FWIW, all verbiage herein courtesy of ChatGPT. I read the PDF. It's "Lula's Defeat Wasn't Inevitable" by Antonio Martins of Outras Palavras, translated by Eric Blanc and posted on his Labor Politics Substack. It has a different title from the one in your link, so it may be an edited version of the same piece. I'm relying on the article's own figures for the election results, since this is after my knowledge cutoff.
**Summary** Martins argues that Lula's first-round loss on October 4 was a real disaster and not a fluke. Lula finished 2.2 million votes behind Flávio Bolsonaro and 3.4 million below his own 2022 total. His share fell in 98 percent of municipalities. The PL is now the largest bloc in both houses. That bloc, together with the Centrão, could amend the Constitution or impeach Supreme Court justices. A Flávio presidency could also reshape the Court. He rejects three common explanations. The first says the real story is a shift within the right, from the Centrão to the PL and Novo. The second says politics now runs on subjective identity and no longer on material interests. The third forecasts a long "political winter" of right-wing dominance. He says each contains some truth but omits the main point, which is that Lula's third term was "small-bore." It offered voters neither a visibly better life nor a reason to believe in politics again. He traces that to two "fatal accommodations": 1. **Institutional accommodation.** The government worked inside the limits set by Congress and the Centrão and avoided popular mobilization. His examples are the six-day-workweek campaign, which Lula left to Senate president Alcolumbre instead of building a mass campaign, and the Shielding Amendment fight in September 2025. Street protests helped defeat that amendment, but the government then retreated. It stayed tied to a political world seen as corrupt, and the protest vote went to the far right. 2. **Fiscal accommodation.** The government accepted the "fiscal framework" and boasted of "putting the accounts in order," even though about 1 trillion reais a year goes to interest payments. Martins says the money was available for public health, schooling, sanitation and transit. He notes Lula only turned in September 2026, with higher Bolsa Família benefits, anti-obesity drugs through the public health system and a ban on online betting, which was too late. His conclusion is that the left must "strengthen politics as collective action." He points to Mamdani, the Left Party's win in Berlin and the Spanish tenants' protests as models of material, collective politics. He cites García Linera's view that the far right's recolonizing neoliberalism may prove short-lived. He says a runoff comeback is still possible but hard. **Critique** The strongest part is the diagnosis of how a left that governs from inside the establishment loses the anti-system vote. The leap from "the Centrão was eroding" to "the far right captured it" is well argued. The Centrão's decline did not benefit the left because Lula was identified with the Centrão, and that is a sharper explanation than the usual "voters moved right." The contrast between mobilization and legislative deal-making is well chosen, and the Shielding Amendment episode is the best evidence. The article also usefully rejects fatalism about Big Tech and fragmented publics without dismissing it. It treats the algorithmic public sphere as a real obstacle to organize against and not a reason to give up on collective politics. There are real weaknesses. - **The counterfactual is asserted, not shown.** The argument that mobilization plus spending would have won rests on the claim that Lula "could have electrified" the race. Nothing shows that a six-day-week campaign or looser fiscal rules would have moved votes. Lula's relative strength came from the Northeast and low-income voters, and the piece never tests whether his losses were concentrated there, among evangelicals, among young men, or among the informal workforce. A one-line "98 percent of municipalities" figure isn't enough to support that diagnosis. - **It plays down the constraints.