FYI…

Fahd Batayneh
ICANN

Date: Thursday, September 28, 2017 at 8:32 PM
Subject: ICANN News Alert -- KSK Rollover Postponed

[ANN]<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.icann.org_&d=DwMFaQ&c=FmY1u3PJp6wrcrwll3mSVzgfkbPSS6sJms7xcl4I5cM&r=pu7jN3q1ZBfuo7H0_TGgnLZ6DmTKXODkmnlRRHjLLAY&m=zZOyRmEZ5q9Oj5CE6i87JmhRlkz6r5tpNLHmMDWcpqU&s=nA4sOn7RqVXNpI4bbzS9tySxVTVLqG-YgFFbH_gY5U0&e=>
News Alert

https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2017-09-27-en<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.icann.org_news_announcement-2D2017-2D09-2D27-2Den&d=DwMFaQ&c=FmY1u3PJp6wrcrwll3mSVzgfkbPSS6sJms7xcl4I5cM&r=pu7jN3q1ZBfuo7H0_TGgnLZ6DmTKXODkmnlRRHjLLAY&m=zZOyRmEZ5q9Oj5CE6i87JmhRlkz6r5tpNLHmMDWcpqU&s=0ba0JEbAGJPvq_HqJl7Alm2ThK3HqpEXCIpeg11ZUfg&e=>

________________________________
KSK Rollover Postponed

27 September 2017

The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers ("ICANN") today 
announced that the plan to change the cryptographic 
key<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.icann.org_resources_pages_ksk-2Drollover_-23overview&d=DwMFaQ&c=FmY1u3PJp6wrcrwll3mSVzgfkbPSS6sJms7xcl4I5cM&r=pu7jN3q1ZBfuo7H0_TGgnLZ6DmTKXODkmnlRRHjLLAY&m=zZOyRmEZ5q9Oj5CE6i87JmhRlkz6r5tpNLHmMDWcpqU&s=OCEmbF3jQTXtgLOZdcZzauCXO3faSLEByembATOUJgQ&e=>
 that helps protect the Domain Name System (DNS) is being postponed.

Changing the key involves generating a new cryptographic key pair and 
distributing the new public component to the Domain Name System Security 
Extensions (DNSSEC)-validating resolvers. Based on the estimated number of 
Internet users who use DNSSEC validating resolvers, an estimated one-in-four 
global Internet users, or 750 million people, could be affected by the KSK 
rollover.

The changing or "rolling" of the KSK Key was originally scheduled to occur on 
11 October, but it is being delayed because some recently obtained data shows 
that a significant number of resolvers used by Internet Service Providers 
(ISPs) and Network Operators are not yet ready for the Key Rollover. The 
availability of this new data is due to a very recent DNS protocol feature that 
adds the ability for a resolver to report back to the root servers which keys 
it has configured.

There may be multiple reasons why operators do not have the new key installed 
in their systems: some may not have their resolver software properly configured 
and a recently discovered issue in one widely used resolver program appears to 
not be automatically updating the key as it should, for reasons that are still 
being explored.

ICANN is reaching out to its community, including its Security and Stability 
Advisory Committee, the Regional Internet Registries, Network Operator Groups 
and others to help explore and resolve the issues.

In the meantime, ICANN believes it prudent to follow its process and to delay 
the changing of the key rather than run the risk of a significant number of 
Internet users being adversely affected by the changing of the key. ICANN is 
committed to continuing its education, communication and engagement with the 
relevant technical organizations to ensure readiness for the key change.

"The security, stability and resiliency of the domain name system is our core 
mission. We would rather proceed cautiously and reasonably, than continue with 
the roll on the announced date of 11 October," said Göran Marby. "It would be 
irresponsible to proceed with the roll after we have identified these new 
issues that could adversely affect its success and could adversely affect the 
ability of a significant number of end users."

A new date for the Key Roll has not yet been determined. ICANN's Office of the 
Chief Technology Officer says it is tentatively hoping to reschedule the Key 
Roll for the first quarter of 2018, but that it will be dependent on more fully 
understanding the new information and mitigating as many potential failures as 
possible.

ICANN will provide additional information as it becomes available and the new 
Key Roll date will be announced as appropriate.

"It's our hope that network operators will use this additional time period to 
be certain that their systems are ready for the Key Roll," said Marby. "Our 
testing platform 
(http://go.icann.org/KSKtest<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__go.icann.org_KSKtest&d=DwMFaQ&c=FmY1u3PJp6wrcrwll3mSVzgfkbPSS6sJms7xcl4I5cM&r=pu7jN3q1ZBfuo7H0_TGgnLZ6DmTKXODkmnlRRHjLLAY&m=zZOyRmEZ5q9Oj5CE6i87JmhRlkz6r5tpNLHmMDWcpqU&s=f_HUZq23UgNC7RlFBn_7mhEg6sbEwSqhP_1631oqJS0&e=>)
 will help operators ensure that their resolvers are properly configured with 
the new key and we will continue our engagement and communications to these 
operators."

About DNSSEC

To easily identify resources on the Internet, the underlying numerical 
addresses for these resources are represented by human readable strings. The 
conversion of these strings to numbers is done by the distributed hierarchical 
Domain Name System (DNS). Increased sophistication in computing and networking 
since its design in 1983 have made this "phone book" vulnerable to attacks. In 
response to these threats, the international standards organization, 
IETF<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.ietf.org_&d=DwMFaQ&c=FmY1u3PJp6wrcrwll3mSVzgfkbPSS6sJms7xcl4I5cM&r=pu7jN3q1ZBfuo7H0_TGgnLZ6DmTKXODkmnlRRHjLLAY&m=zZOyRmEZ5q9Oj5CE6i87JmhRlkz6r5tpNLHmMDWcpqU&s=jAvTC56Jr-65I87o_WYH_RIX5HdwXHjZe1bp0vWjnTI&e=>,
 developed DNSSEC to cryptographically ensure DNS content cannot be modified 
from its source without being detected. Once fully deployed, DNSSEC will stop 
the attacker's ability to redirect users using the DNS.

##

To keep informed about KSK Rollover developments go here: 
https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/ksk-rollover<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.icann.org_resources_pages_ksk-2Drollover&d=DwMFaQ&c=FmY1u3PJp6wrcrwll3mSVzgfkbPSS6sJms7xcl4I5cM&r=pu7jN3q1ZBfuo7H0_TGgnLZ6DmTKXODkmnlRRHjLLAY&m=zZOyRmEZ5q9Oj5CE6i87JmhRlkz6r5tpNLHmMDWcpqU&s=gBuamOSmVOoYcpcE1STpuuD-x4PpY7B0QH934kOlXYU&e=>

On social media use: #Keyroll
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