Legendary commander tells story of shuttle's close call
BY WILLIAM HARWOOD
STORY WRITTEN FOR CBS NEWS "SPACE PLACE" & USED WITH PERMISSION
Posted: March 27, 2009
http://www.spaceflightnow.com/shuttle/sts119/090327sts27/

The exhaustive attention NASA now devotes to making sure shuttle heat 
shields are damage-free and safe for re-entry is a direct result of the 
2003 Columbia disaster. But a blacked-out military flight 21 years ago 
still stands out as a warning to astronauts, engineers and managers, a 
frightening "close call" that had the potential to bring the shuttle 
program to an early end.

It was that close.
 
"I will never forget, we hung the (robot) arm over the right wing, we 
panned it to the (damage) location and took a look and I said to myself, 
'we are going to die,'" recalled legendary shuttle commander Robert 
"Hoot" Gibson. "There was so much damage. I looked at that stuff and I 
said, 'oh, holy smokes, this looks horrible, this looks awful.'"

He was seeing the worst tile damage any shuttle had ever experienced.

But a perfect storm of poor communications, caused in part by military 
restrictions that prevented the crew from downlinking clear images 
showing scores of chipped and broken tiles, ultimately resulted in a 
flawed analysis on the ground that indicated the crew had nothing to 
worry about. Flight controllers were not convinced the shuttle was 
seriously damaged at all. Some engineers apparently believed the 
astronauts had been misled by poor lighting conditions and grainy TV images.

The crew knew better. The images were crystal clear on the shuttle, and 
definitely alarming. But the astronauts reluctantly accepted the 
judgment of mission control and went on about their business. The 
mission still stands out as an example of how assumptions, poor 
communications and an unwillingness to challenge authority can put 
people in danger in high-risk endeavors like spaceflight.

"There was a big failure to communicate," Gibson recalled in an 
interview this week. "When you talk about crew resource management, or 
cockpit resource management or any of that resource management stuff, 
it's real easy to be talking and not communicating. In order to be 
really communicating, you've got to say 'here is what's on my mind.' I 
think I was doing that to a major degree, but maybe I fell short by not 
arguing with them. But they really did not tell us what was on their minds."

Gibson, a former Navy test pilot, "Top Gun" graduate, chief astronaut 
and veteran of five shuttle missions, was at the controls when the 
shuttle Atlantis blasted off Dec. 2, 1988, on the second post-Challenger 
mission. Carrying a top-secret spy satellite, the mission was fully 
classified and all communications with the astronauts were blacked out.
 
But 85 seconds after launch, a piece of insulation on the tip of the 
shuttle's right-side solid-fuel booster broke away and struck Atlantis' 
right side. The impact was not noted on NASA television at the time and 
after landing, NASA engineers said that while the shuttle had suffered 
more tile damage than usual, "it isn't something that's of a major concern."

But as it turned out, the damage was, in fact, extensive. More than 700 
heat shield tiles were damaged. One tile on the shuttle's belly near the 
nose was completely missing and the underlying metal - a thick mounting 
plate that helped anchor an antenna - was partially melted. In a 
slightly different location, the missing tile could have resulted in a 
catastrophic burn through.

It was the most extensive shuttle heat shield damage ever recorded until 
Columbia took off on its final voyage.

Years later, Gibson would be asked to brief the Columbia Accident 
Investigation Board about his experiences aboard Atlantis and as the 
tale was told, "their jaws dropped," he said.

Crewmate Mike Mullane devoted a chapter to the mission in his book 
"Riding Rockets: The Outrageous Tales of a Space Shuttle Astronaut," 
writing that as entry approached, "the anxiety was exhausting."

"I finally gave in to Hoot's solution. The day before (entry), as he 
floated to the windows to do some sightseeing, he said, 'no reason to 
die all tensed up.' I would do my best to relax and enjoy the sights."

Even so, he wrote, during Atlantis' descent "I had visions of molten 
aluminum being smeared backward like rain on a windshield."