** Lula faced a hostile Congress, bond-market pressure and Brazil's high real interest rates. The article treats the fiscal framework as pure political timidity. A fuller account would address inflation, the exchange rate and what happens to a government that ignores the framework in a country that sells its debt in markets. It also does not say whether the Centrão would have allowed higher spending. His own "1 trillion in interest" point is an argument for challenging the central bank and rentier finance, and the piece never says how. - **The foreign examples are thin.** Mamdani, Berlin and Madrid are all urban housing fights in rich, dense cities, not national governments in a country with Brazil's regional and religious divides. They show that material demands can mobilize people, but they don't show how that scales to a national election against a strong right. - **It underweights the right's own appeal.** Crime, evangelical identity, anti-PT sentiment and resentment of corruption scandals get little weight. The piece also barely addresses the Bolsonaro coup case or Lula's closeness to Moraes, which it mentions only in passing as one of the "episode" explanations. - **Factual slips.** It says the "fiscal framework" was adopted in the "first months of 2022." Lula took office in January 2023, so that is presumably 2023. It also gives the runoff date as November 25, but Brazilian runoffs are held on the last Sunday of October, which would be October 25. Both are probably translation or editing errors, but they would be worth fixing before quoting the piece. **Where it fits** The piece reads as a left-populist case for conflict, mobilization and public investment over technocratic prudence. That is familiar from Eric Blanc's own writing and fits the DSA debates about governing versus organizing. Its core claim, that a left government which looks like the system loses to the anti-system right, is plausible and widely shared. Its prescription is less proven than it sounds. If useful, I can check the election numbers against other reporting or compare this with other post-mortems on the Brazilian result. On Tue, Oct 6, 2026 at 8:14 AM Michael Pugliese via groups.io <[email protected]> wrote: > -------- Forwarded message --------- > From: Eric Blanc <[email protected]> > Date: Tue, Oct 6, 2026 at 8:13 AM > Subject: Lula’s Defeat Wasn't Inevitable > To: <[email protected]> > > > We need fights, collective action, and vision. Otherwise, the left is > identified with the status quo > ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ > ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ > ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ > ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ > ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ > ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ > ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ > ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ > ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ > ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ > ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ > ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ > ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ > ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ > ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ > ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ > ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ > ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ > ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ > Forwarded this email? Subscribe here > <https://substack.com/redirect/2/eyJlIjoiaHR0cHM6Ly93d3cubGFib3Jwb2xpdGljcy5jb20vc3Vic2NyaWJlP3V0bV9zb3VyY2U9ZW1haWwmdXRtX2NhbXBhaWduPWVtYWlsLXN1YnNjcmliZSZyPTU4MGZmciZuZXh0PWh0dHBzJTNBJTJGJTJGd3d3LmxhYm9ycG9saXRpY3MuY29tJTJGcCUyRmJyYXppbC1sZXNzb25zLWZyb20tYS1kaXNhc3RlciIsInAiOjIxOTEwMTAzNSwicyI6NzAxMjI0LCJmIjp0cnVlLCJ1IjozMTU3ODc4MTUsImlhdCI6MTc5MTI5OTYxNSwiZXhwIjoyMTA2ODc1NjE1LCJpc3MiOiJwdWItMCIsInN1YiI6ImxpbmstcmVkaXJlY3QifQ.-N1jCubiCW0J3xdtrDnvBTV8LRm0aI7kKc0HTyvjOYU?