Risk Mismanagement

By JOE NOCERA
The New York Times
January 4, 2009

'The story that I have to tell is marked all the way through by a 
persistent tension between those who assert that the best decisions 
are based on quantification and numbers, determined by the patterns 
of the past, and those who base their decisions on more subjective 
degrees of belief about the uncertain future. This is a controversy 
that has never been resolved.'

- FROM THE INTRODUCTION TO ''AGAINST THE GODS: THE REMARKABLE STORY 
OF RISK,'' BY PETER L. BERNSTEIN

THERE AREN'T MANY widely told anecdotes about the current financial 
crisis, at least not yet, but there's one that made the rounds in 
2007, back when the big investment banks were first starting to write 
down billions of dollars in mortgage-backed derivatives and other 
so-called toxic securities. This was well before Bear Stearns 
collapsed, before Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were taken over by the 
federal government, before Lehman fell and Merrill Lynch was sold and 
A.I.G. saved, before the $700 billion bailout bill was rushed into 
law. Before, that is, it became obvious that the risks taken by the 
largest banks and investment firms in the United States - and, 
indeed, in much of the Western world - were so excessive and 
foolhardy that they threatened to bring down the financial system 
itself. On the contrary: this was back when the major investment 
firms were still assuring investors that all was well, these little 
speed bumps notwithstanding - assurances based, in part, on their 
fantastically complex mathematical models for measuring the risk in 
their various portfolios.

There are many such models, but by far the most widely used is called 
VaR - Value at Risk. Built around statistical ideas and probability 
theories that have been around for centuries, VaR was developed and 
popularized in the early 1990s by a handful of scientists and 
mathematicians - "quants," they're called in the business - who went 
to work for JPMorgan. VaR's great appeal, and its great selling point 
to people who do not happen to be quants, is that it expresses risk 
as a single number, a dollar figure, no less.

VaR isn't one model but rather a group of related models that share a 
mathematical framework. In its most common form, it measures the 
boundaries of risk in a portfolio over short durations, assuming a 
"normal" market. For instance, if you have $50 million of weekly VaR, 
that means that over the course of the next week, there is a 99 
percent chance that your portfolio won't lose more than $50 million. 
That portfolio could consist of equities, bonds, derivatives or all 
of the above; one reason VaR became so popular is that it is the only 
commonly used risk measure that can be applied to just about any 
asset class. And it takes into account a head-spinning variety of 
variables, including diversification, leverage and volatility, that 
make up the kind of market risk that traders and firms face every day.

Another reason VaR is so appealing is that it can measure both 
individual risks - the amount of risk contained in a single trader's 
portfolio, for instance - and firmwide risk, which it does by 
combining the VaRs of a given firm's trading desks and coming up with 
a net number. Top executives usually know their firm's daily VaR 
within minutes of the market's close.

Risk managers use VaR to quantify their firm's risk positions to 
their board. In the late 1990s, as the use of derivatives was 
exploding, the Securities and Exchange Commission ruled that firms 
had to include a quantitative disclosure of market risks in their 
financial statements for the convenience of investors, and VaR became 
the main tool for doing so. Around the same time, an important 
international rule-making body, the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, went even further to validate VaR by saying that firms 
and banks could rely on their own internal VaR calculations to set 
their capital requirements. So long as their VaR was reasonably low, 
the amount of money they had to set aside to cover risks that might 
go bad could also be low.

Given the calamity that has since occurred, there has been a great 
deal of talk, even in quant circles, that this widespread 
institutional reliance on VaR was a terrible mistake. At the very 
least, the risks that VaR measured did not include the biggest risk 
of all: the possibility of a financial meltdown. "Risk modeling 
didn't help as much as it should have," says Aaron Brown, a former 
risk manager at Morgan Stanley who now works at AQR, a big 
quant-oriented hedge fund. A risk consultant named Marc Groz says, 
"VaR is a very limited tool." David Einhorn, who founded Greenlight 
Capital, a prominent hedge fund, wrote not long ago that VaR was 
"relatively useless as a risk-management tool and potentially 
catastrophic when its use creates a false sense of security among 
senior managers and watchdogs. This is like an air bag that works all 
the time, except when you have a car accident." Nassim Nicholas 
Taleb, the best-selling author of "The Black Swan," has crusaded 
against VaR for more than a decade. He calls it, flatly, "a fraud."

How then do we account for that story that made the rounds in the 
summer of 2007? It concerns Goldman Sachs, the one Wall Street firm 
that was not, at that time, taking a hit for billions of dollars of 
suddenly devalued mortgage-backed securities. Reporters wanted to 
understand how Goldman had somehow sidestepped the disaster that had 
befallen everyone else. What they discovered was that in December 
2006, Goldman's various indicators, including VaR and other risk 
models, began suggesting that something was wrong. Not hugely wrong, 
mind you, but wrong enough to warrant a closer look.

...

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/04/magazine/04risk-t.html


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