DFC: MS & Nintendo Have a Golden Opportunity 
http://biz.gamedaily.com/industry/feature/?id=13257


Following his last video game industry column, "Could Sony Go from First to
Worst?" DFC Intelligence President David Cole (right) takes a look at why
Sony could very well end up in third place for overall market share in the
next generation.
 
For the past ten years Sony Computer Entertainment (SCE) has been the king
of the video game market. The first PlayStation (PSOne) and PlayStation 2
(PS2) platforms were THE platforms on which the leading third party
publishers made the majority of their revenues. For third party publishers
other game platforms had become of secondary consideration to the Sony
driven gravy train. Even in 2006, the PS2 continues to sell the most units
at retail.

DFC Intelligence has always said that as the dominant market leader, SCE was
largely in control of its own fate. Microsoft and Nintendo had to hope Sony
fumbled or significantly changed its strategy so that they could get an
opportunity to capture some of that PS2 audience. Now it is clear Sony is
handing its competitors a golden opportunity. 

DFC Intelligence has just released a 600 page report with our latest
forecast for the interactive entertainment industry. In this report we
predict several different scenarios for the individual game systems. We
emphasize that there is a great deal of uncertainty because much will depend
on how individual players execute their strategies over the next several
years. However, two things are clear: 1) the high price of the PlayStation 3
is going to slow overall industry growth, especially for software and 2) if
Sony does not change its current strategy for the PS3 the system will
probably end up in third place in installed base. Microsoft and Nintendo
have been handed that golden opportunity and both companies have a chance to
make their systems the market leader. However, it looks like under any
scenario the video game market is going to be severely fragmented, with
several incompatible platforms having strong market share and even the
possibility of a platform doing well in one region and struggling in
another.

As we have mentioned in past briefs, the big concern with Sony is not only
the PlayStation 3 launch price, but the signs that Sony has gotten itself
into a business model that is not conducive to the mass market video game
audience. There has been a lot of talk about positioning the PS3 as not just
a video game system, or even entertainment system, but instead as a computer
system.

In fact, SCE chief executive Ken Kutaragi told Japanese computer magazine PC
Watch in June 2006 that the PS3 is a computer, not a game console. Kutaragi
was quoted as saying "we don't say it's a game console, the PS3 is clearly a
computer unlike PlayStations so far." In other words, Kutaragi no longer
sees the PlayStation brand centered on a specific hardware configuration
that has a life of five to seven years, during which time that hardware is
steadily reduced in price as production becomes more efficient. Kutaragi
views the PS3 as a computer platform that evolves with new features and
capabilities on a constant basis. Kutaragi was further quoted as saying
"Since PS3 is a computer there are no 'models' but configurations. We'll
want to upgrade the hard drive size very soon. If new standards appear on
the PC, we will want to support them. We may want the Blu-ray drive to
write. In the PC business, if you fix the spec for two years you'll be
caught by competitors. Computers should be changing, right? It's inevitable
that 60GB hard drive will become too small, and memory may become too small
as well."

The problem with that computer strategy is that it means prices do not come
down. By fixing its hardware standard for several years, video game console
systems have been able to significantly lower prices over time by not having
to upgrade to the latest technology. Kutaragi has also talked about what he
sees in common between the PS3 and current Apple Computer philosophy and
products. There is clearly a little envy behind such quotes from Kutaragi
like: "If Mr. Jobs adds an Apple logo to the PS3, I think users will say it
can be sold at $2,000. However it's not possible for the PlayStation brand.
That is the difference in the computer world between the PlayStation brand
and the Apple brand."

We would point out that another major difference between Apple and the
PlayStation brand is that the PlayStation 2 had a share of over 60% of the
video game console market, while Apple's computer market share has hovered
in the 2-3% range. We believe that under Kutargai's techno-elite PlayStation
3 strategy, the PlayStation 3 could end up with a market share more
resembling Apple products as opposed to the dominant PlayStation 2 market
share.

In other words, we think that for the PlayStation 3 to maintain Sony's
number one market share position, Sony will have to shift the current stated
strategy of SCE. It should be remembered that SCE is only one part of the
much larger Sony Corporation entity. Ten years ago SCE was a non-factor for
Sony overall, but the video game business has now become very important.
Over the past five years, SCE's video game business has averaged about $7.4
billion in annual revenue and brought in average annual operating income of
around $500 million. Can Sony afford to lose this video game business in
order to go after the smaller base of elite consumers?

