After bailout, AIG sent executives to the spa
Outraged lawmakers blast bosses for risks that lead to need for rescue

The Associated Press

updated 10:29 a.m. CT, Wed., Oct. 8, 2008

URL: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/27075884/


WASHINGTON - Less than a week after the federal government had to bail 
out American International Group Inc., the company sent executives on a 
$440,000 retreat to a posh California resort, lawmakers investigating 
the company's meltdown said Tuesday.

The tab included $23,380 worth of spa treatments for AIG employees at 
the coastal St. Regis resort south of Los Angeles even as the company 
tapped into an $85 billion loan from the government it needed to stave 
off bankruptcy.

The retreat didn't include anyone from the financial products division 
that nearly drove AIG under, but lawmakers were still enraged over 
thousands of dollars spent on catered banquets, golf outings and visits 
to the resort's spa and salon for executives of AIG's main U.S. life 
insurance subsidiary.

"Average Americans are suffering economically. They're losing their 
jobs, their homes and their health insurance," House Oversight Committee 
Chairman Henry Waxman, D-Calif., scolded the company during a lengthy 
opening statement. "Yet less than one week after the taxpayers rescued 
AIG, company executives could be found wining and dining at one of the 
most exclusive resorts in the nation."

The hearing disclosed that AIG executives hid the full range of its 
risky financial products from auditors as losses mounted, according to 
documents released Tuesday by a congressional panel examining the chain 
of events that forced the government to bail out the conglomerate.

The panel sharply criticized AIG's former top executives, who cast blame 
on each other for the company's financial woes.

"You have cost my constituents and the taxpayers of this country $85 
billion and run into the ground one of the most respected insurance 
companies in the history of our country," said Rep. Carolyn Maloney, 
D-N.Y. "You were just gambling billions, possibly trillions of dollars."

AIG, crippled by huge losses linked to mortgage defaults, was forced 
last month to accept the $85 billion government loan that gives the U.S. 
the right to an 80 percent stake in the company.

Waxman unveiled documents showing AIG executives hid the full extent of 
the firm's risky financial products from auditors, both outside and 
inside the firm, as losses mounted.

For instance, federal regulators at the Office of Thrift Supervision 
warned in March that "corporate oversight of AIG Financial Products ... 
lack critical elements of independence." At the same time, 
Pricewaterhouse Cooper confidentially warned the company that the "root 
cause" of its mounting problems was denying internal overseers in charge 
of limiting AIG's exposure access to what was going on in its highly 
leveraged financial products branch.

Waxman also released testimony from former AIG auditor Joseph St. Denis, 
who resigned after being blocked from giving his input on how the firm 
estimated its liabilities.

Three former AIG executives were summoned to appear before the hearing. 
One of them, Maurice "Hank" Greenberg — who ran AIG for 38 years until 
2005 — canceled his appearance citing illness but submitted prepared 
testimony. In it, he blamed the company's financial woes on his 
successors, former CEOs Martin Sullivan and Robert Willumstad.

"When I left AIG, the company operated in 130 countries and employed 
approximately 92,000 people," Greenberg said. "Today, the company we 
built up over almost four decades has been virtually destroyed."

Sullivan and Willumstad, in turn, cast much of the blame on accounting 
rules that forced AIG to take tens of billions of dollars in losses 
stemming from exposure to toxic mortgage-related securities.

Lawmakers also upbraided Sullivan, who ran the firm from 2005 until June 
of this year, for urging AIG's board of directors to waive pay 
guidelines to win a $5 million bonus for 2007 — even as the company lost 
$5 billion in the 4th quarter of that year. Sullivan countered that he 
was mainly concerned with helping other senior executives.

Sullivan also came under fire for reassuring shareholders about the 
health of the company last December, just days after its auditor, 
Pricewaterhouse Cooper, warned him that AIG was displaying "material 
weakness" in its huge exposure to potential losses from insuring 
mortgage-related securities.

AIG's problems did not come from its traditional insurance subsidiaries, 
which remain healthy, but instead from its financial services 
operations, primarily its insurance of mortgage-backed securities and 
other risky debt against default. Government officials feared a panic 
might occur if AIG couldn't make good on its promise to cover losses on 
the securities; investors feared the consequences would pose a threat to 
the U.S. financial system, which led to the government bailout.

AIG suffered huge losses when its credit rating was cut, thanks largely 
to complex financial transactions known as "credit default swaps." AIG 
was a major seller of the swaps, which are a form of insurance, though 
they are not regulated that way.

The swap contracts promise payment to investors in mortgage bonds in the 
event of a default. AIG has been forced to raise billions of dollars in 
collateral to back up those guarantees.

Sullivan said many of the firm's problems stemmed from "mark to market" 
accounting rules mandating that its positions guaranteeing troubled 
mortgage securities be carried as tens of billions of dollars in losses 
on its balance sheet.

This in turn, said former AIG chief executive Willumstad, who ran the 
company for just three months after Sullivan left, forced the firm to 
raise billions of dollars in capital. The federal rescue came after AIG 
suffered disastrous liquidity problems after its credit rating was 
lowered, forcing the company to come up with even more capital.

"AIG was caught in a vicious cycle," Willumstad said in the testimony.

Greenberg said that AIG "wrote as many credit default swaps ... in the 
nine months following my departure as it had written in the entire 
previous seven years combined. Moreover, "unlike what had been true 
during my tenure, the majority of the credit default swaps that AIGFP 
wrote in the nine months after I retired were reportedly exposed to 
subprime mortgages."

But Sullivan said the complex swaps had underlying value, even as the 
market for them froze, sending their book value plummeting and forcing 
AIG to scramble for collateral.

"When the credit markets seized up, like many other financial 
institutions, we were forced to mark our swap positions at fire-sale 
prices as if we owned the underlying bonds, even though we believed that 
our swap positions had value if held to maturity," Sullivan said.

The hearing is the second in two days into financial excesses and 
regulatory mistakes that have spooked stock and credit markets and 
heightened fears about a global recession.

URL: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/27075884/

-- 
================================
George Antunes, Political Science Dept
University of Houston; Houston, TX 77204 
Voice: 713-743-3923  Fax: 713-743-3927
Mail: antunes at uh dot edu

*******************************
* POST TO [EMAIL PROTECTED] *
*******************************

Medianews mailing list
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://lists.etskywarn.net/mailman/listinfo/medianews

Reply via email to