> > for more > Lula’s Defeat Wasn't Inevitable > <https://substack.com/app-link/post?publication_id=701224&post_id=219101035&utm_source=post-email-title&utm_campaign=email-post-title&isFreemail=true&r=580ffr&token=eyJ1c2VyX2lkIjozMTU3ODc4MTUsInBvc3RfaWQiOjIxOTEwMTAzNSwiaWF0IjoxNzkxMjk5NjE1LCJleHAiOjE3OTM4OTE2MTUsImlzcyI6InB1Yi03MDEyMjQiLCJzdWIiOiJwb3N0LXJlYWN0aW9uIn0.vLH3ZkrseZ6CAwBHvZiV6ldv4cf3aTpP3jyrUdI-V_A>We > need fights, collective action, and vision. Otherwise, the left is > identified with the status quo > > Oct 6 > > > <https://substack.com/app-link/post?publication_id=701224&post_id=219101035&utm_source=substack&isFreemail=true&submitLike=true&token=eyJ1c2VyX2lkIjozMTU3ODc4MTUsInBvc3RfaWQiOjIxOTEwMTAzNSwicmVhY3Rpb24iOiLinaQiLCJpYXQiOjE3OTEyOTk2MTUsImV4cCI6MTc5Mzg5MTYxNSwiaXNzIjoicHViLTcwMTIyNCIsInN1YiI6InJlYWN0aW9uIn0.S1xuqqSsnXM1Zstw5NbXUV7FDqOSrns-DX8fr7LcbfI&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=email-reaction&r=580ffr> > > <https://substack.com/app-link/post?publication_id=701224&post_id=219101035&utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email&isFreemail=true&comments=true&token=eyJ1c2VyX2lkIjozMTU3ODc4MTUsInBvc3RfaWQiOjIxOTEwMTAzNSwiaWF0IjoxNzkxMjk5NjE1LCJleHAiOjE3OTM4OTE2MTUsImlzcyI6InB1Yi03MDEyMjQiLCJzdWIiOiJwb3N0LXJlYWN0aW9uIn0.vLH3ZkrseZ6CAwBHvZiV6ldv4cf3aTpP3jyrUdI-V_A&r=580ffr&utm_campaign=email-half-magic-comments&action=post-comment&utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email> > > <https://substack.com/app-link/post?publication_id=701224&post_id=219101035&utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email&utm_content=share&utm_campaign=email-share&action=share&triggerShare=true&isFreemail=true&r=580ffr&token=eyJ1c2VyX2lkIjozMTU3ODc4MTUsInBvc3RfaWQiOjIxOTEwMTAzNSwiaWF0IjoxNzkxMjk5NjE1LCJleHAiOjE3OTM4OTE2MTUsImlzcyI6InB1Yi03MDEyMjQiLCJzdWIiOiJwb3N0LXJlYWN0aW9uIn0.vLH3ZkrseZ6CAwBHvZiV6ldv4cf3aTpP3jyrUdI-V_A> > > <https://open.substack.com/pub/laborpolitics/p/brazil-lessons-from-a-disaster?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=email-restack-comment&action=restack-comment&r=580ffr&token=eyJ1c2VyX2lkIjozMTU3ODc4MTUsInBvc3RfaWQiOjIxOTEwMTAzNSwiaWF0IjoxNzkxMjk5NjE1LCJleHAiOjE3OTM4OTE2MTUsImlzcyI6InB1Yi03MDEyMjQiLCJzdWIiOiJwb3N0LXJlYWN0aW9uIn0.vLH3ZkrseZ6CAwBHvZiV6ldv4cf3aTpP3jyrUdI-V_A&utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email> > > READ IN APP > <https://open.substack.com/pub/laborpolitics/p/brazil-lessons-from-a-disaster?utm_source=email&redirect=app-store-no-desktop&inbox=true&utm_campaign=email-read-in-app> > > > *An electoral turnaround is possible, however difficult. But the illusion > that the left can govern without a long-term project, without confronting > the powerful, and without popular mobilization must be left behind* > > *By Antonio Martins **(Outras Palavras)* > > Defeats become deeper and more prolonged when we misunderstand what caused > them, avoid correcting course, and embrace “solutions” that only compound > our mistakes. Lula’s government and the Brazilian left suffered a disaster > in Sunday’s election. Contrary to every poll, the president finished the > first round 2.2 million votes behind Flávio Bolsonaro—and, more > significantly, 3.4 million votes below his total four years ago, when the > machinery of the state was working against him and in favor of his > opponent. His vote share declined in 98 percent of Brazil’s municipalities. > > The PL, the main party of the far right, elected 121 deputies and 28 > senators, becoming the largest caucus in both houses of Congress. The > parties aligned with the *Centrão*—Brazil’s bloc of transactional > center-right parties—were somewhat diminished, but will still hold roughly > 250 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 35 in the Senate. That will make > it easier to assemble the majorities needed to amend the Constitution or > impeach Supreme Federal Court justices. If elected, Flávio Bolsonaro could > appoint four members of the Court, substantially altering its internal > balance of power. > > What produced these results? How can the far right be prevented from > consolidating them into a prolonged political hegemony? And what is the > essential change of direction the left now needs? > > <https://substack.com/redirect/d03a3269-29af-4233-b4c3-1ff2b7ceb86a?j=eyJ1IjoiNTgwZmZyIn0.4-F9rrDaTIDT-BFhVJ-H3_6v2EHmK4Mkh2ldNSBY0Pg> > Reuters > *Explaining the Disaster* > > Across the commercial media and the exuberant chaos of digital platforms, > interpretations are multiplying. Some focus on specific episodes: Lula’s > absence from the Globo debate, his very close relationship with Alexandre > de Moraes, or his emphasis on issues supposedly remote from most people’s > everyday concerns, such as rare earth minerals. > > Among the more systemic interpretations, three seem especially > questionable. > > One argues that the principal defeat was not the left’s, since its > congressional