Faced with a naval blockade and the threat of further military aggression, perhaps on a much larger scale, the Venezuelan government may make further concessions to US imperialism. Instead of blaming Maduro and Flores for making concessions, we should be discussing how to build a solidarity movement strong enough to (in combination with other movements such as Palestine solidarity, anti-ICE, etc) challenge the Trump regime and US imperialism in general.
Chris Slee ________________________________ From: [email protected] <[email protected]> on behalf of Fred Fuentes via groups.io <[email protected]> Sent: Thursday, 8 January 2026 10:00 PM To: [email protected] <[email protected]> Subject: Re: [marxmail] Signs point to PSUV collaboration in Maduro kidnapping Two bits of speculation surrounding the US assault on Venezuela and kidnapping of Nicolas Maduro and Cilia Flores that, IMO, are wrong: 1) US President Donald Trump did not install Maria Corina Machado (MCM) as president due to his anger at her being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize — in reality, evidence indicates that Trump had lost interest in MCM and Edmundo González Urrutia (EGU, the opposition candidate that the outgoing Biden government declared president-elect) long before this. From failing to invite them to his inauguration or having any subsequent meeting, through to choosing to send his special envoy, Richard Grenell, to meet with Maduro, it was clear Trump had sidelined MCM/EGU in his designs for Venezuela. There were several reasons for this: the lack of any organic links between Trump and the Venezuelan opposition (unlike those that existed with previous administrations or Marco Rubio); his belief they had misled him about their ability to overthrow Maduro during his first term; and, most importantly, his conclusion that only some kind of Madurista government could oversee the kind of project he wants while maintaining certain stability. That is why Trump never spoke about democracy as a pretext for the military build-up; it was always about US interests, whether fighting “narcotrafficking” or securing oil. This is also why, as I argued at the time, MCM's Nobel Peace Prize was not part of Trump’s strategy but rather an intervention by those who saw that he was seeking a transition that did not necessarily involve her. 2) Venezuelan vice-president (now acting president) sold out Maduro to Trump — beyond the lack of evidence to support this speculation, it misses the fact that there is much more continuity than discontinuity between the government headed by Maduro and the government headed by Delcy Rodríguez. For some time now, Maduro had been seeking a rapprochement with US imperialism. With Trump in power Madurismo thought this was on the cards, particularly after the meeting with Grenell. Amid the military build-up, the Venezuelan government felt that by offering up Venezuela’s resources it could avoid confront. However, at some point, for some reason, Trump decided Maduro himself had to go. Why this happened would be entering into speculation: did Rubio convince him? Did he feel he needed a trophy? Was he not happy with how negotiations were going? I do not know. But I do know that unity among the various factions within Madurismo has been key to it hold on power; any such betrayal would be a huge risk to its future. The risk of giving up Maduro in order to do what they already had offered up was that it would destroy this unity. That makes no sense for the point of view of preservation. The end result of these two things is that today Trump (still) has a government in Caracas willing to cut a deal, that can (still) provide the most stable transition possible, but understands it is in no position to negotiation. Moreover, its only ability to come out of this in some fighting shape is united. Given this, Trump is likely to want to completely humiliate the Rodríguez government at it forces it to submit to its every will. One argument I have made for a long time is that the US never preferred a “democratic transition” in Venezuela. This was in large part driven by the difficulties the opposition had in winning elections. In 2024, they overcame this difficultly only to not be able to overcome a second difficulty: turning that electoral majority into a social force capable of making that victory count and install EGU in power (another reason Trump distrusted MCM/EGU’s ability to rule). An unelected, unaccountable, transitional authority would better serve US interests, be able to rule without worrying about a democratic mandate, and implement all the policies that would be deeply unpopular at the ballot box. Such an authority would also be in a better position to crush resistance. Another argument I have made is that while US pressure never succeeded in forcing regime change in the traditional sense — removing Maduro and replacing him with the opposition — it had played its role in shifting the government's project away for an anti-imperialist and socialist horizon towards an authoritarian capitalist project based on accommodation to imperialism. What I failed to see was how these two things could come together to give us what we have today: a pro-US transitional authority controlled by Madurismo. -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- Groups.io Links: You receive all messages sent to this group. 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