Right now the PlayStation 3 could be considered a relatively inexpensive
part of a household looking to go to a high definition system. Consider this
mid-level high-definition home theater budget:

High-definition television: $2,500

Stereo Receiver: $600

Speakers: $1,200

Cables: $400

Installation and Calibration: $1,000

Movie/CD/Game Player: $600

Under this budget, a PlayStation 3 is a fairly small line item in what is a
$6,000+ take out a home equity line of credit project. Kutaragi is right,
for this consumer the PS3 is a bargain. However, we must ask how big that
consumer base is and if these are the type of consumers shopping for
bargains. Furthermore, when we are talking about Sony's video game base we
are looking at a worldwide business. Consumers in markets like Europe lag
behind the U.S. when it comes to spending thousands on a new home
entertainment system.

Take for an example, Valencia, the third largest city in Spain. Walk into an
El Corte Ingles (Spain's flagship retailer) or FNAC (a leading media
entertainment retailer) in Valencia and you will see about 67% of video game
shelf space given over to Sony products, with another 25% reserved for
Nintendo's portable game systems. Valencia even has entire Sony Stores
devoted to Sony products. The PlayStation 2 practically defines mass market
video games in Spain (and much of Europe) with its casual party franchises
like Singstar and Buzz. In other words, Sony has been absolutely dominant in
Spain and most of Europe. All that is now at risk with Sony's PlayStation 3
strategy. Sony's new approach seems to be to position its products as luxury
items, epitomized by a recent ad in a French high fashion magazine which
features a PSP dripping with diamonds.

At 600 euro, the PS3 would be more than 35% of the monthly household income
of a family in Valencia. Combined with the 2000 euro for an HDTV that could
take advantage of Blu-Ray and four games, the total cost could top 15% of a
family yearly income. On a per person basis, that would be almost 40% of an
adult Valencian's average income. Consumers in much of Europe (and North
America as well) simply aren't ready for that type of expenditure and
success for Sony will require that 1) they can keep the PlayStation 2
business alive and slow consumer adoption of new systems and 2) they can
make the price more affordable. However, as the chart below shows, even
under the best case scenario the PlayStation 3 has a much lower installed
base than the PlayStation 2. Under the worst case scenario the bottom falls
out for Sony's market share. 
So while Sony struggles with positioning issues Microsoft and Nintendo are
free to try and build a solid base of actual video game players. The good
news is that for both companies, under any scenario, DFC forecasts that the
Microsoft Xbox 360 and Nintendo Wii will have a larger installed base than
their respective predecessors. However, we think the company with the
biggest opportunity is Nintendo. With a market leading price and a
compelling mass market message the Wii has the opportunity to be the market
share leader in all major regions.

The Xbox 360 also has an opportunity to be the overall market share leader,
but we think the system will generally be stronger in North America than in
Europe or Japan. In fact, even under the best case scenario for the Xbox 360
we predict the system will finish third in Japan while being the number one
system worldwide.

Other potential issues that concern us with the Xbox 360 have been
Microsoft's struggles to break out beyond the hard-core gamer and the
significant losses that the company has been forced to take to build market
share. Microsoft could become bogged down in efforts to reach out to the
mass market via casual games, portable games and other areas that could
distract from the overall Xbox 360 business.

On the other hand Nintendo has almost nowhere to go but up with the Wii.
Since the 8-bit NES from the 1980s, Nintendo console hardware systems have
sold less and less. Now is the time for Nintendo to turn that around. In the
last generation, the casual mass market game audience by and large went with
the PlayStation 2. The GameCube was stuck with the loyal Nintendo diehard
base. Now with the Wii, Nintendo has the chance to keep its loyal base and
expand into a much more mass market audience. By letting Sony and Microsoft
split the hard-core teenage/twenty something video game marketplace, the Wii
could end up number one in market share for the next generation.

Not surprisingly, under all our scenarios, market fragmentation is a big
theme. For the past five years, the PlayStation 2 has been a steady platform
that provided a solid worldwide base for software publishers. Sony's
strategy is utterly dependent on keeping the PlayStation 2 around for as
long as possible and hoping mass market consumers hold-off on upgrading.
However slowing the future can be difficult. For a consumer there are all
types of choices for playing games: portable games, online games, old
console systems, new console systems and so on. The console system remains
the largest segment of the overall market, but its importance is clearly
declining. Over the next two years we will see which companies can weather
the eventual decline by diversifying beyond the PlayStation business.


Gregory S. Williams
[EMAIL PROTECTED]



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