representation declined only slightly. The decisive movement > captured at the ballot box, according to this view, was a shift within the > right itself—from the more moderate and transactional forces of the > *Centrão* toward the more ideological and radicalized forces of the PL > and Novo. > > A second interpretation holds that the nature of electoral and political > processes has changed. The material interests and aspirations of society, > it argues, no longer play the central role they once did; they have given > way to forms of subjective self-identification that the left has yet to > understand. > > And a third concludes that, because of these two developments, we should > expect a political winter: a prolonged period in which the far right and > the broader right dominate Brazilian political life. > > There are important elements in all three interpretations. The problem > lies in what they deny or leave out: Lula’s third government was a > small-bore government. It offered the majorities that elected it neither a > clearly better life nor reasons to believe again in politics and its power > to transform society. > > These failures flowed from two fatal accommodations, which I will examine > below. As a result, the government suffered a slow but steady erosion of > support. And, as has happened in so many Western countries, it gave the far > right the opportunity to present itself as anti-system and to benefit from > popular frustration and distress. > > The interpretation that emphasizes the migration of votes from the > center-right and traditional right toward the far right has been advanced, > among others, by the courageous journalist Leonardo Sakamoto. In his UOL > column on Monday, October 5, he highlights the miserable behavior of the > traditional conservative parties. > > Over the past four years, they repeatedly joined forces with the > “neo”-fascists, helping to “normalize” them—a criticism that could equally > be directed at almost the entire corporate media. Believing they could use > the far right as a stepping stone, they instead ended up partly devoured by > it. This was especially true in the Senate, where the PL’s gain of 13 > senators and Novo’s gain of two came at the expense of the PSD, which lost > nine; the MDB, which lost two; the PSDB, which lost two; and the PP, which > lost one. > > Sakamoto’s observation is accurate and necessary, but it leaves > uncomfortable questions unanswered. Why did the erosion of the *Centrão* > benefit the far right rather than, for example, producing growth for the > left—as has happened so many times before, both in Brazil and elsewhere? > > The answer is not difficult. Throughout its four years in office, Lula’s > third government was almost invariably associated with the *Centrão*. > Here lies its first accommodation: accepting the limits imposed by > conservative institutions; avoiding, as much as possible, any attempt to > strain those limits through popular pressure; and believing only in the > modest changes that could be squeezed through openings in Congress. > > The failure of the campaign to end the six-day workweek is emblematic. > Lula could have electrified the presidential race by pairing it with a > popular campaign for passage of the measure. Instead, he chose to place his > hopes in the hands of Senate president Rodrigo Alcolumbre. He generated no > mass mobilization, did not force his opponents onto an uncomfortable > defensive, and won no victory. > > In September 2025, the government squandered the greatest of its many > opportunities to shake up conservative power in Congress. Popular > opposition to the so-called Shielding Amendment—which, if approved, would > have restricted criminal proceedings against members of Congress—brought > crowds into the streets, mobilized primarily by artists and social > movements. > > This opened the possibility for a broader political education: a campaign > that could begin exposing the limits and dysfunctions of Brazil’s political > system while putting Bolsonaro’s movement on the defensive for its > predictable support of political privilege. > > The amendment was defeated. But the executive branch then backed away from > the fight. It remained associated with an institutional world widely seen > as corrupt, elitist, and indifferent to ordinary people’s struggles. In > doing so, it forfeited