Gibson, Mullane, pilot Guy Gardner, Jerry Ross and William Shepherd had 
no idea Atlantis had been hit during ascent. It was not until the next 
day that mission control called up with an unusual request. The crew was 
asked to use Atlantis' robot arm to inspect the shuttle's heat shield on 
the ship's right side.

Mullane, the arm operator, dutifully carried out a procedure to maneuver 
the arm into position so a black-and-white television camera on the end 
could "see" the tiles in question.

"As I moved the arm lower the camera picked up streaks of white," he 
wrote in "Riding Rockets." "There was no mistaking what they were. ... 
As I continued to drop the arm lower we could see that at least one tile 
had been completely blasted from the fuselage. The white streaking grew 
thicker and faded aft beyond the view of the camera. It appeared that 
hundreds of tiles had been damaged and the scars extended outboard 
toward the carbon-composite panels on the leading edge of the wing. Had 
one of those been penetrated? If so, se were dead men floating."

Gibson, who flew for Southwest Airlines for years after retiring from 
NASA, recalled his impressions as the images snapped onto TV monitors in 
Atlantis' cockpit and his immediate "we are going to die" reaction.

"So I get on the mic and I call Houston and I tell them, Houston, we are 
seeing a whole lot of damage on the right wing, in the chine area and 
back on the right wing in the tiles. ... The ground comes back and says 
well, you know what, we need you guys to send us secure TV."

Because the mission was classified, no pictures or television were being 
downlinked, even to mission control. When the decision was made to send 
down TV images of the tile damage, the video had to be encrypted."

"So we send them secure TV," Gibson said. "The problem with secure TV 
is, it takes a frame, it encrypts it, it ships that frame, it takes the 
next frame, it encrypts it, it ships the next one, so you get a frame 
about every three seconds."

While the astronauts beamed down the images, Gibson was thinking the worse.

"I think the words 'we're in deep doo doo' were said in the cockpit, 
this could be a problem, guys, you know? This looks bad. Now you know, I 
didn't really think at that instant, yep, we're as good as dead, write 
our wills and all that stuff. But I did look at it and say 'holy smokes, 
we are going to die' to myself.'"

The astronauts anxiously waited for mission control's assessment. And 
they were stunned when the ground called back.
 
"We've looked at the images and mechanical says it's not a problem," the 
mission control CAPCOM said, according to Mullane. "The damage isn't 
that severe."

"We couldn't believe what we were hearing," Mullane wrote. "MCC was 
blowing us off."

Gibson then chimed in, saying "Houston, Mike is right. We're seeing a 
lot of damage."

But mission control repeated the engineering assessment that the damage 
was not that severe.

"I'm just perplexed at this point," Gibson said. "Because I'd never seen 
anything like this before. Never seen anything even close, and I'd been 
there since before day one. ... He came back and he said 'Hoot, they've 
looked at it and they've determined that it's not any worse than what 
we've seen on other flights.' And I am just perplexed. I think I was 
silent for maybe 30 seconds, because I didn't know what to say. And I 
came back and I said something to the effect that well, all right. It 
looks pretty bad to us, but you guys are the experts, so OK.

"And I honestly believed at that point, the rest of my crew said, 'Oh, 
OK, great, no problem.' I did not. I did not believe them. I didn't want 
to argue with them, I didn't want to have a long drawn-out argument over 
the air, but I suppose I was probably remiss to some degree because I 
didn't quiz them some more."

Of course, it's not clear what, if anything, could have been done if 
engineers had realized the severity of the problem. There were no tile 
repair tools on board the shuttle and no techniques for even getting an 
astronaut to the damage site. Changes to the shuttle's re-entry 
orientation and trajectory could have been attempted, Gibson said, but 
whether anything like that would have worked is an unknown.

The real issue for Gibson - and the same issue was faced Columbia's crew 
- was that no one took the extra step to make sure the problem was fully 
resolved.

"NASA does amazing things when they've got their back against the wall," 
he said. "Like Apollo 13. I've seen us work out some really dramatic 
things in some of the missions when we had on-orbit problems and we did 
in-flight maintenance and things like that. You never know what you 
could have done because you didn't try."

