Published on Monday, April 11, 2005 by TomDispatch.com
http://www.commondreams.org/views05/0411-21.htm
 
   Oil, Geopolitics, and the Coming War with Iran  
   by Michael T. Klare
     As the United States gears up for an attack on Iran, one thing is certain: 
the Bush administration will never mention oil as a reason for going to war. As 
in the case of Iraq, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) will be cited as the 
principal justification for an American assault. "We will not tolerate the 
construction of a nuclear weapon [by Iran]," is the way President Bush put it 
in a much-quoted 2003 statement. But just as the failure to discover illicit 
weapons in Iraq undermined the administration's use of WMD as the paramount 
reason for its invasion, so its claim that an attack on Iran would be justified 
because of its alleged nuclear potential should invite widespread skepticism. 
More important, any serious assessment of Iran's strategic importance to the 
United States should focus on its role in the global energy equation. 
 Before proceeding further, let me state for the record that I do not claim oil 
is the sole driving force behind the Bush administration's apparent 
determination to destroy Iranian military capabilities. No doubt there are many 
national security professionals in Washington who are truly worried about 
Iran's nuclear program, just as there were many professionals who were 
genuinely worried about Iraqi weapons capabilities. I respect this. But no war 
is ever prompted by one factor alone, and it is evident from the public record 
that many considerations, including oil, played a role in the administration's 
decision to invade Iraq. Likewise, it is reasonable to assume that many factors 
-- again including oil -- are playing a role in the decision-making now 
underway over a possible assault on Iran. 
 Just exactly how much weight the oil factor carries in the administration's 
decision-making is not something that we can determine with absolute assurance 
at this time, but given the importance energy has played in the careers and 
thinking of various high officials of this administration, and given Iran's 
immense resources, it would be ludicrous not to take the oil factor into 
account -- and yet you can rest assured that, as relations with Iran worsen, 
American media reports and analysis of the situation will generally steer a 
course well clear of the subject (as they did in the lead-up to the invasion of 
Iraq). 
 One further caveat: When talking about oil's importance in American strategic 
thinking about Iran, it is important to go beyond the obvious question of 
Iran's potential role in satisfying our country's future energy requirements. 
Because Iran occupies a strategic location on the north side of the Persian 
Gulf, it is in a position to threaten oil fields in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, 
and the United Arab Emirates, which together possess more than half of the 
world's known oil reserves. Iran also sits athwart the Strait of Hormuz, the 
narrow waterway through which, daily, 40% of the world's oil exports pass. In 
addition, Iran is becoming a major supplier of oil and natural gas to China, 
India, and Japan, thereby giving Tehran additional clout in world affairs. It 
is these geopolitical dimensions of energy, as much as Iran's potential to 
export significant quantities of oil to the United States, that undoubtedly 
govern the administration's strategic calculations. 
 Having said this, let me proceed to an assessment of Iran's future energy 
potential.  According to the most recent tally by Oil and Gas Journal, Iran 
houses the second-largest pool of untapped petroleum in the world, an estimated 
125.8 billion barrels. Only Saudi Arabia, with an estimated 260 billion 
barrels, possesses more; Iraq, the third in line, has an estimated 115 billion 
barrels. With this much oil -- about one-tenth of the world's estimated total 
supply -- Iran is certain to play a key role in the global energy equation, no 
matter what else occurs. 
 It is not, however, just sheer quantity that matters in Iran's case; no less 
important is its future productive capacity. Although Saudi Arabia possesses 
larger reserves, it is now producing oil at close to its maximum sustainable 
rate (about 10 million barrels per day). It will probably be unable to raise 
its output significantly over the next 20 years while global demand, pushed by 
significantly higher consumption in the United States, China, and India, is 
expected to rise by 50%. Iran, on the other hand, has considerable growth 
potential: it is now producing about 4 million barrels per day, but is thought 
to be capable of boosting its output by another 3 million barrels or so. Few, 
if any, other countries possess this potential, so Iran's importance as a 
producer, already significant, is bound to grow in the years ahead. 
 And it is not just oil that Iran possesses in great abundance, but also 
natural gas.  According to Oil and Gas Journal, Iran has an estimated 940 
trillion cubic feet of gas, or approximately 16% of total world reserves. (Only 
Russia, with 1,680 trillion cubic feet, has a larger supply.) As it takes 
approximately 6,000 cubic feet of gas to equal the energy content of 1 barrel 
of oil, Iran's gas reserves represent the equivalent of about 155 billion 
barrels of oil. This, in turn, means that its combined hydrocarbon reserves are 
the equivalent of some 280 billion barrels of oil, just slightly behind Saudi 
Arabia's combined supply. At present, Iran is producing only a small share of 
its gas reserves, about 2.7 trillion cubic feet per year. This means that Iran 
is one of the few countries capable of supplying much larger amounts of natural 
gas in the future. 
