In response to feedback from operational security communities, CAIDA's source address validation measurement project (https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which we received packets with a spoofed source address. We are publishing these reports to network and security operations lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational contacts in these ASes.
This report summarises tests conducted within are, bhr, egy, irn, irq, jor, kwt, lbn, omn, pse, qat, sau, syr, tur, yem. Inferred improvements during Jun 2019: none inferred Source Address Validation issues inferred during Jun 2019: ASN Name First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed 8452 TE 2016-09-23 2019-06-05 43754 ASIATECH 2017-02-06 2019-06-17 9038 BAT-AS9038 2018-09-19 2019-06-24 15802 DU-AS1 2018-09-22 2019-06-29 57474 Nazhin 2019-05-15 2019-06-25 48292 CIKLET 2019-06-26 2019-06-26 Further information for these tests where we received spoofed packets is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.php?country_include=are,bhr,egy,irn,irq,jor,kwt,lbn,omn,pse,qat,sau,syr,tur,yem&no_block=1 Please send any feedback or suggestions to [email protected] _______________________________________________ Menog mailing list [email protected] http://lists.menog.org/mailman/listinfo/menog