Hoping for the best, Gibson and Gardner fired Atlantis' twin braking 
rockets on Dec. 6 to begin the shuttle's fiery descent to a landing at 
Edwards Air Force Base, Calif. The astronauts did not discuss any fears 
they may have had, but as the shuttle fell into the discernible 
atmosphere, Gibson kept his eyes on a gauge that showed how much the 
elevons at the back of each wing were deflected.

"I knew that what would happen was, if we started to burn through we 
would change the drag on that wing," he said, "which is exactly what 
happened to Columbia. We would change the drag on the right wing and 
what we'd see happening is, we'd start seeing right elevon trim, you'd 
start seeing right aileron, if you will, trim, which means putting down 
the left elevon, moving the left elevon down.

"I knew we would start developing a split (between right and left wing 
elevon positions) if we had excessive drag over on the right side. The 
automatic system would try to trim it out with the elevons. That is one 
of the things we always watched on re-entry anyhow, because ... if you 
had half a degree of trim, something was wrong, you had a bunch of 
something going on if you had even half a degree. Normally, you wouldn't 
see even a quarter of a degree of difference on the thing.

"So I knew that that's what I was going to see if it started to go," 
Gibson said. "And therefore, that told me that I'd have at least 60 
seconds to tell mission control what I thought of their analysis."

But as it turned out, Atlantis did not suffer a burn through and Gibson 
guided the shuttle to a smooth landing at Edwards. Gathered on the 
runway after touchdown, the astronauts, engineers and NASA managers were 
astonished at what they saw.

"The damage was much worse than any of us had expected," Mullane wrote. 
"Technicians would eventually count 700 damaged tiles extending along 
half of Atlantis's length. It was by far the greatest heat shield damage 
recorded to date."

During debriefing after the mission, Gibson finally learned why the 
engineering community had not taken the crew's descriptions of the 
damage more seriously.

"Their conclusion, which they did not pass back to us, was 'oh, you know 
what? That's not tile damage, those are just lights and shadows we're 
seeing in this video.' So in other words, the resolution on the 
encrypted video was that bad that they based a conclusion on it that was 
in gross error. ... If I had said hey, I think this is important enough 
for us to break the encryption and send you guys clear video, oh, it 
would have been pandemonium down there at DOD. But in hindsight, oh man, 
that's what we should have done. Because they were drawing an incorrect 
conclusion from it and they were not telling us what their conclusion was."

Wayne Hale, a veteran ascent-entry flight director and former shuttle 
program manager at the Johnson Space Center, agreed engineers were 
caught off guard by the severity of the damage when they finally saw the 
shuttle on the runway.

"We were struggling in those days to try to maintain the security 
classification, so on and so forth," Hale said in a telephone interview. 
"When the crew reported they saw this stuff, we had a long negotiation 
as I recall with the customer to say well, can we look at the TV? 
Because we weren't supposed to see any TV from on orbit. (They said) 
absolutely not. Could we look at the bottom side of the shuttle? That 
was the agreement, that we could, but we used this special slow-scan TV. 
And it was grainy.

"People were concerned, I suppose, but not nearly at the level that we 
would be today. And STS-27 has always been the worst tile damage flight 
we ever had. It set all the reference marks. It's interesting that there 
is enough capability in that thermal protection system to take that kind 
of damage and survive."

Reflecting on what Hale agreed "was a real close call," Gibson said he 
believes NASA came close to losing the crew and along with it, the 
shuttle program. STS-27 was only the second flight after the Challenger 
disaster and unlike Columbia, the shuttle re-entered over the Pacific 
Ocean for a descent to Edwards. Had Atlantis been lost, most of the 
wreckage would have sunk and engineers might never have discovered the 
cause.

"We had spent all that money and all that time rebuilding and revamping 
and we launched one successful mission, we lost the very next one," 
Gibson said. "I think the Congress would have said OK, that's the end 
guys, we just don't need to do this again. I think that just would have 
been the end of it."

-- 

Gregory S. Williams
gregwilliams(at)knology.net
k4hsm(at)knology.net

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