Best regards, Andrew Stewart
Begin forwarded message: > From: H-Net Staff via H-REVIEW <[email protected]> > Date: April 25, 2021 at 8:10:09 AM EDT > To: [email protected] > Cc: H-Net Staff <[email protected]> > Subject: H-Net Review [H-Diplo]: Ambrosius on Hamilton, 'Manipulating the > Masses: Woodrow Wilson and the Birth of American Propaganda' > Reply-To: [email protected] > > John Maxwell Hamilton. Manipulating the Masses: Woodrow Wilson and > the Birth of American Propaganda. Baton Rouge Louisiana State > University Press, 2020. Illustrations. 656 pp. $49.95 (cloth), ISBN > 978-0-8071-7077-9. > > Reviewed by Lloyd Ambrosius (University of Nebraska) > Published on H-Diplo (April, 2021) > Commissioned by Seth Offenbach > > In this excellent book, John Maxwell Hamilton examines the darker > side of US president Woodrow Wilson's administration during the First > World War. In historical scholarship, the president has been > identified with progressivism at home and liberal internationalism > abroad. When he led the United States into war against Germany in > 1917, he promised to make the world safe for democracy. Yet Wilson > authorized and encouraged wartime practices that denied civil > liberties to Americans in the name of winning the war in Europe. > "This book," Hamilton writes, "is about the profound and enduring > threat to American democracy that rose out of the Great War--the > establishment of pervasive, systematic propaganda as an instrument of > the state" (p. 4). > > A week after the United States entered the war, Wilson established > the Committee on Public Information (CPI) under the leadership of > progressive journalist George Creel. The CPI and Creel are the > central focus of Hamilton's book, which recognizes their positive > contributions but also their negative impact on the nation. "The > CPI's accomplishments are not its whole story, however." Hamilton > emphasizes, "More than anything else, this book is a cautionary > lesson about the intoxicating power of propaganda.... The CPI > subverted the democratic ideals it espoused. It sanitized news, > distorted facts, and was tendentious. It appealed to emotions of home > and hearth, which was relatively benign, but aroused fear and hatred, > which was not.... Working with federal intelligence agencies eager to > sniff out subversives and stifle dissent, the CPI was an accomplice > to the Wilson administration's trampling of civil liberties" (pp. > 7-8). Hamilton warns against the long-term consequences of what began > during the Great War: "The quest for more effective propaganda--and > the danger to democracy--intensifies when a nation is at war. This is > the case today" (pp. 13-14). > > Hamilton notes a pattern of leadership that characterized Wilson's > presidency. Those who managed the publicity for his 1916 presidential > campaign emphasized the "He Kept Us Out of War" slogan. He knew he > might be unable to keep that promise of peace because the demands of > his policies toward the European belligerents might culminate in > America's entry into the war. Yet he embraced that false promise. > > After winning reelection, Wilson issued a peace note to the > belligerents but failed to control the public message. Hamilton > notes, "The badly plotted peace note added to Wilson's difficulties > achieving his peace goal. The fundamental error was rooted in his > disdain for journalists. He wanted them to keep their pens in their > pockets until he told them when it was time to write. His efforts to > control the message this way produced exactly the opposite of what he > wanted. By taking the press into his confidence, even if on > background, he could have avoided confusion about his peace > proposal." Hamilton emphasizes, "This episode revealed a fundamental > aspect of Wilson's thinking about the presidency: the great faith he > put in leading the public with soaring appeals through diplomatic > notes and speeches from behind a lectern. This concept of leadership, > which sprang from his thinking about government as a professor, was > informed by progressive belief in the need to engineer citizens' > opinions. That reasoning lay behind his creation of the Committee on > Public Information when, within the next few weeks, the country went > to war" (p. 77). > > While Wilson touted pitiless publicity, Hamilton observes, he often > remained quite secretive and even uninvolved in his own > administration. "Wilson's weakness warred with--and undermined--his > greatness," writes Hamilton. "He expanded the role of the office and > enlarged the scope of the federal government, yet he was detached > from crucial aspects of governing" (p. 82). Wilson strongly supported > Creel and his aggressive leadership of the wartime CPI, yet he sought > to keep his distance from some of its worst abuses. > > Hamilton provides a detailed account of the CPI's operations, ranging > from propaganda to censorship both at home and abroad. "Wilson's > administration revolutionized press relations like the steam engine > revolutionized manufacturing," he writes. "Theodore Roosevelt had > made effective use of press releases, to the point of annoying > Congress, but these handouts were largely the products of a few > bureaus and amounted to a trickle compared to what gushed from the > CPI. Creel mass-produced news and established impersonal routines to > reach the press day in and day out. The CPI was not limited to > handling the flow of news from government agencies. Because Wilson > did not hold press conferences and [his secretary Joseph] Tumulty > ceased giving daily press briefings, the CPI was the principal source > of White House news" (p. 127). It also stopped alternative sources of > information. "Creel and the president were largely shoulder to > shoulder with regard to censoring. In May 1918, Creel forwarded an > analysis by British correspondent Arthur Willert of the president's > attitudes toward Irish independence. 