 What all this means is that Iran will play a critical role in the world's 
future energy equation. This is especially true because the global demand for 
natural gas is growing faster than that for any other source of energy, 
including oil. While the world currently consumes more oil than gas, the supply 
of petroleum is expected to contract in the not-too-distant future as global 
production approaches its peak sustainable level -- perhaps as soon as 2010 -- 
and then begins a gradual but irreversible decline. The production of natural 
gas, on the other hand, is not likely to peak until several decades from now, 
and so is expected to take up much of the slack when oil supplies become less 
abundant. Natural gas is also considered a more attractive fuel than oil in 
many applications, especially because when consumed it releases less carbon 
dioxide (a major contributor to the greenhouse effect). 
 No doubt the major U.S. energy companies would love to be working with Iran 
today in developing these vast oil and gas supplies. At present, however, they 
are prohibited from doing so by Executive Order (EO) 12959, signed by President 
Clinton in 1995 and renewed by President Bush in March 2004. The United States 
has also threatened to punish foreign firms that do business in Iran (under the 
Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of 1996), but this has not deterred many large 
companies from seeking access to Iran's reserves. China, which will need vast 
amounts of additional oil and gas to fuel its red-hot economy, is paying 
particular attention to Iran. According to the Department of Energy (DoE), Iran 
supplied 14% of China's oil imports in 2003, and is expected to provide an even 
larger share in the future. China is also expected to rely on Iran for a large 
share of its liquid natural gas (LNG) imports. In October 2004, Iran signed a 
$100 billion, 25-year contract with Sinopec, a major
 Chinese energy firm, for joint development of one of its major gas fields and 
the subsequent delivery of LNG to China. If this deal is fully consummated, it 
will constitute one of China's biggest overseas investments and represent a 
major strategic linkage between the two countries. 
 India is also keen to obtain oil and gas from Iran. In January, the Gas 
Authority of India Ltd. (GAIL) signed a 30-year deal with the National Iranian 
Gas Export Corp. for the transfer of as much as 7.5 million tons of LNG to 
India per year. The deal, worth an estimated $50 billion, will also entail 
Indian involvement in the development of Iranian gas fields. Even more 
noteworthy, Indian and Pakistani officials are discussing the construction of a 
$3 billion natural gas pipeline from Iran to India via Pakistan ¬ an 
extraordinary step for two long-term adversaries. If completed, the pipeline 
would provide both countries with a substantial supply of gas and allow 
Pakistan to reap $200-$500 million per year in transit fees. "The gas pipeline 
is a win-win proposition for Iran, India, and Pakistan," Pakistani Prime 
Minister Shaukat Aziz declared in January. 
 Despite the pipeline's obvious attractiveness as an incentive for 
reconciliation between India and Pakistan -- nuclear powers that have fought 
three wars over Kashmir since 1947 and remain deadlocked over the future status 
of that troubled territory -- the project was condemned by Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice during a recent trip to India. "We have communicated to the 
Indian government our concerns about the gas pipeline cooperation between Iran 
and India," she said on March 16 after meeting with Indian Foreign Minister 
Natwar Singh in New Delhi. The administration has, in fact, proved unwilling to 
back any project that offers an economic benefit to Iran. This has not, 
however, deterred India from proceeding with the pipeline. 
 Japan has also broken ranks with Washington on the issue of energy ties with 
Iran. In early 2003, a consortium of three Japanese companies acquired a 20% 
stake in the development of the Soroush-Nowruz offshore field in the Persian 
Gulf, a reservoir thought to hold 1 billion barrels of oil. One year later, the 
Iranian Offshore Oil Company awarded a $1.26 billion contract to Japan's JGC 
Corporation for the recovery of natural gas and natural gas liquids from 
Soroush-Nowruz and other offshore fields. 
 When considering Iran's role in the global energy equation, therefore, Bush 
administration officials have two key strategic aims: a desire to open up 
Iranian oil and gas fields to exploitation by American firms, and concern over 
Iran's growing ties to America's competitors in the global energy market. Under 
U.S. law, the first of these aims can only be achieved after the President 
lifts EO 12959, and this is not likely to occur as long as Iran is controlled 
by anti-American mullahs and refuses to abandon its uranium enrichment 
activities with potential bomb-making applications. Likewise, the ban on U.S. 
involvement in Iranian energy production and export gives Tehran no choice but 
to pursue ties with other consuming nations. From the Bush administration's 
point of view, there is only one obvious and immediate way to alter this 
unappetizing landscape -- by inducing "regime change" in Iran and replacing the 
existing leadership with one far friendlier to U.S. strategic
 interests. 