its credibility as a vehicle for the protest vote. > > On Sunday, it reaped the bitter fruits. > Are We Doomed? > > Taking a different approach from Sakamoto, the philosopher Moysés Pinto > Neto and other writers have drawn attention, in their first analyses of > October 4, to the fragmentation of the public sphere produced by Big Tech > platforms. Through their algorithms, these platforms present each person > with a different view of social reality. > > As a consequence, it becomes much harder to identify common material > problems and demands—for example, the fight for labor rights or for a > properly funded public health system. Voters no longer embrace such > demands, these authors argue, because they no longer see themselves as part > of a collective. Instead, they tend to value the identities assigned to > them by neoliberal subjectivity—the role of the entrepreneur, for example. > On this interpretation, the left’s possible error lies in clinging to > outdated illusions. > > Moysés’s warning is highly relevant and resonates with arguments such as > Naomi Klein and Astra Taylor’s “Apocalyptic Fascism and the Billionaires’ > Bet.” Unlike a century ago, the far right no longer promises a radiant > future. It concentrates instead on resentment—especially that of young men. > > “They belong to a generation that fears it may never own a home, but > compensates with the pleasure it gets from constantly provoking > progressives online. Convinced their future has been stolen, they share > memes romanticizing historical authoritarian regimes,” the authors write. > > But Moysés seems to confuse this danger with inevitability. He fails to > see that the left’s answer cannot be adaptation. On the contrary, it must > strengthen the possibility of politics as collective action. > > Nor does he recognize that precisely such a reversal is already becoming > possible in some of the most promising mobilizations of the twenty-first > century: the election, at the end of 2025, of the young Muslim Zohran > Mamdani as mayor of New York, on a platform centered on the intensely > material fight for an affordable city; the Left Party’s victory in Berlin > two weeks ago, built around the demand to expropriate private real-estate > corporations; and the very recent wave of demonstrations in Spain—including > an occupation of Madrid’s Puerta del Sol—in which tens of thousands of > young people mobilized by the Tenants’ Union have demanded limits on rents. > > By putting itself in the straitjacket of the “fiscal framework” in the > first months of 2022, Lula’s third government adopted the second fatal > accommodation of its term. > > Faced with conservative institutions and a country devastated by four > years of Bolsonaro, increased public investment was the government’s > remaining weapon for offering a more dignified life to the majority and > forging an anti-conservative pact with them. > > The same state that disburses 1 trillion reais a year to enrich a small > class of rentiers could instead spend money to extend the Family Health > Strategy to every Brazilian, at a cost of 30 billion reais; provide > full-day public schooling and childcare to all adolescents and > children—and, especially, relief to their mothers; achieve universal > sanitation while cleaning up polluted urban rivers; multiply metro systems; > begin transforming the urban peripheries; and undertake many other urgently > needed projects. > > In April 2023, an article in *Outras Palavras* warned that the fiscal > framework could “shrink the Lula government and preserve the forces that > condemn the country to inequality and regression.” A year later, another > article showed that restraints on public spending were strangling policies > vital to ordinary people and undermining the president’s popularity. > > In November 2024 came a reality check, in the form of the government’s > humiliating defeat in the municipal elections. Even then, the fiscal lock > was neither removed nor loosened. On the contrary: throughout the > government’s four years, fiscal restraint remained central to its political > narrative. The administration proudly proclaimed that it had “put the > state’s accounts in order,” without grasping either how misleading that > phrase was—given the payment of 1 trillion reais in interest—or how badly > the message was hurting it politically. > > Lula