In response to feedback from operational security communities, CAIDA's source address validation measurement project (https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which we received packets with a spoofed source address. We are publishing these reports to network and security operations lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational contacts in these ASes.
This report summarises tests conducted within are, bhr, egy, irn, irq, jor, kwt, lbn, omn, pse, qat, sau, syr, tur, yem. Inferred improvements during Jul 2019: ASN Name Fixed-By 41689 FCP-NETWORK 2019-07-10 44375 AISDP 2019-07-10 48292 CIKLET 2019-07-10 202365 2019-07-10 Further information for the inferred remediation is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/remedy.php Source Address Validation issues inferred during Jul 2019: ASN Name First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed 51559 NETINTERNET 2017-05-30 2019-07-31 9038 BAT-AS9038 2018-09-19 2019-07-30 15802 DU-AS1 2018-09-22 2019-07-20 58224 TCI 2018-10-22 2019-07-29 25124 DATAK 2019-07-09 2019-07-09 202365 2019-07-10 2019-07-16 Further information for these tests where we received spoofed packets is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.php?country_include=are,bhr,egy,irn,irq,jor,kwt,lbn,omn,pse,qat,sau,syr,tur,yem&no_block=1 Please send any feedback or suggestions to [email protected] _______________________________________________ Menog mailing list [email protected] http://lists.menog.org/mailman/listinfo/menog
