The authors of the Clingendael report are not very reliable.  They make 
careless mistakes. For example, in Annex 1, there is a list of 9 documents 
supposedly obtained from regime defectors.  Three of them are described as 
follows:


3

From: Mohammad Ibrahim Mohammad

To: The General Manager of the Syrian Petroleum Company

27 January 2012, Rumeilan

This document refers to the request for exemption for the YPG to tender for 
contracts pertaining to the protection of petroleum installations belonging to 
the Directorate of Hasaka fields (areas: Kratchouk – Suwaidiyyat – Saida – 
Zaria – Alyan and Babasi)

4

From: Representative of the YPG, Mohammad Ibrahim Ibrahim

To: The General Manager of the Syrian Petroleum Company Damascus

30 January 2021, Rumeilan

This document requests an exemption for the YPG to have to tender for contracts 
to protect petroleum installations belonging to the Directorate of Hasaka 
fields, i.e. to enable single-sourcing. It also provides the names of the 
contracting persons with whom contracts will be concluded by mutual consent.

5

From: Dr. Ghassan Hassan, Commercial Affairs Director at the Ministry of 
Petroleum and Minerals

To: The Director General of the same Ministry

Referring to letters of 29 January and 27 February 2012

Referring to the submission of Mohammad Ibrahim Ibrahim regarding his request 
to exempt YPG representatives from having to follow regular procurement 
procedure (e.g. paying bid bonds). He forwards the correspondence to the 
Minister of Oil and Mineral Resources.


Document no. 3 is said to be dated 27 January, 2012.  It refers to the YPG.  
But the YPG did not exist in January 2012.

A small precursor organisation, the YXG, did exist, but it seems unlikely that 
the Assad regime would hand over protection of the oilfields in Hasaka province 
to a tiny illegal armed group.  (Hasaka was NOT one of the areas from which the 
regime withdrew in July 2012)

Document no. 4 is said to be dated 30 January 2021.  This is a bit more 
plausible - at least the YPG existed on that date.

However, Document no. 5 reverts back to the year 2012.

If the documents are genuine, they might have been written in 2021, but 
definitely not in 2012.

If the documents are genuine, why would the YPG be talking about the protection 
of the oilfields with the Assad regime at all?  We need to look at the context.

Turkey had invaded Afrin in January 2018.  It then invaded the area between Tal 
Abyad and Ras al-Ayn in October 2019.  There are ongoing attacks and the threat 
of a further major invasion.

Faced with this threat, the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria 
tried to improve relations with the Assad regime, in the hope that the latter 
might help to deter yet another Turkish invasion.  The documents (if genuine) 
would have been written in that context.

****

The report published by Clingendael, a pro-imperialist think tank, is useful in 
explaining the thinking of the imperialists, even if it is not reliable as a 
source of factual information.  It explains the US policy of trying to separate 
the Syrian Democratic Forces from the PKK.  The US is cooperating with the SDF 
against ISIS, while at the same time supporting Turkey's war against the PKK.

Up to now, the imperialists have not been successful in this "divide and rule" 
tactic.

Chris Slee





________________________________
From: [email protected] <[email protected]> on behalf of Louis Proyect 
<[email protected]>
Sent: Wednesday, 12 May 2021 4:09 AM
To: [email protected] <[email protected]>
Subject: [marxmail] The YPG/PYD during the Syrian conflict | Clingendael


This report analyses the role of the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units 
(YPG) and the associated Democratic Union Party (PYD) during the Syrian civil 
war. The purpose of our research is to obtain a better understanding of the 
nature, objectives and methods of the YPG/ PYD as a combined paramilitary and 
rebel force that is involved in a quasi-statebuilding project during an 
internationalised civil war. We start by examining the critical factors that 
enabled the swift rise of the YPG: informal arrangements with the Assad regime, 
support from the Kurdistan Workers’ Party and a pragmatic partnership with the 
US against Islamic State. This sets the scene for an inquiry into how core YPG 
strategies to maintain its dominance once it was established – coercive, 
deal-making, identity and basic service strategies – both shape the group’s 
behavior and result from its current organization. Finally, we dissect a number 
of major challenges to future YPG rule, such as its relation with the PKK, 
intra-Kurdish reconciliation, the US presence in northeast Syria and its 
interaction with the Arab populations over which it rules.

https://www.clingendael.org/publication/ypgpyd-during-syrian-conflict




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