finally woke up in September 2026. The increase in Bolsa Família > benefits, after four years of being frozen; the announcement that > anti-obesity drugs would be offered through Brazil’s public health system; > and the ban on online betting showed that the state has the power to act > decisively on behalf of the majority when those in government are willing > to confront obstacles. > > The huge marches that closed the campaign in Fortaleza, Salvador, Rio de > Janeiro, and São Paulo on the eve of October 4 showed how such initiatives > can mobilize activists and the broader public. > > But it was too late—and too little to change the outcome of the first > round. > History has not ended > > The possibility of a turnaround in the three weeks leading up to November > 25 cannot be ruled out. It will not be simple or easy. Lula must not only > make up a deficit of 2.2 million votes; he must also offset the movement of > voters who backed other right-wing candidates in the first round, most of > whom are likely to move toward Flávio Bolsonaro. > > Pulling that off will require a broad, grassroots effort to win over > voters, potentially reinforced by new initiatives from Lula. The coming > hours and days will be decisive. > > If Bolsonaro’s movement also wins the presidency, the result will create a > high-risk situation for Brazilian sovereignty and democracy. The enormous > challenges posed by such an outcome would require the left to reexamine, in > depth and with a genuine willingness to engage in self-criticism, its > political projects—or its lack of them—and its practices. > > But would that mean we are condemned to the long winter of far-right > hegemony that some analyses are beginning to forecast? > > It is far too early to say, suggests a recent text by Álvaro García > Linera, the thinker who served as vice president of Bolivia under Evo > Morales. > > His central hypothesis is that this political current will prove > short-lived. At a moment when the entire world is once again talking about > sovereignty and protecting national economies, the far right offers a > stale, recolonizing neoliberalism. Its submission to the United States is > as blatant and pathetic as Flávio and Eduardo Bolsonaro’s overtures to > Donald Trump. > > Its project amounts to something like every man for himself: greater > inequality, capitalism without limits, devastation, and supremacism. > > Will it work? > > In the United States, just two years into his second term, Trump himself > is reaching record levels of unpopularity and may be on the verge of losing > Republican control of both the House and Senate in November. > > Every new beginning is difficult. Whatever the outcome of the second > round, the defeats of October 4 show how profoundly the Brazilian left will > have to rethink and rebuild. > > But just as it would be foolish to underestimate the seriousness of its > mistakes, it would be equally foolish to conclude that rebuilding a > political project is no longer possible. > > History has not ended. The times are moving faster than ever. > > *Originally published in Portuguese > <https://substack.com/redirect/bf89ef11-d94d-44e1-a425-8ab600c735d4?j=eyJ1IjoiNTgwZmZyIn0.4-F9rrDaTIDT-BFhVJ-H3_6v2EHmK4Mkh2ldNSBY0Pg> > by Outras Palavras. English translation by Eric Blanc; I’ve added the > subtitles. (CC BY-SA)* > ------------------------------ > > *More* > > - > > We can’t stop the far right at home or abroad without a revitalized > labor movement, which is yet another reason why you should become a > sustaining supporter > > <https://substack.com/redirect/85c4e076-cd1a-4e6b-8f11-ba51bd432ef4?j=eyJ1IjoiNTgwZmZyIn0.4-F9rrDaTIDT-BFhVJ-H3_6v2EHmK4Mkh2ldNSBY0Pg> > of the Emergency Workplace Organizing Committee (EWOC) — one of US labor’s > pivotal bright spots. > - > > Relatedly, *Jacobin* published a short piece of mine reflecting on a > decade of Bernie Sanders inspiring > > <https://substack.com/redirect/f4bf88fc-2fd2-46b7-ab42-f87ff523e4c3?j=eyJ1IjoiNTgwZmZyIn0.4-F9rrDaTIDT-BFhVJ-H3_6v2EHmK4Mkh2ldNSBY0Pg> > a whole new generation of young worker organizers. > > > You're currently a free subscriber to Labor Politics > <https://substack.com/redirect/7ac063ce-fe68-4ee1-a2a1-a273019acd37?j=eyJ1IjoiNTgwZmZyIn0.4-F9rrDaTIDT-BFhVJ-H3_6v2EHmK4Mkh2ldNSBY0Pg>. > For the full experience, 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