'Acting under my blanket > instructions, to the effect that censors should not pass matter > purporting to give your views,' Creel wrote, 'the whole cable was > killed with the exception of the opening [para]graph.' The first > [para]graph was one sentence. The portion killed amounted to more > than three pages. Creel asked if Wilson approved. Wilson did. He said > the reporter 'had no authority' to speculate on his thinking. This > despite Willert's close cooperation with the CPI" (p. 245). > > Although generally critical, Hamilton credits the CPI with effective > public diplomacy abroad. "The CPI's signal achievement was not > individual accomplishments in one country or another. It was," he > explains, "the implementation of Wilson's New Diplomacy, a > progressive idea of international relations. The CPI went over the > heads of governments to shape the attitudes of their citizens about > the United States, about their own domestic politics, and about > creating better ordered world comity" (p. 294). Yet the CPI failed in > its propaganda aimed at bolstering the morale of US and Allied > soldiers and undermining that of enemy soldiers. "Creel's > mismanagement of field propaganda exceeded the bungling of CPI > propaganda in allied and neutral countries. Nothing redeemed the CPI > apart from its belief that field propaganda was a good idea. The > spare account in Creel's _Complete Report_ swept the embarrassing > episode under the historical carpet. Little has been written about > it. The story is worth telling not only because it fills out the > history of the CPI. Field propaganda against enemy combatants, which > the AEF [American Expeditionary Force] eventually oversaw, marked the > advent of a species of psychological warfare deemed essential today > but was then, in many military minds, considered a waste of time" > (pp. 297-98). > > Hamilton regards the Sisson documents, which purported to prove a > German-Bolshevik conspiracy that enabled Vladimir I. Lenin and the > Bolsheviks to seize power in the Russian Revolution of 1917, as the > worst example of the CPI's operations. Although these documents were > forgeries, Edgar Sisson, who headed the CPI's Office of War > Propaganda, vowed for their authenticity. Both Creel and Wilson > strongly supported this falsehood, disregarding warnings from other > officials about the evident forgery. It served their short-term > interests in promoting democracy abroad through propaganda. "The > administration badly miscalculated," Hamilton concludes. "It assumed > the great mass of Russians could be induced to throw off the > Bolsheviks for a democratic government and enthusiastically fight the > Germans. 'It was perfectly possible to make them have heart in the > war,' Charles Edward Russell told Wilson when the [Elihu] Root > mission, of which he was part [in 1917], returned to the United > States. An education campaign was needed. 'If it is addressed to > Russian's passion for democracy, and if it shows him that his beloved > Revolution is in peril, he will be ready to fight with all his > strength.' Wilson replied that Russell's thinking 'runs along the > lines of my own thought.' If one believed that Russians really wanted > to fight, it was an easy next step to believe the Bolsheviks, who > took the country out of the war, were an alien political element > acting on behalf of the Germans" (pp. 384-85). This falsehood not > only contributed to failure abroad but also helped promote the Red > Scare at home. > > "The Sisson-Creel combination played to both men's weaknesses, the > one being inclined to sensationalism and the other to impetuousness," > Hamilton observes. "Wilson's reliance on two men with no credentials > for pronouncing judgment on a German-Bolshevik conspiracy and his > failure to tell the State Department that he approved publication > constituted administrative malpractice. Wilson had warned Sisson to > stay away from 'political entanglements' and then followed him into > an adventure that haunted policy toward the Soviet Union for years to > come" (p. 390). The United States thus became a victim of its own > false propaganda. > > Hamilton concludes that the CPI left a negative legacy. Ironically, > it helped undermine Wilson's vision for a new world order. "CPI > propaganda had other postwar liabilities besides accentuating > partisanship," he notes. "CPI images of Hun brutality and CPI stories > of German-Bolshevik conspiracies worked against the fair treatment > that Wilson had promised--a promise that Germans believed when they > signed the armistice" (p. 429). Despite the accuracy of Hamilton's > criticism, there were other reasons for the failure of Wilson's > peacemaking. If he had succeeded in convincing the Allies to accept > all his ideas for the peace treaty with Germany, it would still not > have satisfied the postwar German claims. No propaganda, even more > accurate and less harsh than the CPI's, could have resolved those > deep international conflicts. > > In Hamilton's view, Wilson ultimately failed to use propaganda > effectively when he most needed it to persuade the American people to > support the Versailles Treaty with the League of Nations Covenant. > The president's illness and his abrupt ending of the CPI were > contributing factors to his inability to convince the Senate to > approve the peace treaty. But his personality and style of leadership > also influenced this outcome. "Wilson's stubbornness and > sanctimoniousness and his aversion to courting the press and > political opponents were not new. These traits had existed for a long > time. Illness only exacerbated them" (p. 450). > > Wilson's legacy was mixed, as Hamilton convincingly demonstrates in > this outstanding book. "Wilson profoundly transformed the > communication functions of the American government, but he did not > grasp how much. He enlarged the executive branch in his first years > in office and expanded it more during the war. This growth required a > presidency that was more engaged in persuasion--persuasion of members > of his administration, of Congress, of key constituencies, and of > citizens.... All this, and yet, when the need for propaganda was as > great, if not greater, than at any other time, he treated it as a > secondary matter" (p. 451). > > Hamilton believes that the president's misguided use of propaganda > contributed to his failure at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and > in the treaty fight over the League of Nations and other parts of the > peace treaty with Germany. Wilson failed to understand the proper > role of propaganda in democratic governance. "Democracy privileges > process. It presupposes that open, vigorous deliberation ensures > better outcomes. The CPI subverted this. It did all the things that > Creel insisted it did not do. It ignored facts and opinions that > spoiled its narrative. Its publicity was tendentious" (p. 458). > Hamilton's book makes a convincing case for this critical conclusion. > > Citation: Lloyd Ambrosius. Review of Hamilton, John Maxwell, > _Manipulating the Masses: Woodrow Wilson and the Birth of American > Propaganda_. H-Diplo, H-Net Reviews. April, 2021. > URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=55992 > > This work is licensed under a Creative Commons > Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States > License. > > -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- Groups.io Links: You receive all messages sent to this group. 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