Rhode Island) > Published on H-Diplo (March, 2021) > Commissioned by Seth Offenbach > > Heather Stur's _Saigon at War: South Vietnam and the Global Sixties > _joins a push among Vietnam War historians to take into greater > consideration the perspectives of Vietnamese, and it contributes to > the historiography by paying particular attention to South Vietnamese > voices. Through archival research in Ho Chi Minh City, Stur provides > insight into the lives and livelihoods of Vietnamese from all walks > of life: urban elite, youth activists, religious leaders, military > families, and diplomats. In doing so, _Saigon at War _moves away from > the world of high politics and into everyday life on the streets of > Saigon from the assassination of President Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963 to > the fall of Saigon in 1975. > > Two main questions drive Stur's analysis: who represented the > authentic voice of the Vietnamese and why was it so difficult to > build and maintain a democracy in South Vietnam? These questions and > their answers go hand-in-glove with one another and, for Stur, point > to the existence of a "chaotic yet proto-democratic national culture" > in South Vietnam before its collapse (p. 7). _Saigon at War_ > illustrates that no single voice or group of people could be said to > represent the desires of South Vietnamese people, yet many activists, > urban elites, and religious leaders wanted the same thing: some form > of representative government. Even so, a true democracy could not > flourish under the circumstances because neither Saigon nor > Washington harnessed a united front against the Communist North. > Instead, a cacophony of voices led to disorder and confusion, and, > ironically, the potential for a democracy that Stur identifies also > resulted in the downfall of South Vietnam, she argues. > > Stur illustrates the existence of a proto-democracy by homing in on a > few key groups of people who made claims on the government and > expected to be heard. For example, members of the educated elite had > the ear of government officials as well as national and international > press and used the attention to call for democracy, freedom, and > peace--rhetoric that echoed the Saigon administration and Washington. > Yet these politically savvy activists, some of whom had indirect ties > to the National Liberation Front (NLF), undermined Saigon and its US > counterparts by calling for freedom from outside interference and set > themselves up as a "third force"--that is, a term meant to signify > that they neither wanted to be ruled by Hanoi nor by the US-backed > Saigon administration. Students formed another base of political > activity, and like the peace activists a generation older, many youth > activists similarly questioned the legitimacy of the unelected Saigon > government. Even so, many opposed the Communist North--a detail that > Saigon and Washington too often ignored. > > According to Stur, political unrest in Saigon in the early 1960s > provided a cover for NLF cadres determined to take down the > government. Both communist and noncommunist activists took to the > streets in protest of the unelected officials who led the country > following the coup d'état that overthrew President Diem until the > 1967 elections that resulted in General Nguyen Van Thieu's > presidency. The Saigon administration and its US allies often could > not identify who was a communist instigator and who was a > noncommunist citizen exercising their right to freedom of speech and > assembly. Capitalizing on the confusion, the NLF committed strategic > acts of violence within the city limits to destabilize Saigon, boost > the morale of guerrilla fighters, and instill fear in Saigon's > citizens. The key, according to a 1967 US analysis of the situation > that Stur cites, was for the NLF to commit acts of terrorism that > yielded too few casualties to attract international attention but > were visible enough to instigate the Saigon administration into > acting as an authoritarian regime. > > The Saigon administration played into the hands of NLF strategists, > according to Stur, by cracking down on protests and locking up > political prisoners, in many cases without trial. News of mass > incarcerations followed by stories of torture in South Vietnamese > prisons ruined any chance of South Vietnam receiving widespread > international support and strengthened the NLF's ability to claim to > be the rightful inheritors of South Vietnam even after the 1967 > election of President Thieu. Activists publicized acts of political > repression--often committed against themselves--carried out by the > Thieu administration. In the late 1960s, Vietnamese priests added to > international scrutiny of South Vietnam's prison system by publishing > articles about political imprisonment in a Saigon-based Catholic > magazine and by speaking out publicly. Such condemnation, especially > on the part of the Catholic population which had staunchly supported > anticommunist efforts in the early 1960s, made it difficult for the > US administration to make the case to American citizens or to world > opinion that US intervention was in fact boosting an intact > democracy. > > Stur's study adds invaluable new research in her analysis of > on-the-ground activities. She shows that time and again US diplomats' > distrust of activists and their difficulty in determining the intent > of protestors led to missed opportunities for the Saigon government > and its American advisors to cultivate homegrown support. By the mid- > to late 1960s, the situation had turned into "mutual suspicion," > leaving activists who did not want an NLF victory with no reasonable > outcome to champion (p. 108). > > _Saigon at War _would be a welcome addition to either upper-level > undergraduate or graduate-level curriculums on the Vietnam War, the > global 1960s, or the US in the world, and historians, political > scientists, and international relations scholars would do well to > read it. Stur chose to structure the book as a layered history--that > is, the chapters are generally arranged topically by type of > Vietnamese actor (elite, youth, religious leader, etc.) rather than > chronologically--as a way to highlight the diverse perspectives of > South Vietnamese. Although some scholars may level the usual charges > against such a choice in organization--change over time is not the > central focus of the text and some repetition occurs in terms of > explaining the historical context of given events--the structure > makes the book conducive to assigning single chapters (e.g., if a > professor wanted to compare student activism in Saigon with student > activism elsewhere during the global 1960s, they could easily do so). > In short, _Saigon at War _will no doubt become required reading for > those wishing to research any aspect of the US war in Vietnam. > > _Jessica Frazier is an associate professor in the History and Gender > and Women's Studies Departments at the University of Rhode Island._ > > Citation: Jessica M. Frazier. Review of Stur, Heather Marie, _Saigon > at War: South Vietnam and the Global Sixties_. H-Diplo, H-Net > Reviews. March, 2021. > URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=55579 > > This work is licensed under a Creative Commons > Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States > License. > > -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- Groups.io Links: You receive all messages sent to this group. View/Reply Online (#7586): https://groups.io/g/marxmail/message/7586 Mute This Topic: https://groups.io/mt/81679155/21656 -=-=- POSTING RULES & NOTES #1 YOU MUST clip all extraneous text when replying to a message. #2 This mail-list, like most, is publicly & permanently archived. #3 Subscribe and post under an alias if #2 is a concern. -=-=- Group Owner: [email protected] Unsubscribe: https://groups.io/g/marxmail/leave/8674936/21656/1316126222/xyzzy [[email protected]] -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
