In response to feedback from operational security communities, CAIDA's source address validation measurement project (https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which we received packets with a spoofed source address. We are publishing these reports to network and security operations lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational contacts in these ASes.
This report summarises tests conducted within are, bhr, egy, irn, irq, jor, kwt, lbn, omn, pse, qat, sau, syr, tur, yem. Inferred improvements during Jul 2020: none inferred Source Address Validation issues inferred during Jul 2020: ASN Name First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed 8452 TE 2016-09-23 2020-07-20 34296 MILLENICOM 2017-04-28 2020-07-23 15802 DU-AS1 2018-09-22 2020-07-01 202365 Chronos 2019-07-10 2020-07-27 21419 PISHTAZEJADIDINFOMRATION 2020-07-20 2020-07-20 28885 OMANTEL-NAP 2020-07-22 2020-07-22 Further information for these tests where we received spoofed packets is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.php?country_include=are,bhr,egy,irn,irq,jor,kwt,lbn,omn,pse,qat,sau,syr,tur,yem&no_block=1 Please send any feedback or suggestions to [email protected] _______________________________________________ Menog mailing list [email protected] http://lists.menog.org/mailman/listinfo/menog