 That the Bush administration seeks to foster regime change in Iran is not in 
any doubt. The very fact that Iran was included with Saddam's Iraq and Kim Jong 
Il's North Korea in the "Axis of Evil" in the President's 2002 State of the 
Union Address was an unmistakable indicator of this. Bush let his feelings be 
known again in June 2003, at a time when there were anti-government protests by 
students in Tehran. "This is the beginning of people expressing themselves 
toward a free Iran, which I think is positive," he declared. In a more 
significant indication of White House attitudes on the subject, the Department 
of Defense has failed to fully disarm the People's Mujaheddin of Iran (or 
Mujaheddin-e Khalq, MEK), an anti-government militia now based in Iraq that has 
conducted terrorist actions in Iran and is listed on the State Department's 
roster of terrorist organizations. In 2003, the Washington Post reported that 
some senior administration figures would like to use the MEK as
 a proxy force in Iran, in the same manner that the Northern Alliance was 
employed against the Taliban in Afghanistan. 
 The Iranian leadership is well aware that it faces a serious threat from the 
Bush administration and is no doubt taking whatever steps it can to prevent 
such an attack. Here, too, oil is a major factor in both Tehran's and 
Washington's calculations. To deter a possible American assault, Iran has 
threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz and otherwise obstruct oil shipping in 
the Persian Gulf area. "An attack on Iran will be tantamount to endangering 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and, in a word, the entire Middle East oil," Iranian 
Expediency Council secretary Mohsen Rezai said on March 1st. 
 Such threats are taken very seriously by the U.S. Department of Defense. "We 
judge Iran can briefly close the Strait of Hormuz, relying on a layered 
strategy using predominantly naval, air, and some ground forces," Vice Admiral 
Lowell E. Jacoby, the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, testified 
before the Senate Intelligence Committee on February 16th. 
 Planning for such attacks is, beyond doubt, a major priority for top Pentagon 
officials. In January, veteran investigative reporter Seymour Hersh reported in 
the New Yorker magazine that the Department of Defense was conducting covert 
reconnaissance raids into Iran, supposedly to identify hidden Iranian nuclear 
and missile facilities that could be struck in future air and missile attacks. 
"I was repeatedly told that the next strategic target was Iran," Hersh said of 
his interviews with senior military personnel. Shortly thereafter, the 
Washington Post revealed that the Pentagon was flying surveillance drones over 
Iran to verify the location of weapons sites and to test Iranian air defenses. 
As noted by the Post, "Aerial espionage [of this sort] is standard in military 
preparations for an eventual air attack." There have also been reports of talks 
between U.S. and Israeli officials about a possible Israeli strike on Iranian 
weapons facilities, presumably with
 behind-the-scenes assistance from the United States. 
 In reality, much of Washington's concern about Iran's pursuit of WMD and 
ballistic missiles is sparked by fears for the safety of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, 
Iraq, other Persian Gulf oil producers, and Israel rather than by fears of a 
direct Iranian assault on the United States. "Tehran has the only military in 
the region that can threaten its neighbors and Gulf security," Jacoby declared 
in his February testimony. "Its expanding ballistic missile inventory presents 
a potential threat to states in the region." It is this regional threat that 
American leaders are most determined to eliminate. 
 In this sense, more than any other, the current planning for an attack on Iran 
is fundamentally driven by concern over the safety of U.S. energy supplies, as 
was the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. In the most telling expression of White 
House motives for going to war against Iraq, Vice President Dick Cheney (in an 
August 2002 address to the Veterans of Foreign Wars) described the threat from 
Iraq as follows: "Should all [of Hussein's WMD] ambitions be realized, the 
implications would be enormous for the Middle East and the United States.... 
Armed with an arsenal of these weapons of terror and a seat atop 10 percent of 
the world's oil reserves, Saddam Hussein could then be expected to seek 
domination of the entire Middle East, take control of a great portion of the 
world's energy supplies, [and] directly threaten America's friends throughout 
the region." This was, of course, unthinkable to Bush's inner circle. And all 
one need do is substitute the words "Iranian mullahs" for
 Saddam Hussein, and you have a perfect expression of the Bush administration 
case for making war on Iran. 
 So, even while publicly focusing on Iran's weapons of mass destruction, key 
administration figures are certainly thinking in geopolitical terms about 
Iran's role in the global energy equation and its capacity to obstruct the 
global flow of petroleum. As was the case with Iraq, the White House is 
determined to eliminate this threat once and for all. And so, while oil may not 
be the administration's sole reason for going to war with Iran, it is an 
essential factor in the overall strategic calculation that makes war likely. 
 Michael T. Klare is a professor of peace and world security studies at 
Hampshire College and the author of Blood and Oil: The Dangers and Consequences 
of America's Growing Dependency on Imported Oil (Metropolitan Books).  
© 2005 Michael Klare

 
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